BERKELEY BAPTIST DIVINITY SCHOOL LIBRARY

October, 1935 Vol. XII. No 4.

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

CONTENTS

PAGE

NATURALISM, ETHICS AND THEOLOGY. Eugene W. Lyman 321

THE BARTHIAN ETHICS. Albert C. Knudson 331

THE LESSON OF MÜNSTER. W. O. Lewis, Ph. D. 348

SHOULD AMERICA EVER GO TO WAR AGAIN? Oliver C. Horsman 357

A GREAT TIME FOR THE PREACHER. John Milton Moore, D. D. 364

THE HUMANIST CONCEPTION OF SALVATION. Charles S. Braden, Ph. D. 378

THE EDICT OF NANTES, THE 250TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS REVOCATION. Henry J. Cowell 387

EDITORIAL NOTES 390

BOOK REVIEWS 393

BOOKS RECEIVED 411

INDEX 413

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

THE CROZER QUARTERLY is published by the Faculty of Crozer Theological Seminary, with the aid of funds provided by the Trustees. THE QUARTERLY aims to be a journal for the expression of theological opinion, embracing all the interests of students of religion, whether ministers, teachers, or laymen. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed, publication indicating that the editors regard the articles as voicing opinions important enough to command attention.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE, Editor.
RITTENHOUSE NEISSER, Business Manager.

Editorial communications, contributions and books for review should be sent to

THE EDITOR, THE CROZER QUARTERLY
Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pa.

Remittances and business communications should be addressed to

THE BUSINESS MANAGER, THE CROZER QUARTERLY
Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pa.

Requests for catalogues and communications regarding courses in the Seminary should be addressed to

PRESIDENT JAMES H. FRANKLIN
Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pa.

Subscription, $1.50 the year; single numbers, 40 cents

Printed for the Crozer Theological Seminary by
THE JUDSON PRESS
Philadelphia, Pa.

Entered as second-class matter, December 21, 1923, at the post-office at Chester, Pa., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized December 21, 1923.

Copyright, October, 1935, by Crozer Theological Seminary.

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Vol. XII OCTOBER, 1935 No. 4

NATURALISM, ETHICS AND THEOLOGY [1]

EUGENE W. LYMAN

Union Theological Seminary

EACH of the terms in this title can be taken to represent a view of truth and reality which absorbs into itself what the other two terms stand for. Naturalism has come to realize that in its older forms it completely failed to do justice to ethics and religion. Hence the new naturalism of today is concerned to retrieve this failure. This is especially true of the most influential form of the new naturalism, the "empirical naturalism" of John Dewey. Dewey subsumes ethics under naturalism, and while he must repudiate theology as being supernaturalistic, he undertakes to do justice to all that is valid in religious experience.

Ethics, of course, denotes primarily a special discipline rather than a comprehensive view of truth and reality. But when it is supported by the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, it becomes the only doorway to metaphysics and thus supplies the dominating principles of a world-view. The world of nature becomes a phenomenal world, and religious experience is not a source of metaphysical knowledge. This ascendancy of ethics by means of the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason is attacked by both the new naturalism and the new German theology. Naturalism gives a genetic account of the moral consciousness. It asks: "How do we come by the notions about conduct which conscience makes so authoritative?" And by such an inquiry it holds that the claims of the practical reason to be the prime source of metaphysical truth are broken down. The new German theology, being a thoroughgoing supernaturalism, finds in the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason one of the chief phases in the development of humanism. It holds that this doctrine tends to nourish humanism's confidence in the self-sufficiency of man, with the result that in the end humanism substitutes faith in man for faith in God, and belief in progress through man's intelligent control of nature and history for salvation by the grace of God. I am not here admitting that the Kantian ethics

[1] A paper read before The American Theological Society.

logically merges into humanism, nor that it must capitulate before a genetic account of the moral consciousness. I am merely pointing out that this attack on two flanks is an indirect testimony to the fact that in the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason we have a world-view which claims to be an adequate interpreter of nature and of the truths of religion.

As for the third term in our theme, theology, its historic claim is that it is the queen of the sciences, and it is doubtful whether theology has ever sincerely abdicated that claim. Under the pressure of secular modernism it may have acquiesced in being the kind of monarch who rules but does not govern, but it is always ready to move, whenever a favorable moment occurs, towards the reestablishment of its powers. The rise of the new naturalism is such a favorable moment and prompts theology to reassert the claims of supernaturalism. The vulnerability of humanism in view of our present cultural crisis is another such favorable moment, which impels at least the new German theology to affirm the impotence of reason, including the practical reason, in respect to the ultimate questions of existence and to insist that not only is salvation by faith alone but truth, in ultimate matters, is also by faith alone. Thus the Kantian autonomy for ethics and heteronomy for theology is reversed. Theology gains an absolutism which reduces ethics to a state of heteronomy and which disposes completely of naturalism through adopting an irrationalist theory of knowledge.

Our problem, then, can be expressed in terms of these rival claims to sovereignty in regard to the nature of truth and reality. Shall natural science be queen in determining our world-view? Or is the categorical imperative the sole imperator in metaphysics? Or is theology to be reaffirmed as queen of the sciences, and if so, shall it be with unqualified absoluteness? Or again, our problem may be expressed by asking: Shall our all-inclusive idea be Nature? Or shall our all-controlling idea be the Moral Law? Or shall that idea be Divine Sovereignty?

I

First, let us briefly examine the empirical naturalism of John Dewey to see by what means it carries through its enterprise of doing justice to ethics and to religious experience on the basis of comprising all reality under the concept of Nature.

In his autobiographical statement in *Contemporary American Philosophy* Dewey says he came to regard it as an intellectual scandal that there should be a dualism in method "between something called 'science' on the one hand and something called 'morals' on the other." (Vol. II, p. 23.) This dualism he has sought to overcome by his method of

" instrumentalism." Now Dewey's instrumentalism, as we know, presupposes man as a biological individual interacting with his environment. Biology is thus made to bridge the gap between physics and ethics, and when this is done Dewey holds that ethics can be brought under the control of the natural science method.

The result of this procedure is that Dewey interprets all values in terms of natural desires and their causes and consequences. Of value as such, he says, there can be no theory at all. Reflective thought cannot find any standard of value; all it can do is to try to harmonize and make as enduring as possible the immediate values of natural desire. (See *Experience and Nature,* Ch. X.) This results in Dewey's well-known relativism in the field of ethics. But on the basis of such relativism it is difficult to see why, for example, democracy, communism, and fascism may not be equally good in view of the differing national circumstances or differing periods of time in which they arise. But when one comes to such a purely relativistic position, it would seem that any genuinely ethical judgment as to what is good or what ought to be has been abandoned.

As a matter of fact, however, when basic ethical and social questions are reached Dewey is apt to appeal to the intrinsic worth of personality and of a society of cooperative personalities. And in so doing he logically breaks with his own naturalism.

But Dewey in turn has a naturalistic conception of personality or selfhood. Let us see whether this conception enables him to restore the framework of his naturalism, or whether it leads to further logical ruptures. For Dewey a self is primarily the human physiological organism which is capable of intelligent conduct and of communication with its fellows. The organism itself he describes in terms of an active equilibrium of patterns of energies, and the intelligence and communication he describes so far as possible in behavioristic terms. He also finds that to certain organic activities " feelings " correspond, and that these feelings may come to " signify " objective differences in things. Since the human organism has feelings which also become meanings, it can be called a body-mind or self.

Now what are the consequences of this primarily physiological view of the self? First, from the standpoint of overt action the distinctively mental aspects of the self are non-efficacious, since meanings are a by-product of feelings, and feelings simply correspond to organic activities. Hence thoughts and purposes as such make no difference in space-time events. Second, from the standpoint of the truth or falsity of our meanings the physiological view of the self must regard all our judgments as

being determined by organic causation. Hence the power to gain truth and avoid falsehood by adhering to the processes of reason disappears.

Thus by carrying through his natural science method Dewey not only deprives us of norms for ethical judgments; he also robs personality of its powers for purposeful action and for judging truth. When, on the other hand, as a pragmatist he insists that all our ideas and purposes must make a difference in the course of things, or when as a philosopher he criticizes other systems and upholds his own, he again breaks through the bounds of his own naturalism.

The latest phase of Dewey's naturalism is his development of its relation to religion in his book *A Common Faith.* What are the effects of naturalism upon Dewey's view of religion? Three of these effects may be singled out for special mention:

1. In rejecting supernaturalism Dewey rejects every form of theism, including the naturalistic theism which Professor Wieman has endeavored to develop. It is true that Dewey for the first time accepts the word "God"—though always in quotation marks—as capable of having a positive meaning in his system. But the definition of God which he offers us is expressed purely in terms of human functioning. God denotes the "*active* relation between the ideal and the actual"—"the ideal" being an imaginative union of the objects of human desire, and "the actual" denoting the plurality of forces in nature and society which generate the ideals.

2. But further, although Dewey in this book is undertaking to present "a common faith," he takes up a militant attitude of opposition to theism. This is on the ground that dependence on a Divine Will cannot but subtract from the use of human intelligence and from moral effort. "I cannot understand," he says, "how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender of the conception of the basic division to which supernatural Christianity is committed." (P. 84.)

3. A third effect of Dewey's naturalism upon his treatment of religion is his effort to detach the religious quality of life from religion in its concrete form in the positive religions, and in the case of Christianity, from its social expression in the churches. This he does because all religions and churches are bound up with some form of belief in the supernatural. Nevertheless, it seems strange for a thoroughly sociological thinker like Dewey to set aside so sweepingly the institutional side of religion.

Now of course the underlying reason for Dewey's treatment of religion is his assumption that the natural sciences are our sole means of

knowing reality. But another assumption made by Dewey must be briefly examined here. Dewey assumes that essentially the same religious results can accompany a great variety of beliefs about reality. He quotes a passage which records a significant experience of God. It tells how the one whose experience is reported was on the verge of nervous prostration, and how he was permanently delivered from darkness and despair, because, as he said, "I resolved to stop drawing upon myself so continuously and begin drawing upon God."

Dewey says that this is an impressive record but he seeks to separate the valuable experience from its interpretation. A fatalist, he says, would give one interpretation to such an experience, a Christian Scientist another, a naturalist another. But there is a fallacy in this procedure, which consists in supposing that experience and interpretation can be thus separated. The interpretation is inherent in the experience, and a difference in interpretation makes a radical difference in the experience itself. In other words, neither the fatalist nor the naturalist, nor even the Christian Scientist, can have the same experience as the one cited, when you consider it in its essential quality and outcome. But this fact that interpretation and emotional qualities are merged together in such an experience as the foregoing does not deprive it of objective validity. For all experience involves interpretation, whether it be that of finding a flower in a crannied wall, or the greeting of a friend, or one's realization that we are in an orderly universe; and the interpretations become clarified and verified as the experiences grow and manifest their power to illuminate and transform life. Thus we see that, in radically altering the beliefs which are bound up with the characteristic experiences of religion, Dewey is going far towards undermining those experiences.

In sum, then, we must hold that naturalism, since it is committed to relativism in ethics, a physiological view of the self, and an antitheistic interpretation of religion, cannot do justice to the higher spiritual interests of man, and when it attempts to do so, it breaks over its own bounds.

II

Let us now turn for a moment to consider the position which stands at the opposite pole from naturalism, namely, the radical supernaturalism of the new German theology. It must suffice here to point out that this supernaturalism has two points of rather strange agreement with naturalism. In the first place, like naturalism it finds in nature no rational ground for belief in God. In the second place, again formally like naturalism though for very different reasons, it denies autonomy to ethics.

As one theologian who strongly sympathizes with Barthianism says: "Either no ethic or an ethic frankly grounded in the grace of God."

The Barthian would justify his abandonment of effort for a rational grounding of belief in God by insisting that the theoretical reason, when applied to ultimate questions, ends in antinomies. And he would support his denial of autonomy to ethics by insisting that practical reason in man has become thoroughly perverted by sinfulness. Reason, then, cannot be relied on for gaining either metaphysical or moral truth. Alike in the realm of metaphysics and in that of basic moral principles, truth comes by faith alone.

Now it seems to me that there is a kind of nemesis which follows radical supernaturalism, which takes the form of an impoverishment of the meaning of the supernatural. When faith is set apart from the judgments of the theoretical and practical reason it becomes not something which transcends reason, but a retreat before the advances of reason, in the effort to find a stronghold which reason cannot touch. This is evidenced by the fact that the Barthian, unlike the Fundamentalist, feels compelled to abandon the Biblical world-view, and then seeks to compensate himself by expanding the doctrine of justification by faith alone into a doctrine of metaphysical truth by faith alone. Similarly the Barthian, again unlike the Fundamentalist, prides himself on being able to accept quite skeptical results in the historical criticism of the Bible, while insisting that the Word of God has become authoritatively incarnate at a certain point in history—in Jesus of Nazareth. But how is a faith which is thus detached from judgments concerning moral values and from spiritual interpretations of history to be other than an arbitrary will to believe?

Or if we consider the matter from the objective side of God's action, how can the grace of God be other than an exercise of arbitrary sovereignty, if it consists primarily in a timeless creation of man in the image of God—this image being lost to man in time; in the "piercing" of history by the divine incarnation in Jesus Christ, who remains *incognito* except where there is a miraculously created faith, and finally in a thoroughly apocalyptic establishment of the kingdom of God? If the grace of God be not inherently related to the Divine Creative Reason, as the Logos doctrine implies; or to the purpose of God in history according to prophetic teaching; or to the love for man manifested in Jesus' human relations; or to the Spirit of God manifested in faith working through love in the Christian community; then the meaning of grace has been subordinated to the idea of sovereignty, instead of sovereignty being affirmed of the grace and truth embodied in Jesus Christ. But none of

the foregoing significant interpretations of the grace of God is possible if reason and faith are set in opposition to each other, the former being regarded as impotent to gain metaphysical and moral truth and the latter being the exclusive doorway to the knowledge of God.

It would seem, indeed, that the debate between Barth and Brunner concerning the possibility of a natural theology, as embodied in Brunner's *Natur und Gnade* and Barth's rejoinder, *Nein,* were an indication that the Dialectical Theology were discovering that its idea of faith itself involved certain antinomies to which further dialectic must be applied.

III

But let me hasten to complete the dialectic of this paper between thoroughgoing naturalism and radical supernaturalism, though this can be done only very compactly and therefore sketchily.

In the first place, it seems clear that the gaining of the fullest truth concerning man and his universe requires the union of reason and faith. This position has the merit of not being new, but rather of being on the whole the one that has been dominant throughout the history of Christian thought. I would specify, however, that this needed union is best accomplished not by regarding reason and faith as simply supplemental to each other, so that one speaks of truths of reason and truths of revelation, but by regarding faith and reason as in a relation of polarity to each other, as befits a dynamic or creative view of ultimate reality.

In the second place, I think we are bound to acknowledge that Nature cannot be made our all-controlling conception, nor can that place be assigned to the Moral Law, nor can it be accorded to Divine Sovereignty unless the word "Divine" be given a meaning which makes it more than an adjective to the word "Sovereignty." Such being the case, I think we need to effect a synthesis between the truths for which these competing conceptions stand; for they would not be able to make their claims persuasive at all if each did not represent large bodies of truth.

As a means of effecting this synthesis can we do better than to employ the word "spirit" as our unifying term, since this word has its obvious religious and ethical connotations, its historic metaphysical meaning, and its application in the field of nature—at least to human nature. Of course, it is in respect to what the term "nature" primarily stands for which would seem to be most intractable to a synthesis from the standpoint that spirit is the fundamental type of reality. But in favor of the effort to make such a synthesis it may be urged that naturalism's favorite doctrine that man is a part of nature is capable of being carried through only on the basis of a spiritual interpretation of nature.

At all events, in default of time for an elaborate argument, I must urge that the choice which confronts us is: either no synthesis or a synthesis in terms of a spiritualistic philosophy.

In the third place, the conflicting currents of thought which we have been surveying are a pretty good indication that a relative autonomy belongs to the study of nature, to the principles of ethics, and to the experiences of religion. I speak of the autonomy in each case as being "relative" because the very effort for a synthesis between these areas of thought and experience means that they cannot be kept in water-tight compartments. But I speak of a genuine autonomy for each area because each involves certain immanent principles which do not derive their claim to recognition from their connection with those of other areas.

Autonomy for ethics means that for personal beings there are certain normative principles which have a rational claim upon them because of their intrinsic worth.

> Such principles are the Kantian one that every personality is an end in itself and can never rightly be made merely a means to other ends, and the corresponding principle that the goal of ethical living is the achievement of a Realm of Ends. These principles are the ethical equivalents of the Christian teachings, at once ethical and religious, of the human soul's infinite worth, and of the kingdom of God. Other such principles, implied in the foregoing or supplementing them, are justice, equality, the intrinsic worth of all creative capacities, and love as inclusive of all the other principles, and as also requiring them in order that it may be the supreme ethical value.[2]

The relation of these principles to man's natural history is that they are the measures of his desires and customs, and the rightful guides of his conduct, no matter how slow he may have been in discovering them or how imperfectly he may understand them. The relation of these principles to man's life with God is not that they are instituted by God's sovereign will, but that they are inherent to God's own nature. They are timeless truths, although having their application to certain finite beings in time, and as such truths they are constitutive of the nature of God.

Autonomy for the study of nature means, among many other things, the abandonment of the phenomenalistic view of natural objects for a realistic view. This leads to a recognition of individuality in the objects of nature as well as uniformity or continuity in nature's processes. The resultant view of nature, I believe, will be one in which all the entities will be seen to be in an organic relation to each other, as Whitehead has shown us. In such a system of nature purposiveness, creativeness and

[2] See my article in *Contemporary American Theology*, Vol. II, p. 124.

value will be at home, and the whole will betoken a Cosmic Creative Spirit as its ground.

Autonomy for the experiences of religion means that religious experience does not rest on the postulates of morality, significant as those are, nor upon prior metaphysical proofs, but that they are in their own right sources of objective knowledge. Obviously, if ethical principles are inherent in God's nature, religious knowledge will not be something apart from them. Nor can religious experience be something apart from metaphysical truths if it is an experience of the God who is the ultimate ground of reality. Rather does religious experience lay hold of its truths in intuitive fashion. Its basic insights, moreover, are of the synthetic type in which the oneness of the supreme values and the ultimate reality is immediately grasped.

> In religious intuition of the synthetic type there is an apprehension of a totality as having such inner relations as give it divine significance. Such an intuition is expressed in the words of the Apostle Paul: "For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God." Such penetrative and synthetic insights are not substitutes for detailed analyzed knowledge; but they add to our possession of objective truth as really as does the analyzed knowledge, for it is by such insights that comprehensive wholes and inner principles of unity are grasped. At the same time these insights are not to be withdrawn from further testing. They are subject to such testing both by critical reflection and by practical living.[8]

Such intuitive insights vindicate themselves in the philosophy of religion in that they are what the prophet, and also the humble believer, live by in advance of reasoned interpretation; and they vindicate themselves, further, in that the principles of the reasoned interpretation most commonly originate as intuitive insights. Thus I believe it to be a true observation that the idea of law in the natural order originated from the religious perception of a Divine moral order.

It is partly on the basis of this intuitive function of religious experience that the significance and value of religious ethics, as compared with ethics in general, is to be brought out. I find it to be a genuine contribution from Professor Wieman, with whose naturalism I so thoroughly disagree, that he has so well brought out the importance of religious experience, more specifically of mysticism, for the fructifying of the moral life through its aid in problem-solving and in procuring freshness of moral insight.

It seems to me that here too we have a ground for distinctively Christian ethics alongside of general ethics. Not that the truths of Christian ethics, when they are gained, will not be truths for general ethics

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

as well; but that it is very easy for general ethics to fall short of Christian ethics, for the very reason that newness of vision is always needed for discerning the meaning of ethical principles for personal situations and historical crises, and still more, for the discernment of principles never as yet clearly apprehended. As for the uniqueness of the central Christian insights, I must content myself with affirming that it belongs to the very nature of a prophet to be a unique individual in history who has also universal meaning, and that Christian ethics has uniqueness by as much as the figure of Jesus has uniqueness as compared with the figure of Buddha or the figure of Socrates. Each of these figures, I would maintain, has uniqueness not simply in accidental ways of historical contingency, but in universal meaning. Perhaps the generalized meaning of prophetic uniqueness is to be found in the marriage of ideal meaning and historic deed.

It is here, too, that I would find a large place for theology in the social ethics of our time. In my view there are no universal ethical principles which are not social in their scope. But certainly society is proving itself capable of profoundly new situations, situations which are crucial and tragic in their significance. I do not see why the nineteenth or the eighteenth century should receive so much blame for our present moral disorder. Or rather, if they are to be blamed, let the blame be put in the right places. No doubt we are suffering because the sins of our fathers are being visited upon us. But let not the blame be spread indiscriminately over the positive insights and gains of those centuries. The blame is rather our own if we try to live on inherited capital instead of putting out our talents that they may bring forth increase. It is for theology to interpret the Christian life with the living God so that our consciences shall be illumined in social matters and our wills energized for the marriage of insight with deed in historic action. "This is the victory which overcometh the world, even our faith."

THE BARTHIAN ETHICS [1]

ALBERT C. KNUDSON,

Dean, Boston University School of Theology

THERE is some question as to whether ethics has a place in the Barthian theology. Karl Barth himself leans strongly toward the negative. "A system of ethics," he says, "which pretends to know and to establish the commandment of the Creator usurps the throne of God, poisoning the sources of faith. It is more devastating for Christian life than all the cinemas and dance-halls put together!" [2] But despite this vigorous pronouncement his associate Emil Brunner has written a formidable work of almost seven hundred pages on theological ethics; and this may be accepted as the standard Barthian exposition of the subject. In any case I shall treat it as such.

The work was published in 1932 and bears the title *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen,* a title that in its English rendering, "The Commandment and the Orders," would elicit very little interest. In Germany, however, both terms in the title have at present a special interest and significance. The precise meaning of each will be dealt with later. The first half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the underlying principles of "a Protestant theological ethic," as the book is called in its subtitle; and the second half is devoted to the application of these principles to the concrete problems of the moral life. We shall here concern ourselves chiefly with the first half.

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

The author begins his treatise by defining the relation of theological to philosophical ethics. As a Barthian he naturally distinguishes sharply between them. Theological ethics derives its material from revelation, while philosophical ethics is based on the human reason. The former is divine in its source, the latter human. It was, therefore, a mistake on the part of the older theological ethics when it began with the cardinal virtues of the Greeks (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice) and then supplemented them with the three Christian graces (faith, hope, love). Mistaken also is any ethic that treats Christian morality as the crown of natural morality. The two are antithetical rather than supplementary

[1] A paper read before the American Theological Society.

[2] Quoted by Adolf Keller in *Religion and Revolution,* p. 87.

to each other. Christian ethic is an ethic of grace, and grace is the negation, not the perfection, of nature.

With such a dualistic conception of nature and grace it was inevitable that Brunner should seek to discredit natural or philosophical ethics. This he proceeds to do in two different ways.

First, he seeks to show that philosophical ethics is necessarily involved in insoluble antinomies, and that it, consequently, cannot offer a consistent and tenable theory of the moral life. In support of this contention he surveys the history of ethics and concludes that there are two and only two great ethical systems, the naturalistic and idealistic, or what we sometimes call the goods ethics and the duty ethics. Various efforts have been made to combine the two in a mediating theory, but the result has in every instance been confusing. The naturalistic and idealistic standpoints are irreconcilably opposed to each other, and it is only by overlooking the distinctive character of one or the other that they can be brought into any sort of harmony with each other. If we are to be logically consistent, we must choose between them. We must be either naturalistic or idealistic in our ethical theory; we can not be both. But if we are naturalistic, we fall into conflict with our moral nature. For on the naturalistic theory we are unable to account for the sense of "ought" in our moral consciousness. We reduce ethics to a system of prudence and miss the distinctive element in the ethical life altogether. On the other hand, if we are idealistic in our ethical theory and lay stress on the moral will to the exclusion of all reference to ends or to the good to be achieved, we fail to make contact with the objective moral order. We can not by reflection on the formal law of duty determine how we ought to act in the complex relations of human life. In order to secure concrete moral guidance we must take account of the principle of well-being. There is no other method by which we can work out a moral code; and this method introduces an element alien to the duty ethics. There is, therefore, according to Brunner, a hopeless contradiction in our ethical theory, so long as we remain on the philosophical plane.

Another criticism passed on natural ethics is that it is legalistic and anthropocentric. It lays the stress on human ability, on the realization of the good through human effort, and thus encourages self-righteousness, self-confidence, and a false independence as over against God. This attitude toward God is the essence of sin and is to be condemned regardless of the moral motive that may lie back of it. Indeed, "moralism with its legalism and self-righteousness is at all times the worst foe of the truly ethical life" (p. 44). And this moralism, we are told, is

the direct product of philosophical ethics both in its naturalistic and idealistic forms. Philosophical ethics is, therefore, under condemnation from the practical as well as the theoretical standpoint. It is not only logically inconsistent, it inculcates a false morality.

Justification by Faith

The only way to overcome the legalism, self-righteousness and inconsistencies of philosophical ethics is through the Pauline and Reformation doctrine of justification by faith. In this doctrine we have the key to what is most fundamental and most distinctive in the Christian life. This has been generally recognized in Protestant theology, but not in Protestant ethics. Investigation, says Brunner, discloses the "astonishing fact" that "since the Reformation not a single ethic has been deduced from the center of the evangelical faith" (p. vi). Here, then, is an opportunity for a new and more distinctive type of Protestant ethic; and this is what Brunner has endeavored to give us, an ethic based on the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Such a theological ethic, he maintains, is wholly unique in character and has a distinct superiority to all forms of natural ethics.

Its uniqueness is due to the fact that the doctrine of justification by faith, as understood by Brunner, implies the absolute sinfulness of man and his consequent absolute dependence on God for everything that is morally good. Justifying faith is the gift of God in the strictest sense of the term; and this means that man has no independent moral capacity, that faith and everything else that is good within him are the direct work of the Holy Spirit. He himself has and can have no creative relation to that which is properly called good. The morally good is inseparable from the divine will and the divine activity.

And if this is so, it is evident that natural morality cannot overlap or be in any sense continuous with Christian morality. For the natural man is self-centered. He seeks, it is true, inner worth as well as outward fortune. But both are self-ends, and as such they are not from the Christian point of view morally good. For man from the Christian standpoint is sinful to the very core of his being, and hence his self-ends are necessarily evil. Furthermore, the natural man regards the good as something which he can achieve through his own efforts. And this is contrary to Christian teaching. Every act of ours that is truly good or a quest after that which is truly good is a divine act within us. We can of ourselves do no good thing.

There is, therefore, a deep cleavage between natural morality and natural ethics, on the one hand, and Christian morality and Christian

ethics, on the other. Natural ethics in both its eudemonistic and perfectionist forms is anthropocentric and humanistic or Pelagian; it treats man as an independent agent through whom moral good may be realized. Christian ethics is theocentric and radically anti-Pelagian; it views man as a sinner, as incapable of any good thing, and, consequently, looks upon God as the sole independent agent in the achievement of moral good. Any claim to moral independence on man's part is itself sinful, the original and primal form of sin. It implies self-righteousness, the sin against which biblical teaching is most emphatically directed. Between Christian and natural ethics there is thus a fundamental difference. Christian ethics not only transcends, it negates natural ethics; and it does so because of its doctrine of justification by faith alone.

Through this doctrine a new and altogether unique quality is introduced into the ethical life. Or rather the doctrine is an expression of a unique and distinctive quality of the Christian life. The Christian life is a life derived from God. It is a life dependent on the Holy Spirit, a life receptive of the divine grace, a life that has its initiative in God, not in man. Such a life is qualitatively different from the natural life. The latter at its best is a life directed toward God. It is a quest after him, a search for him, a striving after the ideal. As such it receives the praise of men and properly so; but it is after all a self-centered life. It derives its initiative from human rather than divine sources, and as it becomes more strenuous it widens rather than narrows the breach between man and God. The only way to find God is to be found of him. This is the Christian way. The Christian life has its roots in God and has no other rootage. It is this truth that is taught by the doctrine of justification by faith and that gives uniqueness to Christian ethics.

The superiority attributed to Christian ethics is to some extent implied in its uniqueness, but the special ground for it is to be found in its freedom from the antinomies inherent in natural ethics. We have already referred to the antinomy between material and formal ethics or between the goods and duty ethics. In addition, there are antinomies between freedom and necessity, between individualism and universalism, between the immanent and the transcendent, between what "is" and what "ought" to be. These and other antinomies, according to Brunner, are structural in every natural or philosophical ethic. They have their root in the false independence that such an ethic attributes to man. Man is not free in the sense that he is independent of God; there is in him no immanent moral law to which he is able to render obedience in his own strength; there is in him no native sense of oughtness that

makes of him an independent moral monad. Such independence as this, assumed by natural ethics, runs counter to the fundamental facts of man's being; and out of this assumed independence there arises necessarily an inner conflict, a conflict that gives rise to the foregoing antinomies.

The only way to escape this conflict is by accepting the doctrine of justification by faith and relinquishing all claim to moral independence. God is the one source of salvation. Man can not save himself. He is completely dependent upon God. When this is realized, the tyranny of the "ought" is broken, the curse of the law is removed, and man becomes truly free. Redemption is now accepted as the gift of God, the inner discord is at an end, and the antinomies that have vitiated ethical thought in the past are no more.

The Divine Command

From Brunner's conception of justification by faith and its ethical significance, as just summarized, it follows that the philosophical conception of the autonomy of the human spirit can have no place in Christian teaching. Neither the sense of duty nor the idea of the good nor both together can for the Christian serve as the ground and norm of the ethical life. Only the will of God can fulfil these functions. Christian ethics must, therefore, be theonomous, not autonomous. It must be based wholly on the divine command and be derived exclusively from revelation.

According to Scripture the good is inseparable from the divine will. Nothing is good in and of itself. That only is good which God wills and does. His will is the source of all goodness. There is no moral law to which he must subject himself. He is himself the Creator of the moral law. Indeed, his will is the only ultimate moral law. With it, therefore, Christian ethics must primarily concern itself.

But what is the divine will? What is the divine command? How are we to ascertain its content? To these questions there is from the Barthian standpoint no simple and concrete answer. We are referred to the Word of God, but the answers we receive from this source are, according to Brunner, all general in character. Three points in particular are emphasized.

First, the divine command is not to be identified with the laws of Scripture or those of conscience. These can be perceived by anyone. But not so the divine command. It is "the voice of the personal God which can be apprehended only by those to whom God himself speaks his living word and who receive it in faith." It is thus limited to believ-

ers, and with the Barthians this means the elect. Exactly how they apprehend it we cannot say. The process is a divine mystery. There is, of course, no audible voice. Such teaching would be fanaticism. God speaks and his voice is heard by faith, but faith is itself a divine gift, a gift that carries with it obedience to the divine command. Faith and the divine command thus involve each other. Where there is faith there is an implicit divine command. The command may be vague, it may be felt as a kind of categorical imperative. But whatever form it may take in consciousness, it is objective, divine in its source, and as such elicits obedience from the believing heart.

In the second place, the divine command is personal, and the human response to it is also personal. It can not, therefore, be reduced to a general principle or to a general rule that fulfils itself. Personal decision characterizes the life of the believer at every turn. The moral problem for him is indeterminate. No casuistry can relieve him from the necessity of deciding the moral issues of life for himself. And no system of ethical principles can determine in advance what the divine command will be in any concrete situation. God is not a system of moral principles. He is a free person, and his will and it alone determines what is good. The good can not, therefore, be embodied in a principle. It is incapable of theoretic definition. This is a distinctive characteristic of Christian ethics. Other types of ethics are made up of impersonal principles and laws. Christian ethics, on the other hand, is wholly personal. God stands in a direct personal relation to believers and they stand in a direct personal relation to him and to each other. They are not separated from one another by abstract principles. What God wills is the only objective good, and obedience to his will is the only subjective good.

The third point emphasized by Brunner is that while the divine will is free it is not arbitrary. It has revealed itself in Christ as a *loving* will. That is the meaning of the incarnation and the atonement. God is Redeemer. He has so completely identified himself with humanity that to serve him is to serve mankind. There is no independent service of God. To love God is to love man. And for us to love man is but a reflection of the divine love. Indeed, our love of men *is* the divine love or the Divine Spirit operative within us. God is love and the source of all true love in the human heart. But love is not a principle. It is not a law to which the divine will conforms. It is a divine attribute revealed in and through the divine activity. Apart from the divine activity we would not know what love is. We learn what love is from what God does.

Love is the fulfilling of the law. It is the one fundamental commandment. But its application to the complex relations of life is by

no means self-evident. The Decalogue and Sermon on the Mount contain samples of how it should be applied, but these samples are not themselves laws that are to be literally obeyed. They are merely illustrations that stimulate and guide the believer as he makes his own decisions. Nothing can exempt the individual believer from this responsibility. He must decide for himself what the one commandment of love requires in each particular situation; and this he does, so far as it is possible for a sinful human being to do so, by virtue of the love implanted in him by the Divine Spirit.

The Order or Orders of Creation

Another important source of moral guidance, according to Brunner, is the order or "orders" of creation, to which reference is made in the title of his book. God is Creator as well as Redeemer. From his redemptive activity we learn "the commandment" of love, with which we have dealt in the preceding section. His creative activity, however, is different. From it we receive other revelations of his will, revelations that have a significant bearing on the problems of social ethics and that are embodied in the idea of *Schöpfungsordnungen* or "orders of creation."

This term both in its singular and plural form is at present having an extraordinary vogue in Germany. It may be regarded as the German response to the "Social Gospel" in the Anglo-Saxon world and bids fair to be almost equally popular. There is, however, greater difference of opinion as to its meaning and concrete application. For the most part the term is interpreted in a conservative and even reactionary sense as a justification of the traditional social order or some phase or phases of it.[3] But there are some religious socialists[4] who use the term in an almost opposite sense as meaning "revolution," the eternal revolution, the ceaselessly transforming tendency both in the individual and society. Others again employ the term in a more ideal sense, treating it as practically synonymous with socialism, which they regard as the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and also as the original order of creation before the fall. Still others, and to this class Emil Brunner belongs, give to the term both a conservative and revolutionary meaning. The term is thus an elastic one, capable of being turned to account by representatives of the most diverse schools. But it is not on that account wholly devoid of significance.

[3] Cf. Friedrich Gogarten, *Politische Ethik* (1932); Frau von Tiling, *Was Sollen Wir Denn Tun?*; Wilhelm Stapel, *Der Christliche Staatsmann* (1932).

[4] Cf. Paul Tillich, *Religiöse Verwirklichung* (1930); Georg Wünsch *Evangelische Wirtschafts Ethik* (1927).

Its common use at present in Germany is due to various causes. One is the increased veneration for Luther occasioned by the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the Reformation. Luther in opposition to the fanatics of his day deduced Christian ethics not from the Sermon on the Mount and other ethical sayings of Jesus, but from the "orders" of creation such as the family, the state and the church; and the augmented authority that has of late come to be attached to his name has given new significance to this aspect of his teaching. Another and more important cause is the powerful reaction that has taken place during the past ten years against individualism and idealism, and the liberalism that attended both. The older ethical interest in the development of personality and the inner life of the spirit has given way to a profound interest in race, blood, nationality and the state. The social framework of life has become the object of intense devotion. The totalitarian state has usurped the place formerly held by the conscience of the individual. Individual rights have succumbed to those of the group. The sanctity previously attributed to the soul has been transferred to the state or some other *Ordnung*. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the religiously minded should see the divine will manifested in what they regarded as "the orders of creation." Instead of looking exclusively within they have, consequently, begun to look without for divine guidance.

Then, too, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the so-called "liberal" conception of Jesus and a growing uncertainty as to the practicability of his ethical teaching. The German people quite generally are at present inclined to look upon the various efforts made in the past generation by Friedrich Naumann and others to translate Jesus' idea of the kingdom of God into a concrete social ethics for our day as having ended in failure. The whole thing seems to them visionary and impractical, and so they have been turning away from the ethical idealism of Jesus and from idealism in general. They want something more realistic, and in the doctrine of a divinely created and sustained social order they find a response to this yearning. The doctrine seems to them to be a protection against such a fanatical and secularistic misinterpretation of Jesus' teaching as in their opinion is represented by the Anglo-Saxon stress on pacifism and the social gospel as a whole.

Barth himself rejects the new doctrine, if such it may be called, chiefly because it seems to him out of harmony with the doctrine of original sin.[5] In a totally depraved humanity and a thoroughly sinful world there can, he holds, be no trace of the original creative will of God. The orders of creation must under such conditions be obliterated. But in

[5] See Werner Wiesner, *Die Lehre von der Schöpfungsordnung*, pp. 19f.

direct opposition to this Brunner maintains that despite human sinfulness the orders of creation are traceable in human nature and human society. And on this assumption his theological ethics is to a large extent based. He holds, in other words, that there is a place for natural theology—a thesis that Barth vigorously repudiates.[6]

In the doctrine of *Schöpfungsordnungen* it is implied that we can to some extent ascertain the divine will from a study of the natural and particularly the human world. But there is some question as to whether these "orders" should be called "orders of creation." There is also a question how they should be classified, how they should be defined, and how much practical guidance can be derived from them. It has been proposed that we call them "orders of preservation" instead of "orders of creation" on the ground that the present order has been corrupted by sin. But this would imply that the divine creative activity belongs exclusively to the past — an idea that is inconsistent with Christian teaching. God is at present Creator as well as Preserver; and the orders of creation, sinful though they be, may still be regarded as his creation. Brunner distinguishes between "orders of creation" and "orders of sin," assigning marriage to the former and the State and Right or Justice to the latter. But this distinction can hardly be carried through. The State does not exist simply because of sin nor is marriage free from relation to it. All the divine "orders" stand related both to creation and to sin.[7]

One might distinguish between those orders of creation that are primarily biological and those that are primarily psychological in character. To the former group would belong sex, marriage, the family, race and blood; to the latter right, custom, morality, and the state.[8] But no particular theological importance would attach to this classification.

Some argue that the word *Schöpfungsordnung* should be used only in the singular and should be interpreted as referring to the general plan and purpose of God in creation. It should not be identified with any particular institution or phase of human society.[9] But this restriction of the term would deprive it of significance for concrete ethics.

Brunner defines the orders of creation as those "given aspects of human community life which underlie all historical life as unchangeable presuppositions, and hence are historically variable in their forms, but unchangeable in their fundamental structure, and which at the same time refer men to one another and unite them together in a definite way"

[6] Emil Brunner, *Natur und Gnade;* Karl Barth, *Nein! Antwort an Brunner.*
[7] Paul Althaus, *Theologie der Ordnungen,* p. 12.
[8] Werner Wiesner, *Die Lehre von der Schöpfungsordnung.*
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 214.

(p. 194). Two tests of an "order" are here laid down: the unchangeability of its fundamental structure, and its binding men together in a definite way. No appeal, it should be noted, is made to the Bible, to the original constitution of the world, or to the theory of evolution. The tests are purely empirical. If a phase or form of community life is an indispensable condition of the historical life of humanity and if it binds men together in mutual service or points to such service as a norm of human activity, it may be regarded as an order of creation.

These tests, according to Brunner, are met by the family, economic activity, the state, culture, and in a special way by the church. Each of these may, consequently, be regarded as an order of creation; and the latter half of Brunner's book is devoted to a consideration of the various practical problems connected with each. The author's position may be described as that of a moderate. He rejects emphatically the principles underlying both radicalism and conservatism. It is, he holds, a fundamental error to regard the Sermon on the Mount or the ethical teaching of Jesus in general as a norm for the reorganization of human society. Such a view he brands as sheer fanaticism. On the other hand, he repudiates with equal vigor the idea that the actual social order is divinely established and should be perpetuated. The present order is sinful, it calls for change. But back of it in a general way and more or less dimly revealed through it is the divine will. The present order is thus to some extent an "order of creation," and our first duty toward it is to accept it. But this is only our initial attitude. We have a second duty, and that is to try to reform it. But this is possible only within fixed limits, and these limits must be recognized. Human sin can not be completely eradicated in this life. It is legislated into the very structure of the world. The natural order is inherently sinful, and as such has its own laws, laws which we can not hope to transform. In this sense it may be said that society is necessarily "immoral." We are to seek to reform it. Christian love bids us do so. And the utmost freedom is to be exercised in the criticism of the existing order. But we need to recognize the limits within which reform is possible. To make reform the fundamental principle of the Christian life is to fall into fanaticism. The last as well as the first word in Christian faith is submission. A distinctly conservative tendency thus manifests itself in connection with the doctrine of the orders of creation as expounded by Brunner.

Criticism

Thus far we have been engaged in setting forth the fundamental principles or characteristics of the Barthian ethics. We now pass from

exposition to criticism. There is much in Brunner's book that is valuable. One can not but admire his learning, his insight into practical problems, the lucidity of his exposition, and the boldness with which he attempts a reconstruction of theological ethics. His book is undoubtedly one of the chief literary monuments of the Barthian movement. But when one examines critically its underlying principles one can not but have serious misgivings as to their validity and their adequacy as a basis for a systematic ethics.

First, it may be noted that the indictment Brunner brings against philosophical ethics has no adequate ground. He charges it, as we have seen, with insoluble antinomies, with legalism and the spirit of self-righteousness, and sees in it "a field of ruins." But the actual situation is by no means so serious. The antinomies referred to grow out of a false abstractionism. Take, for instance, the alleged irremediable conflict between the goods and the duty ethics. "Duty ethics taken alone," as Bowne says, "is an unlawful abstraction resulting from considering the good will apart from its conditions and objects; and the goods ethics taken alone is an equally unlawful abstraction resulting from considering conduct apart from the living subject. The good will must aim at well-being, and well-being is realized in and through the good will." [10] There is, therefore, no real antinomy between them.

Brunner's failure to see this is in part at least due to his assumption or contention that the goods or "value" ethics is necessarily "naturalistic." This, of course, is not the case. The good may include the ethical and in its highest form must include it. The ideal good has been correctly defined as "conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities"; and these "possibilities" manifestly include the moral as an essential element. The ideas of good and duty do not then exclude each other. Rather is the situation the reverse. "The duty ethics leads to the goods ethics, unless we are content to rest in a barren doctrine of good intentions; and the goods ethics leads back to the duty ethics, unless we are content to abandon ethical philosophy altogether." [11] The alleged antinomy between the two thus vanishes. And so it could be shown to be with the other antinomies of natural ethics. They are unreal and factitious, and have no such disastrous implications as Brunner assumes.

Even more unwarranted is his ascription of legalism and self-righteousness to the moral life as conceived and inculcated by philosophical ethics. Eudemonistic theories may have tended toward externalism and legalism, but to attribute this tendency to the Kantian ethics is certainly

[10] *Principles of Ethics*, p. 36.
[11] B. P. Bowne, *ibid.*, pp. 69, 97.

without justification. Kant laid the primary, almost exclusive emphasis on the moral agent, on the good will, on character. Legalism, as commonly and properly understood, is foreign to his ethical system. Nor is there anything in it that tends to generate the spirit of self-righteousness. It does, to be sure, teach the freedom of contrary choice; but there is nothing in this doctrine that is necessarily inconsistent with the spirit of humility. Whatever be our conception of human freedom we all in a sense stand condemned before our own unattained ideal; and in view of this fact there is no place for human pride. The Barthian assumption that freedomism, as commonly understood in idealistic ethics, throws the doors open to Pharisaic self-righteousness and, indeed, logically implies it, is a piece of closet theologizing. There is no real basis for it.

The sharp distinction, drawn by Brunner between idealistic and Christian ethics, is, therefore, unwarranted. Christian or theological ethics is not the negation but the consummation of idealistic or philosophical ethics.

A second general criticism to be passed on the Barthian ethics is that its norm or norms of conduct are vague, and can be made definite and concrete only by employing the natural or rational methods and standards that have been formally renounced. The divine will, we are told, is the only good. It is the sole standard of right. And we learn what the divine will is only through revelation, a revelation that comes to us through the written Word and through the orders of creation. But the revealed will of God is not identical with the Bible nor with nature nor with any specific part of either. What it is in any particular situation must be determined by the individual believer himself; and in arriving at his conclusion he must as a rational being be guided by considerations similar to those of the philosophical moralist.

Much stress is laid by Brunner on the personal and concrete character of the divine command as distinguished from the impersonal and abstract character of the moral imperative in natural ethics. Love with the Christian, he says, is not a principle, as it is in general ethics, but a specific command or series of commands. And the only proper human response is obedience. Christian ethics is an obedience ethics, not a humanistic or value ethics. It takes no account of human self-realization or of the ideas of the good and of duty. It consists purely and simply in self-decision, in obedience. But if obedience is not to be empty of content and is not to be mere "dice throwing," it must be a response to definite divine commands. And what these divine commands are can be ascertained only by mental processes similar to those by which men in general

arrive at a knowledge of their moral duties. The Barthian in his ethical thinking may lay more exclusive stress on biblical teaching and Christian history than does the philosophical moralist, but otherwise his actual method of arriving at moral decisions is not essentially different. He hears no miraculous voice bidding him do this or that. He decides what the divine commands are by means of value judgments similar to those employed in natural ethics. These value judgments have with him a distinct Christian cast, they carry with them a unique religious overtone, but otherwise he employs them in virtually the same way as the ordinary moralist. The latter by means of the principle of love and the ideal of humanity determines what our *duties* are; and the Barthian despite himself determines in a similar way what the *divine will* is. If he did not follow this method, if he accepted uncritically the voice of Scripture or of tradition, his obedience would manifestly be blind and would have no truly spiritual quality.

In his discussion of the concrete problems of Christian ethics Brunner makes much of the orders of creation. But it can not be said that much light is derived from this source. There is, as we have seen, no agreement as to what the orders of creation are, whether they are static or dynamic, whether they are ideal or real, whether they refer to the past or the future or to both. As a rule they are not clearly defined, and even when so defined, as they are by Brunner, they remain vague and indeterminate in their ethical content. Take, for instance, marriage. Does it as an order of creation imply monogamy? Brunner argues that it does, but his argument is a curious one. He bases it on two facts. First, he says "that every human being is irrevocably the child of one man and one woman, that every father is irrevocably with this woman and every woman irrevocably with this man the father or mother of this child" (p. 330). But granting this obvious fact it certainly does not follow that two persons may not have the same father and different mothers or the same mother and different fathers. The other fact to which Brunner appeals is that love even on the physical plane is "monistic." He admits that the sexual impulse is at times polygamous and more or less variable in the objects of its desire, but this he attributes to human "weakness." In its normal expression it is monistic. But these two "monistic facts," as Brunner terms them, are certainly very inadequate proof that monogamy belongs to the order of creation and has divine sanction. The real basis of monogamy must be found elsewhere.

It is so also with economic cooperation, international peace and other social ideals and worthy institutions. They can not be logically deduced from the orders of creation. These "orders" give us only the bare

framework of human life. They do not solve the concrete problems that arise within each order. Such problems can be settled only by a consideration of consequences, and this is at least tacitly recognized by Brunner. The most fruitful part of his discussion of concrete ethics has to do with the consequences of conduct and does not consist in the attempt to prove that certain institutions and practices are or are not a part of the divinely created order. The idea of such an order, when taken strictly, is a vague and comparatively barren ethical conception.

To urge men to obey the will of God as revealed in the orders of creation is similar to bidding them "live according to nature." The latter injunction, current among the ancient Stoics, may serve the purpose of reminding men that they are not abstract moral beings, and of guarding them against an extreme asceticism, but beyond that it has very little value. The same is also true of the doctrine of *Schöpfungsordnungen*. It may remind men that they live in a concrete environment to which they must adjust themselves, and may thus serve as a protection against extreme forms of self-denial and other fanatical practices. But beyond that it has little value. Indeed, it has positive disvalues. As commonly understood it is unduly conservative in its bearing on social and political questions. It is inclined to cast the veil of sanctity over the past and the present. Then too, there lurks in it the old Calvinistic idea that the divine grace is limited by more or less arbitrary exercises of the divine will. The order of creation is willed by God, and hence is good. But it is not good in the same sense as the redemptive love of God. The divine love in its purity knows no barriers of race or class, no distinction of elect and non-elect. It recognizes no arbitrary limits. It embraces all. The order of creation, on the other hand, is full of inequalities, of special privileges, and of deep and permanent divisions within mankind; and as such it apparently limits the range of the divine mercy and the efficacy of the divine love. It seems more or less subject to a blind fate. If the idea of such a social order is retained, it ought in my opinion be completely moralized or idealized, and treated as a specification under the redemptive love of God rather than as an independent expression of the divine will.

A third and final criticism of the Barthian ethics has to do with its central doctrine, that of justification by faith. According to Brunner, this doctrine solves the ethical problem; but it does so only by eliminating it. It logically cancels moral responsibility by denying to men any power whatsoever of moral initiative. And not only that, it condemns the sense of "ought" itself as an evidence of human sinfulness. In the ideal state there will be no consciousness of obligation, no moral life in the present sense of the term, no such moral struggle and no such moral antin-

omies as at present plague us. The moral life will be transcended by a life that recognizes God as the absolute source of all possible good both within and without us.

The state in which this will take place belongs to the future. In this life we necessarily remain sinners and subject to the moral law. But even here we have an anticipation, an adumbration of the better state in the experience of justification by faith alone. In this experience we have the assurance of the divine forgiveness, even though we remain sinful. God "calls" us to service in the midst of this sinful world, and because it is a divine call we can engage in our various "callings," sinful though they be, with a good conscience.

This is the famous Lutheran doctrine of the Christian's vocation, a doctrine that Brunner says expresses "one of the most important ideas that was ever conceived." According to it we are saved *in* our sins, not *from* them. To some extent we are, to be sure, saved from them. But salvation from them can never be complete in this life. And hence the vital, the important thing is that it should be possible for us to be saved *in* them. Only in this way can we attain peace on earth.

Without the conception of vocation and the related doctrine of justification by faith we would as earnest Christians be driven to one of three different courses of action: (1) to monastic flight from the world, (2) to base compromise with it, or (3) to the fanatical attempt to transform it into the kingdom of God. The last of these is rendered impossible by the radical sinfulness of man and the world, and leads inevitably to despair. The first contradicts the Christian law of love and thus defeats its own purpose. The second, which is the one commonly adopted, leaves the Christian with an evil conscience. The one way to escape this result is through the belief that by virtue of the divine grace we are saved in our sins and despite them.

But when this belief leads to a course of conduct that does not differ from that of the compromiser, one wonders what ethical advantage there is in it, and whether through it peace of mind has not been bought at too great a price. Ought a person have a good conscience in an evil world of which he forms a part? Most people would make their answer to this question dependent on the particular part that the person plays in the world. But not so Brunner. Accepting the doctrine of original sin in its extreme form, he holds that all men are equally sinful in the sight of God and that freedom from moral condemnation can in each case come only from a sovereign act of divine grace. This act does not depend upon what we ourselves do. No ethical justification of justification by faith is

possible. Good works may and do follow from justification, but they are not the grounds of the divine favor or of inner peace.

On this line of thought two or three comments may be made. First, it does not meet the most urgent need of our day. That it had profound significance in the time of Paul and of Luther is conceded. But the intellectual and religious background is different today. We are not primarily concerned with the righteousness of *works* and the sin of *self*-redemption through obedience to the law. Our concern is with something different and deeper, with the meaning of life as a whole, with a profounder and more positive type of faith than that which simply justifies from sin in the older sense of the term. And this new spiritual concern cannot be allayed by a bare return to the past. A mere repetition of the Reformation phrases and a strained attempt to adjust them to modern times will not meet the religious and ethical needs of our day.

In the second place, the doctrine of justification by faith, as interpreted by Brunner and the Barthians generally, tends to weaken the moral dynamic of religion. It puts the supreme good of life "beyond conscience" and in so doing makes the sense of "ought" or duty incidental to our present sinful state. Ultimately, we are told, the "law" will be completely supplanted by "love"; and hence the inference is readily drawn that we need not and should not be too much concerned about moral obedience. In that direction lies fanaticism. We can not by any process of sanctification establish direct relationship with God. Ethical activity and interest in social reform on our part are of secondary concern, expressions of the love divinely implanted in us, not constitutive elements in the faith by which we are justified. The result is that the great social movements of the day are treated as more or less extraneous to religion. The mission of religion, it is held, lies elsewhere. And not only is there in the Barthian theory this one-sided view of religion with its possible evil consequences. There is also a serious question as to whether "love" purged of the sense of duty does not cease to be ethical altogether and degenerate into mere good nature. Brunner's "law"-less love seems to me a pretty dubious thing, even though he calls it divine.

A third stricture on the Barthian doctrine of justification by faith is that it implies an extreme doctrine of original sin and that this doctrine confuses the whole moral situation. It substitutes for man as he actually is an abstract "natural" man, wholly devoid of the spirit of God, and thus puts all men equally under the ban of sin. It makes sin a necessity of our present temporal existence; it represents sin as to a large degree non-volitional; it obscures the distinction between volitional and subvolitional sin; it assumes a radical distinction between the human and the divine; it

restricts the agency in man's moral redemption to the Divine Spirit; it dulls the edge of the natural conscience, and deprives our moral imperatives of the high sanctions by which they have commonly been sustained. Indeed, it runs counter to all the common moral judgments of men, and leaves ethics without a rational basis.

But despite the foregoing criticism Brunner's work on ethics is one of extraordinary interest and significance. It is a worthy parallel to the Barthian theology. As the latter is a reconstruction of Christian theology around the principle of "the endless qualitative difference between time and eternity," so Brunner's ethics is a systematic reconstruction of Christian ethics around the doctrine of justification by faith. The two supplement each other, and even though fundamentally invalid as I believe them to be, they are still in my opinion the most challenging contributions to Christian thought in the present century.

THE LESSON OF MÜNSTER

W. O. LEWIS, Ph. D.,

Paris, France

It was on June 24, 1535, that the Anabaptist Kingdom in Münster came to an end. Is there any lesson we can learn from this tragedy of the sixteenth century? The story is worth retelling.

Münster was an important walled city of Westphalia, in northwest Germany. It is not far from the Rhine and not far from the borders of Holland. It was on one of the great trade routes of the Middle Ages which ran from Cologne through Dortmund to Bremen and Hamburg. Merchants passing through the city not only brought goods to sell but also disseminated new ideas. The city was governed by a prince-bishop.

There was already an intense struggle within the city before the Reformation began. On the one side was the bishop, the cathedral chapter, and the patricians. On the other side were the gilds and the common people. The people did not love their bishop, who ruled them with a firm hand and who sided with the patricians.

Humanism had taken root in Münster and helped to prepare the way for the Reformation. From 1500 on the cathedral school in Münster had furnished instruction in Latin and Greek. The humanists Glandorp, Clarenbach, and Gymnich had taught in Münster. Some of these knew Luther. And one of the patricians, Bellholt, was a friend of Carlstadt.

The Peasants' War broke out on the border of Switzerland and in southern Germany in 1524 This was not the first time that peasants had revolted. During the latter part of the fifteenth century and the first decades of the sixteenth century, there were various local uprisings in different parts of Germany. The demands of the peasants seem to us today to be relatively mild and for the most part just. The Lutheran Reformation began at a time when there was much social unrest. Luther preached freedom and democracy. The peasants, knowing of his humble origin, naturally expected sympathy from him. But Luther disclaimed any responsibility for the uprising among the peasants. While it may be true that Luther did not intentionally encourage the unrest among the peasants, it is not possible to free him from all responsibility for the Peasants' War. The peasant uprising was put down with great cruelty. It is estimated that within a few months one hundred thousand people —mostly peasants—lost their lives. After losing the war, the peasants suffered more than ever and their discontent was all the greater.

The news of the struggle among the peasants reached Münster at a time when the city was having a struggle within its walls of a similar nature. The gilds resented the competition of the rich monastery of Niesing, which was not only claiming to do a religious work but was also doing business in the city of Münster. The monastery was attacked May 22, 1525. The attack failed. But in spite of this failure the common people and the gilds demanded certain far-reaching social and religious reforms similar to those which the peasants were demanding. The cathedral chapter signed certain articles granting some of the demands of the people. But under pressure from the Archbishop of Cologne, the Bishop of Münster annulled the articles which had been signed by the cathedral chapter in Münster. The spirit of free inquiry due to Humanism and the ferment of social unrest prepared the way for the Reformation in Münster.

One of the earliest preachers of the new religious doctrines was Bernhard Rothmann. He was born about 1495, educated in Deventer and Mainz. He spent some time in Wittenberg and came into contact with Luther and Melanchthon. He began to preach Protestant doctrines in the vicinity of Münster in 1531. He soon had a large following among the common people. Rothmann put out a confession of faith which showed that he had been influenced by Melanchthon, the Augsburg Confession, by Zwingli, and even by the Anabaptists. It must not be forgotten that the Anabaptists had made such progress that they were considered to be very dangerous enemies by both the Protestants and the Roman Catholics. Hübmaier had been burned at the stake in Vienna in 1528 and many other Anabaptists were put to death about this time. When the Diet of Augsburg met in the summer of 1530, it was the purpose of the Emperor Charles V to unite all the various parts of his empire against the Turks and to unite, if possible, Catholics and Protestants against the Anabaptists. So it may be truly said that the Turks and the Anabaptists had a large share in shaping the Augsburg Confession. By 1532 there was a Protestant congregation in the city of Münster. Rothmann, who had been denied the right to preach in a church, preached in the churchyard. People were so stirred by his preaching that they plundered all the churches in the city with the exception of the cathedral.

Upon the death of Erich von Braunschweig-Grubenhagen in 1532, Franz von Waldeck, of Minden, was elected prince-bishop of Münster and Osnabrück as his successor, and was thus one of the most powerful ecclesiastical rulers in that part of Germany. Soon after the new prince-bishop was elected, Rothmann stirred up the people against him. The new bishop decided under the circumstances that it would be wise for him to

remain outside the city for some time. The common people appealed to Philipp of Hesse, who was known to be friendly to the Reformation. Philipp sent some Protestant preachers to Münster, but exhorted the people to be law-abiding and to do nothing contrary to the gospel. The Reform principles made rapid progress in Münster. Late in the summer of 1532 the prince-bishop took steps to gain control of the city. He ordered the city to expel Rothmann. This the people refused to do and took up arms against the bishop, appealing once more to Philipp of Hesse for help. Disorder in the city of Münster increased. Not only Rothmann but several prominent citizens took the part of the common people against the bishop. And the cathedral chapter was not always in harmony with the bishop. The bishop finally decided to blockade the city. The magistrates raised money to hire mercenary soldiers to fight the bishop and to end the blockade. At this point Luther, who heard about the struggles in Münster, felt that the Protestants had gone too far. He warned Rothmann of the dangers of extreme methods. The bishop came to Telgte, a few miles east of Münster, with the intention of storming the city. The magistrates of Münster made a plan to take the bishop prisoner. Many were captured, but the bishop did not happen to be in Telgte at this time. The blockade of the city still continued. Protestantism increased in influence steadily. Early in 1533, the Lord's Supper was celebrated in both kinds in several of the churches of Münster and many nuns were converted. Finally the bishop was able to arrange matters with the magistrates and entered the city in triumph in May of this year. Soon afterwards, he left Münster to visit other cities in his bishopric. It was at this stage that Anabaptist influence began to be felt in Münster.

In order to understand what followed in Münster, it is necessary to know of the work and influence of Melchior Hoffmann. Hoffmann was for a time a faithful follower of Luther. He preached in various parts of Germany, in the Baltic provinces, and even in Sweden. About 1530 he began to preach doctrines more and more like those of the Anabaptists and less and less like those of Luther. From 1530 to 1533 he spent most of his time either in Strasbourg or Holland. When he came to Strasbourg, the power of the Anabaptists had been broken by persecution. He cast in his lot with them and by his energy soon put new life into the movement. But in many respects he was more extreme than the Anabaptists. He began to preach that the Lord would set up a millennial kingdom in Strasbourg in 1533. He claimed that he was one of the two witnesses referred to in the eleventh chapter of Revelation. He was arrested and kept in prison until he died about 1543. Although in his personal life he was blameless there is no doubt that his doctrines were dangerous.

After his imprisonment, the leadership of the movement fell into the hands of Jan Matthys, a baker of Haarlem, who claimed that he was the other witness referred to in the Book of Revelation. From this time on Holland was the principal center for Hoffmanite ideas.

Before the end of 1533, followers of Hoffmann appeared in Münster. They preached with such fervor that many people were converted. It is said that in eight days fourteen hundred people renounced their infant baptism and had themselves baptized upon a confession of faith. Practically all the common people accepted the ideas of the Hoffmanite Anabaptists. Many who disagreed with them were banished from the city. From this time on Münster was dominated by the extremest fanatics. The stories that are told of what happened subsequently are almost incredible. The reports which have come down to us were written by the enemies of the Anabaptists and are no doubt exaggerated. But after making due allowance for these exaggerations, it must be admitted that disgraceful scenes soon followed.

Early in 1534 Jan Matthys and John of Leyden both appeared in Münster. They were received into the house of a citizen of Münster by the name of Knipperdolling. Rothmann had gone over to the side of the fanatics. In February, Rothmann with a strong force stormed the city hall and took from it a large supply of weapons. Soon afterward the prince-bishop of Münster began to make preparations to capture the city and destroy the Anabaptists. He and the neighboring princes realized that they were dealing with desperate men. The bishop not only had his own troops but those of several neighboring cities and even some of the imperial troops. The gates of the city were promptly closed and the inhabitants prepared to defend themselves.

Jan Matthys was the commander-in-chief, and professed to be directed in all of his movements by direct revelation from God. He gave orders that all the church towers should be torn down and the stone should be used to strengthen the defences. Food was becoming scarce in the city. Some of the poorer citizens began to complain. At this point, Matthys introduced communism of goods. The bishop's forces on the outside drew nearer and it looked as if the city would soon be taken by storm. Matthys decided on a bold stroke. After prayer and fasting he claimed that God directed him to make a sortie and prophesied that the "saints" in Münster would be saved by miracle. He took a few men with him. They were promptly killed by the bishop's soldiers and the promised deliverance did not come. After the death of Jan Matthys, John of Leyden became the leader. This man's real name was Bockelson. He learned to read and write in the elementary schools of Leyden. He

decided to become a tailor. But he was a restless spirit and his little world in Holland was too small for him. He spent a number of years traveling all over Western Europe. He spent four years in England during the time of Henry VIII. He also visited Portugal, France, and Belgium. For a while he traveled in Germany with a band of strolling actors who were playing various scenes from Shakespeare. Bockelson (John of Leyden) always played the rôle of king. After some years he settled down in Leyden, opened a drinking-saloon and got married. He was converted soon afterwards to Anabaptism by Jan Matthys, a baker of Haarlem, and became an ardent missionary for the movement. One of his converts was a man by the name of Krechting, about whom we shall hear later.

John of Leyden was a diligent student of the Bible and especially of the Book of Revelation. And for him the most important part of Revelation was the twentieth chapter. He came to the conclusion that the whole world was doomed to destruction. The Pope was the devil's vicegerent on earth, but Martin Luther was worse than the Pope. The time had come for the "saints" to slay their enemies and set up a new kingdom which was to last a thousand years.

The city of Münster is now the "New Jerusalem." Its inhabitants are "true Israelites." John of Leyden issued a new set of laws for the city. Every "Israelite" must obey all the commands of the Scriptures on pain of death. Every command of the new ruler must be carried out blindly. Elders were appointed to settle any disputes that might arise among the citizens. Bernard Knipperdolling was appointed chancellor to enforce the laws. No one was allowed to kill any animal without first obtaining permission of the authorities. From time to time transgressors were condemned to death and Knipperdolling cut off their heads.

In the month of May, 1534, the bishop stormed the city. The defenders fought desperately. Women mounted the walls and poured boiling water on the attackers. Bockelson, who seems to have had some military gifts, organized the defence and appeared everywhere to encourage his followers. After heavy loss, the bishop's forces withdrew.

The city of Münster was full of women. Some of them had left their husbands, some of them had never had husbands. The care of these women soon became a great problem for the prophet. He decided to introduce polygamy. In spite of the fact that he had a wife in Holland, he had already married the widow of Jan Matthys. He now proceeded to set the example and took unto himself fifteen other wives. Many resisted this innovation, and it is said that at least sixty-six persons who were opposed to polygamy were killed.

Soon after this, John of Leyden decided to proclaim himself king in Zion. The title he took was "John by the grace of God, the true servant of righteousness, the strength of the city of Münster." Immediately afterwards, money was hastily coined for circulation in the "New Jerusalem." The coins bear the date 1534. They also bear as a motto in Low German of that period, "One God, one faith, and one baptism." On the margin of the coins appears also "He who is not born of the water and of the Spirit shall not enter into the kingdom of God." The words of John 1:14 are also printed on the coins: "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us."

From time to time King John showed himself on the streets of Münster riding a horse and clothed in his royal robes. Just behind him rode his favorite wife as queen. In front of him marched Knipperdolling, bearing a large sword, and Krachting, bearing a copy of the Old Testament.

The bishop prepared to attack Münster once more in August, 1534. Every precaution was taken to insure success. But inside of Münster fanaticism had increased to such an extent that the people fought like demons. Once more the bishop had to confess failure and withdraw his forces. To celebrate this victory, the population of Münster was invited to a feast which was held in the open space near the cathedral. This was probably the last time many people were ever able to satisfy their hunger. Food was getting very scarce in the city. Cats and dogs were eaten and grass and weeds were pulled up by the roots to furnish food for the starving people. The prophet and some of his counselors, however, fared sumptuously every day. One of his wives, Elisabeth Wantscher, reproached him with his inconsistency and begged that something might be done for the poor people. It is said that with his own hands King John cut off her head and invited the multitude to dance with him around the body of this disobedient woman.

King John was shrewd enough to realize that he would not be able to hold out much longer. He claimed to have received a revelation from God to send out twenty-seven apostles into the outside world to convert the heathen. His real purpose, however, was through these apostles to stir up friends on the outside to come to his aid. Some of these apostles were able to break through the lines of the bishop's forces and reach their friends in neighboring cities. It looked for a while as if the Anabaptists of the outside world might succeed in organizing an army to deliver Münster. As distress in the city grew, the fanatical pretentions of King John increased. He imagined himself to be the king of Europe and of the world and divided up various parts of the earth among his followers, who, he said, would soon be able to enter into their inheritance.

Early in 1535 the bishop prepared for a third attack on the city. For eighteen long months the fanatics had been able to hold out against fearful odds. Before the attack began, the bishop summoned Münster to surrender. Rothmann answered in the name of King John. He said the "saints" would not surrender unless God by some revelation or a vision should reveal to them that it was his will that they should do so. In spite of famine conditions which prevailed in the city it might have held out longer but for the fact that five traitors went over to the enemy. Three of them were put to death immediately. The two others saved their lives by promising to help the bishop capture the city. The attack was planned to begin on the night before the celebration of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, June 24. A terrible thunder-storm made it possible for the bishop to send in a small force guided by the traitors. The city was taken entirely by surprise. Hundreds were slaughtered in the streets and plundering was rife everywhere. When the prophet realized that all was lost, he hid himself in the top of one of the towers on the city walls. A little boy betrayed to the furious soldiers his place of hiding. When they found him, he shouted, "How dare ye lay hands on the great prophet of God, the anointed of the Lord, the king in Zion. All ye who dare shall go to hell." But the soldiers took the chances. Soon afterwards Knipperdolling and Krechting were taken. These three leaders were brought before the bishop. "Art thou a king?" asked the bishop. "Art thou a bishop?" was John of Leyden's pungent reply.

Instead of putting these three men to death immediately, the bishop decided to send them in chains throughout the surrounding country so that all the people might realize that the kingdom of Münster had come to an end. After being taken from place to place in July, 1535, they were brought back to Münster and thrown into prison where they were kept until the end of the year. Philipp of Hesse sent theologians to try to convert these men from the errors of their ways. John of Leyden promised that if he were pardoned, he would, with the help of Melchoir Hoffmann and his wife, persuade all the Anabaptists of Europe to cease their illegal activities and to submit themselves to the authorities. Knipperdolling and Krechting would make no such promise. It was evident that the prophet was offering all he could in the hopes of saving his life. But the bishop would not allow his prey to escape him.

After six months of imprisonment the bishop decided to put the three prisoners to death. The day before the execution, John of Leyden was asked whether he desired the consolations of a priest. It is said that he expressed the desire to confess to the court preacher, John of Syburg. It is said that he refused to admit the validity of infant baptism, but

expressed regret for the suffering which he had brought upon the people. Knipperdolling and Krechting were more stubborn and refused to admit that they had done any wrong whatever.

On January 22, 1536, the prisoners were brought to the market-place to be tortured and put to death. People had come into the city from all the surrounding districts. "His grace," the bishop, had invited the Archbishop of Cologne and others to witness with him the execution. They sat in the window of a neighboring house where they could see all that took place. A platform on which beside the prisoners were hot irons had been erected high enough so that all the people standing on the market could also see the suffering of the three men. The judgment was read. Then began a period of the most cruel and inhuman torture. The flesh of the prisoners was torn from their bodies with red-hot pincers. John of Leyden is said to have cried out repeatedly "Father have mercy on me." Finally the death stroke was given with red-hot daggers thrust through the hearts of the prisoners. It is said that the last words John of Leyden uttered were "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." The remains of these three men were not buried, but were placed in three iron cages and hung from the tower of St. Lambert's Church. The birds ate the flesh from their bones and one by one the bones fell from the cages and disappeared. These three cages still hang from the towers of this church in Münster.

The fall of Münster was a great catastrophe for the Anabaptist movement. Luther, Melanchthon, and most of the Protestant theologians vied with each other in attacking the writings and ideas of the Anabaptists. It is easy to point out the folly and the sin of the Anabaptists of Münster. They lived too much in the Old Testament. They took certain passages of the Bible too literally. They were too much interested in the Book of Revelation. For four centuries it has been the fashion to regard the kingdom of Münster as a natural result of Anabaptist teaching. But the truth is beginning to prevail.

In order to understand Münster, the dozen years preceding Münster must be understood. Anabaptists were driven from Switzerland. The better elements among them moved eastward into southern Germany, Austria, and Poland. Then persecution began in the Catholic districts. More than one thousand persons were put to death in the Tyrol in 1531. At Linz alone, twenty-three were killed in six weeks. Duke William of Bavaria ordered that those who renounced their faith should be beheaded instead of being burned at the stake. There was no escape.

Then the Lutheran evangelists joined in the hue and cry. Anabaptists were declared to be not only religious but political offenders. They

were outlawed everywhere. They were beheaded; they were drowned; they were torn in pieces with red-hot pincers; they were burned at the stake. At Salzburg, women and girls were dragged to the horse-pond and held under the water until they were drowned and their bodies were afterwards burned. Even the houses in which the Anabaptists lived were destroyed. But until shortly before the Münster kingdom not only women but even children bore without flinching all this persecution and went to the stake praying and singing psalms.

At length the worm turned. Human nature could stand no more. Driven wild by cruelty, these Anabaptists who had been pacifists began to wreak vengeance on their enemies. They came to believe that such horrors could only precede the end of the age. Is it any wonder that these simple people followed such men as Melchior Hoffmann and John of Leyden at the end, after hundreds of their wisest and best leaders had been killed? The wonder is rather that such hysterical fanaticism did not manifest itself sooner.

Persecution has more than once in history engendered such fanatical outbreaks. After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes similar things happened in the Cevennes between 1688 and 1715. Here the Camisards followed prophets not unlike Jan Matthys and John of Leyden. It is just possible that similar things may happen in Russia. What is true in the religious realm is also true in other realms. It is just possible that one explanation of the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany is the wide-spread belief—whether justified or not—that Germany has been unduly humiliated and that the German people are being persecuted.

Strictly interpreted, the Anabaptists were not responsible for Münster. Other Anabaptists at the time protested against what was done by John of Leyden. There was a greater failure on the part of Roman Catholics and Protestants in dealing with Anabaptists than there was dereliction on the part of the Anabaptists considered as a whole.

First innocent Anabaptists were persecuted by Roman Catholics and by Protestants. Last of all the Protestant section of Czechoslovakia and of Hesse refused to tolerate them. Soon after this, when Jesuit influence became dominant in Moravia, the Protestants of Czechoslovakia were deprived of their freedom and the Thirty Years' War began, which reduced the population of Bohemia from four million to seven hundred thousand. Much of Germany was devastated also. The Thirty Years' War was ended by the Treaty of Westphalia, which was signed on July 24, 1648, in the city hall of Münster, a few rods from the place where John of Leyden was put to death. If the principles for which the Anabaptists stood had prevailed, there would never have been a Thirty Years' War.

SHOULD AMERICA EVER GO TO WAR AGAIN?

OLIVER C. HORSMAN

Minister, First Baptist Church, Morristown, N. J.

Some threescore years ago or more, General Sherman voiced a sentiment which subsequent experiences have strongly and repeatedly confirmed. "War is hell," he said. There was no glamor about war for men who actually do the fighting as any soldier will testify who has served long at the front whether in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War or the World War.

Sherman's definition was born of internal strife. The great international conflict, half a century later, was, we thought, "war to end war," a war to banish forever this experience of hell on earth. And yet it is agreed today that war is the most momentous and complicated problem of our age. Libraries have been written on this subject. Today I choose to confine myself to the one question—"Should America Ever Go to War Again?" Our aim is practical. We seek a common ground on which we can all agree to stand.

There are three plausible reasons that might induce America to go to war. America might be led into war in defense of her life, her liberty, her honor. No less compelling motive would be sufficient. But the question remains, Should America ever allow herself to be dragged into war in defense even of her life, her liberty, or her honor? Let us consider these plausible reasons in their reverse order.

I

First, Should America Ever Go to War in Defense of Her Honor?

My answer emphatically is No. It is conceivable that at some future time, the honor of America might be at stake because of what some foreign nation would do to America or because of what some foreign nation would do to another foreign nation. I contend that in neither case should America go to war for the sake of her honor, but should seek to vindicate her honor by some other means than war.

There are some super-patriots who say that an insult to the flag must be wiped out in blood. Theodore Roosevelt once declared, "We despise a nation as we despise a man who fails to resent an insult." With that sentiment we agree. But is there no way to resent an insult except by drawing blood? When Jesus Christ was insulted he did not use his divine power to smite down his enemies. He did not revile them.

He did not even threaten them. Today we revere Jesus Christ while we pity or despise those who insulted him. The day of the duel is done among civilized nations. A duel determines nothing with respect to the honor of the combatants. It determines only that one duelist is a little quicker on the trigger or a little more deft with the sword than the other duelist. If an insult to a nation's honor can be wiped out only with blood, then the small nations of the world are doomed by their very size to endure dishonor. Only the big nations can vindicate their honor by the exercise of their power. If America ever thinks her honor is tarnished by what another nation has said or done to her, let her request an apology or resort to arbitration or use any other diplomatic method. Let America stand on her dignity. In no case would a physical fight either preserve, restore or add to the honor of America.

On the contrary, since America has signed the Kellogg-Briand pact agreeing to settle all differences between nations by pacific means, a resort to arms in order to avenge an insult would be a dishonorable violation of her plighted word. Let America keep her honor by keeping her promises, even though every other nation dishonors herself by breaking her promises.

A different situation is conceivable in which the honor of America might be at stake. Suppose a big nation were to attack a small nation. Should America go to war in defense of the small nation? Well, that is what we thought we were doing in the World War, but subsequent experience has taught us the fallacy and the futility of that position. Vattel, the Swiss jurist, once said, "A struggle between nations is never a fight between a quite unmistakable angel on the one side and a quite unmistakable devil on the other side. Each nation thinks itself to be the angel and its enemy to be the devil and no one can say which nation is wrong and which is right."

That was so in 1914. Each group of nations was convinced that they were defending justice and righteousness and that their opponents were fighting for injustice and wickedness. We know now that the guilt of that war was shared in varying degrees by all the nations engaged in it. Ray Stannard Baker was entrusted by President Wilson with the secret minutes of the peace conference following the war and was requested to prepare a history of the proceedings. As revealing the war guilt of those very nations on whose side America fought Ray Stannard Baker writes the following summary:

> Such were in general the needs, desires and ambitions of the allied governments set forth in the secret treaties. So they intended to divide up the world. So they actually tried to divide it up at the peace conference. Though outwardly they were

combatting imperialism as symbolized by Germany, they were themselves seeking vast extensions of their own imperial and economic power. They kept these agreements secret from their own people fearing their effect upon the great masses of the workers and liberal groups. They kept them secret also from their smaller allies like Serbia and they kept them secret from America both before and after America came into the war.

In view of these revelations of the selfish intrigues of the nations with whom America allied herself in the last war, I say, never again should America allow herself out of a sense of honor to be drawn into war on the side of one group of nations as against another group. America indeed may and should in all honor use her great influence, diplomatic, financial, commercial, to bring about as speedily as possible a peaceful adjustment and agreement between the conflicting nations, but honor does not require that America herself should get into the fight. She is likely to come out of the fight with less honor than as though she had stayed out.

America has no treaties, thank God, and America ought never to make any treaties by which she covenants to go to war for any cause whatsoever.

II

Should America Ever Go to War in Defense of her Liberty?

Again I answer emphatically No. By liberty we mean national security, integrity and independence, and by going to war we mean waging war outside her own territory. We need at this point to bear in mind the clear distinction between defending self and waging war. Genuine self-defense is not war, although the plea of self-defense has often been used as an excuse for war. English common law holds that a man's home is his castle which he has a right to defend forcibly against unauthorized invasion. But the common law never justifies a man in invading his neighbor's home on the plea that his neighbor was the original aggressor or intruder. That principle holds between nations. America would be morally justified in resisting by force of arms any foe that attempted to cross her border with hostile intent. But she would not be justified in crossing the frontier of another nation with hostile intent. One is defense. The other is warfare. And there is a vital distinction between the two.

Many Christians, on the basis of our Lord's teachings and example, believe that it is not right to use force even to defend self, home or country, and a strong argument can be framed for that extreme doctrine of pacifism. But the vast majority of our citizens cannot, I am sure, be expected to go that far. It is entirely feasible, however, for multitudes of Christians, Jews and other citizens to agree that while they will help to defend their country against invasion, they will never again sanction

the sending abroad on to foreign territory of any American men, money, munitions or warships.

Two years ago, President Roosevelt, analyzing the reasons for armaments, found that they are either a desire of nations to enlarge their territories or a fear of nations that they will be invaded. And there is justification for this fear, he said, for modern weapons of offense are vastly stronger than modern weapons of defense. So that "if all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defenses automatically will become impregnable and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become secure. The ultimate objective of conferences for disarmament must be the complete elimination of all offensive weapons. The immediate objective should be a substantial reduction of some of these weapons and the elimination of many others."

In complete accord with this point of view was a subsequent suggestion made by Dr. Albert W. Palmer, president of the Chicago Theological Seminary, in which he invites each individual citizen to sign a non-aggression pledge which reads as follows:

> Stop all war now. A personal non-invasion promise. Let us as Christians assure all other nations that we will not attack them. Reserving the right of national self-defense by such means as may seem to me wise, effective and Christian, I from now on definitely repudiate all aggressive war. I will cross no national boundary-line to kill and destroy. Nor will I support my government in sending its army or navy to do so.

If the fifty million church-members in America would register such a vow as that and would voice it in a clear-cut and unmistakable manner, millions of other peace-loving citizens would be encouraged to take a similar stand and two results would follow:

Our government authorities would never dare again to commit America to war without a specific mandate from the people, and

Fear of America and preparations for a possible war with her would cease in certain nations, which today look with uncertainty and anxiety in our direction.

By following the policy just outlined, our national security, integrity and independence would be more strongly guaranteed without war than they ever would be with war. Suppose America, in defense of her liberty, should invade another nation, and should conquer that nation by invasion, would America have made herself permanently secure against subsequent retaliation by the conquered people? Not at all. Any nation strong enough to threaten the territory or the liberty of America could not be kept in permanent subjection, unless American troops were stationed as

a permanent garrison in that nation—and American public opinion certainly would never sanction such continued occupation of foreign soil. The history of Germany and the Versailles Treaty since the World War is positive proof that no great people in modern times can be kept down by force. Wars of invasion merely create and perpetuate resentments that lead to more wars. Pure self-defense, on the contrary, is not provocative of bitterness and retaliation. Self-defense might involve some losses and sacrifices, but these would be insignificant compared with the costs in men, money and hatreds of a war of conquest. America can easily defend herself against all serious threats to her integrity and independence. Let her stake her security on self-defense alone.

III

Should America Ever Go to War in Defense of Her Life?

A third time I answer just as emphatically No. By life we mean economic subsistence, prosperity and happiness upon which national life is dependent. By going to war we mean undertaking military operations outside her own boundaries. My position is this. On the one hand America is in duty-bound to make secure and keep secure the economic life and prosperity of all her citizens. But on the other hand, it would be foolish as well as immoral to go to war with anybody in the expectation of effecting by means of war such economic plenty, security and happiness.

It is not selfish for a nation to desire and to determine that all of its citizens shall have enough and to spare of the good things of life. Parents give many years of their life in providing for their children. Their effort is economic and materialistic but it is not selfish. The biblical conception of ideal national blessedness contains such features as these: A land flowing with milk and honey; every man sitting securely and contentedly under his own vine and fig tree; abundance of grain in the land, even upon the tops of the mountains, the fruit thereof shaking like Lebanon.

The major purpose of our national government in this year 1935, and properly so, is to make possible for every American citizen just such economic security and abundance as these Scriptures mention. Undoubtedly that will continue to be a major purpose of our government for generations to come. But war can never help. Rather it will enormously obstruct our efforts to reach and maintain that economic state. In our modern world, military power, military preponderance has no value whatever to bring about permanent improvement in the economic life of a nation. That is the theme of that remarkable book *The Great Illusion,*

published by Norman Angell in 1913 and republished and enlarged in 1933.

The main contentions of this book were conclusively proved by the World War and its aftermath. The thesis of the author, briefly, is this: The commerce and industry of a nation no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers. Military power is socially and economically futile and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it. It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth of trade of another, to enrich itself by subjugating or imposing its will by force on another. In short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which people strive.

As an up-to-date demonstration of the truth of this thesis, Norman Angell writes concerning his own country:

> Britain's complete military victory over her greatest pre-war commercial rival, Germany, has not enabled Britain to take that rival's trade, has not made it possible to use victory for the purpose of extending British trade, to prevent disastrous decline, or to improve Britain's economic position. That victory coincides with the most profound economic crisis the victor has ever known. That victory has not enriched Britain but has bankrupted her.

Nothing in this statement of fact and principle would surprise us if we were properly acquainted with the teaching of the Bible. The Bible likens that institution which we call the church to a human being, "One body with many members." If one member suffers, all the members suffer with it. If one member prospers, all the members share the benefits. The simile holds in the case of the whole body of nations on the earth, closely connected by international interests and relationships. If any nation is impoverished, every other nation is impoverished, every other nation suffers from the loss of trade and commerce with that poverty-stricken nation. Any nation that is prosperous is a better neighbor and customer of every other nation. As Norman Angell says, "The only feasible policy in our day for a conqueror to pursue is to leave the wealth of a territory in the possession of its occupants. Wide-spread confiscation or destruction of industry and trade in a conquered territory would react disastrously upon the commerce and finance of the conqueror."

In short, great victorious nations neither destroy nor transfer to themselves the trade of small defeated nations, because they cannot. Military power does not determine the relative economic position of peoples. The average Dutch citizen, living in a little country, insignificant in a military sense, enjoys as much material prosperity as the average German, English, Russian, Italian or American citizen, living in countries that boast great war establishments.

Furthermore, we have learned in the last ten years, by bitter experience, that in modern war indemnities and reparations at all commensurate with the cost of the war cannot be collected because they cannot be paid. France cannot make Germany pay. America cannot use her immense naval power to collect the debts due her from the countries of Europe and South America or even to protect her investments in those countries.

All of the foregoing is conclusive evidence that it would be sheer folly and insanity for America ever to go to war again with the idea of either preserving or acquiring any financial, commercial, industrial or other economic advantage anywhere in the world. America can get by friendly agreement, adjustments and compromises with the countries of South America, Europe, Asia and Africa immeasurably more prosperity than she could conceivably get by fighting for it even though she were strong enough to beat those other countries to their knees.

A few individuals like the armament manufacturers would become multimillionaires by plunging our nation into war. But to the masses of our people a future war would be not an economic blessing but an economic curse. For every three American soldiers killed in battle during the World War over there, one American millionaire was made over here. The war costs were fifty thousand deaths in battle, the war profits were twenty-one thousand millionaires in business. The stock of the Du Pont munition firm increased five thousand per cent. as a result of the World War, and the firm made net profits of two hundred and fifty-five million dollars. The United States Treasury Department in January of this year reported that the World War has already cost the taxpayers of the United States approximately fifty-two billions of dollars.

General Sherman said, "War is hell." General Smedley Butler adds, "To hell with war," a sentiment which I adopt as a perfectly pious and proper prayer. As voters, we are trustees of our nation, and as trustees it is our duty to do the best we can to promote its prosperity. As Christians, we are trustees of the kingdom of God. As trustees it is our duty to secure a social order that abounds in peace, purity and plenty.

Both as voters and as Christians, let us register a vow that we will never again engage in war or give our sanction to it. Recently there met in the Riverside Church of New York City more than two hundred ministers and rabbis with a congregation of eight hundred laymen and solemnly swore this covenant of peace:

> In loyalty to God I believe that the way of true religion cannot be reconciled with the way of war. In loyalty to my country, I support its adoption of the Kellogg-Briand pact which renounces war. In the spirit of true patriotism and with deep personal conviction I, therefore, renounce war, and never will I support another.

A GREAT TIME FOR THE PREACHER [1]

JOHN MILTON MOORE, D. D.
Bridgeport, Conn.

Few preachers approaching the end of their ministry escape this question: Would you do it again? My answer would be an emphatic affirmative. If one accepts Jesus' philosophy of life and is reasonably well qualified for the work, I know of no opportunity for idealistic service that equals the gospel ministry. At the same time I should recognize now as I did not forty years ago that in entering the ministry I was walking straight into trouble. Indeed that was not true then. The safest, easiest job in the world was that of preaching orthodox Christianity in the conventional fashion. The fact that ministers have been considered extra good life-insurance risks has troubled me a bit when I recall the commission given to the early gospel preachers: "I send you out as sheep in the midst of wolves." A sheep that lived in a pasture infested by wolves would not be sought out as a good insurance prospect.

I have never wooed martyrdom and have no complaints to offer as to the hardships of the ministry. I have had few painful experiences. This is not a matter for boasting or great satisfaction as it contains the material on which may be based the chief count in the indictment to be brought against the ministry of my generation. T. R. Glover's characterization of the early Christians as "perfectly fearless, absurdly happy and always getting into trouble" accounts for their power. This is especially true of their facility for getting into trouble. Most of the ministers of my generation have been pretty successful in avoiding or escaping that sort of trouble. We have not known much of that which Paul declared to be his aim, to know "the fellowship of His suffering."

That will not be true of the ministers of the next forty years. Even though they be only as sincere and heroic as we who are now passing on, and love martyrdom no more than we, they will find it less easy to escape it. And that is a part of what I had in mind when I chose as my subject for this occasion "A Great Day for the Preacher."

With only my limited knowledge of history and particularly of the history of preaching, I can find at least three periods that offered the preacher a distinctly great opportunity.

There was a century or so between 630 and 530 B. C., which, for some reason that so far as I am aware no historian has ever explained,

[1] Address delivered before the Crozer Alumni Society, June, 1935.

was a supremely great day for the preacher. During that hundred years, of the eleven living religions of the world today five took their rise. They are Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Jainism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. I do not need to remind you how only a century earlier religion went moral in Judah and Israel under the influence of such preachers as Amos and Isaiah, and how in this marvelous sixth century Jeremiah and the second Isaiah also in varied phrase reiterated the dominant note that Micah had made so clear and appealing: "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love kindness and to walk humbly with thy God?"

Another great day for the preacher dawned in Europe in the sixteenth century when religion went personal under the influence of such preachers as Martin Luther, and John Calvin, and Ulrich Zwingli, and Balthasar Hübmaier with their insistence in season and out of season that "the just shall live by faith."

In between these two great preaching periods I call your attention to another and a greater. It was when Jesus came preaching in Galilee and saying: "The time is fulfilled; the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye and believe the Gospel." This period I shall characterize further as I undertake to show that now in this twentieth century we are living in another great day for the preacher comparable to those that I have cited and a time to which the conditions and message of Jesus' ministry are particularly pertinent.

When men talk to me about the old gospel I point them to this passage, when the word gospel first appears in the Bible. Much of the so-called "old gospel" is neither old enough nor gospel enough to satisfy me. This is a great time for the preacher whose mind and heart and will have been captured and are held by the gospel of the Kingdom, the real old gospel, the oldest gospel.

This summary of Jesus' earliest preaching falls very naturally into three divisions: a judgment, an announcement and a challenge.

I

"The time is fulfilled," declares Jesus, thus pronouncing a judgment on what has gone before. It is the end of an epoch. All that lies behind is ancient history. Every calendar that declares this day to be June third in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-five bears witness to the accuracy of his religious and historic insight. Most of us probably explained to the world shortly after leaving Crozer just how those particular years came to be "the fulness of time." This does not need to be elaborated here. Negatively the epoch was ending through the moral and spiritual bankruptcy of Roman and Jewish religion and the decadence

of both Roman and Jewish political power. Positively the epoch ended and the way was prepared for the new day by the establishment of law and order and peace in the world through Roman power, the spread of the Greek language as an instrument and vehicle of a new world culture and the scattering through the Empire of the Jews with their high doctrine of God and their effective system of synagogues. These creative movements focus upon the years 767-821 A. U. C., in which the successors of Octavian Augustus—Tiberius, Gaius Claudius and Nero—ruled the world. Rome seemed to be at the height of its power with nearly a thousand years of glorious history guaranteeing its future for another millennium. But Rome's time was fulfilled. Before another century had passed it would be evident that she was on the way to be "one with Nineveh and Tyre."

Coming down to the sixteenth century we can discover world-shaking events that remanded to ancient history the civilization of the Renaissance and the Holy Roman Empire with what had gone before, the Middle Ages, as this period has been designated. The world of Henry VIII and Francis I and Charles V, of Rabelais and Machiavelli, of Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael and Galileo, of Popes Julius and Leo and Adrian and Clement seemed to them to be very modern and momentous. It certainly was momentous; but it was an old world passing rapidly into ancient history. Its time was fulfilled.

A revolutionary idea was just then beginning to lay hold of the minds of men; and nothing, says Victor Hugo, is so powerful as an idea whose hour has come. This revolutionary idea was the conception of personal freedom. Hitherto men had thought and lived as had their fathers. Custom was king, tradition was trusted, non-conformity was treasonable. To the pioneers of the spirit who began to think for themselves and to depart from the old paths we owe whatever praise or blame we have to award for the new world in which we live. Everything else followed upon their activities and was bound to do so.

The discovery of America by Columbus not only revealed the existence of a new continent, but made possible the beginning of a new type of national life free from many of the limitations and traditions of European civilization. But it did more than that. Turning the eyes of the world from the east to the west, arousing men from their satisfaction with old achievements to undertake high adventure for new and strange and vaster achievements, making them forget the glories of the past in their eagerness to embrace the larger glories of the beckoning future, Columbus changed the whole mental outlook of the Western world. Larger maps produced larger minds.

But other events contributed necessary elements of progress. Just forty-one years before the three small ships sailed out of the harbor of Palos on their momentous voyage, there took place what must have been considered at the time a major disaster to Christian civilization. Constantinople, the capital of the Roman Empire in the East for a thousand years, surrendered to the besieging armies of the Turks, to become the Ottoman capital and high vantage-ground from which the followers of the Prophet might launch new attacks upon Europe. But here, as so often, the uses of adversity were sweet and ultimately rewarding. Greek culture, driven from its ancient home, was carried westward, through the banishment of her scholars, to be sown throughout Europe. In this hospitable soil it became the seed of a renascence, a new birth of the human mind. About that time printing from movable type was developed, a most timely event, for now the new culture had a suitable vehicle for its transmission. And it was at this opportune moment that Columbus added the new world.

Only one thing more was needed, and that was to come twenty-four years later through Martin Luther and his associates. The human conscience must find freedom from ecclesiastical bondage. The Reformation accomplished this and set the stage for a new and thrilling act in the drama of man.

And now here we are set in the midst of these tumultuous, crashing, creative years in which again a political and economic order that has grown old is apparently passing away. To what specific events will future historians point that will as clearly indicate a turning-point in time comparable to those which made inevitable the passing of the European civilization of the fifteenth century and its predecessors? I venture a guess. They will date the beginning of the Machine Age more definitely than I am able to do and designate it as one of the signs of the time which men of prophetic insight might discern and count revolutionary. More obvious would be the assassination of the Austrian archduke Ferdinand, which ultimately plunged the world into well-nigh universal war and no end of national convulsions and revolutions. A third would be the crash of the Bull Market in 1929 which, if not the cause, was the distinct forerunner and announcement of the approach of an economic depression of utterly incalculable moral and social consequences. Back of these thundering events later study and a longer perspective will no doubt disclose more delicate and subtle energies and influences whose emergence will help to date the end of an amazing epoch.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that historians now recognize a more continuous development of society than formerly. There is not

discernible any such sharp break between the epochs or ages of history as we have been accustomed to assume. It was a hundred years and more after the birth of Christ before the real significance of the Christian movement was recognized in the Roman Empire. It was not until the sixth century that our Christian chronology was introduced by which all historical time is divided between B. C. and A. D. It is doubtful if those who were living in Rome at the time of its historic "fall" were fully aware of its having *fallen*. The Middle Ages are generally accounted to have ended with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, but another century was required to register sufficient change to make it fully evident that a new world was in the making. And the years in which we live must be followed by other years, a hundred of them perhaps, before the far-reaching changes now taking place will have gone far enough to certify fully the end of an old epoch and the beginning of a new one. Such prophets and scholars of our century as Walter Rauschenbusch, for example, or Nicholas Murray Butler, whose insight seem trustworthy as to the trend of contemporary life, are clear and definite in their conviction that we live in just such a creative hour. It was in 1907 that Rauschenbusch wrote these words: "We are standing at the turning of the ways. We are actors in a great historical drama. It rests upon us to decide if a new era is to dawn in the transformation of the world into the kingdom of God, or if Western civilization is to descend to the graveyard of dead civilizations and God will have to try once more."

Recently President Butler said: "The period through which we are passing is a period like the fall of the Roman Empire, like the Renaissance, like the beginning of the political and social revolutions in England and France—it is different from them all, is more powerful than them all and holds the world more in its grip than any of them, but it resembles them in its epoch-making character. . ."

The recent five-four decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the Railroad Pension Plan illustrates the delicacy of adjustment between the epoch that is closing and the new day that is dawning, as regards a fundamental issue of social justice. Says the majority decision: "The pension plan is an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat non-contractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee." But, replies the minority, "there are responsibilities that cannot be confined to the contractual engagements." Here the old and the new meet in head-on collision.

Probably the present economic system with its necessary emphasis on property rights will not work effectively without encroachment on human rights. Very well, is the inevitable reply. Why not devise a system that

will work? The decision is five to four in favor of the day that is declining. But the margin is small.

The smashing decision of the Supreme Court nullifying the legislation of the National Recovery Act, though unanimous, is a still more striking illustration of the changing times. Operating under a constitution adopted one hundred and forty-six years ago, American industry broke down with a crash that shook the nation's industrial and commercial institutions like a vast devastating earthquake.

Since 1789 our national domain has been expanded successively by the Louisiana purchase, the acquisition of Florida and the Oregon country, Texas and "all points west," Alaska, Hawaii and other islands of the sea. To the original thirteen have been added thirty-five more states in our three-thousand-mile-wide continental domain.

In the meantime new methods of communication, such as the telegraph and telephone, the radio and modern newspaper, and new instruments of transportation such as the railway, which bound remote sections together, the motor-car, creating a vast new system of public highways and the airplane, whose contribution to the annihilation of space is just beginning to be felt, have practically blotted out state lines so far as industry and commerce are concerned. Something had to be done to adjust industrial life to the new conditions, to curb the vast powers of concentrated and conscienceless wealth, to end the exploitation of the farmer and the wage-earner, to protect children from the all-devouring machine. Something had to be done even to save the economic system itself which the exercise of liberty had created and the abuse of liberty was now destroying. Something had to be done at once.

Something was done. It was radical. It was extensive. It was courageous. Whether it was wise or unwise I do not pretend to say. Probably it contained important elements both of wisdom and unwisdom. Be that as it may, now comes the Supreme Court to say in substance that it is all off. The Founding Fathers of 1789 forbid it. To be sure they legislated for other conditions in another century, in practically another world; but they continue to rule America without the privilege of using their fine intelligence and statesmanship to modify their judgments in the light of national economic and social changes which they could not then have possibly foreseen. It doesn't seem fair to the Fathers to assume that their political and economic wisdom would not have grown with the growing America, nor that for forty-eight states we should insist upon rules and regulations that they deemed suitable for the government of thirteen very different states. Nor does it seem reasonable to suppose that they were given any miraculous guidance to legislate for all time.

But the decision of the Supreme Court was right of course. It was not concerned over the merits of nor the necessity for the New Deal. It was simply telling us how the NRA accorded with what the gentlemen who met in Philadelphia one hundred forty-six years ago thought about the proper relationship of Federal and State powers. No direct help was given by this decision. The nine distinguished gentlemen in Washington have blocked what was supposed to be the road to Recovery with a large sign which reads, "No Thoroughfare." (Or have they only sent us on a simple and possibly short detour?)

The really big job to which our Colonial Fathers were addressing themselves when they wrote the Constitution still challenges us: "to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

Or take the question of war and peace. What a menace to social order the idea of peace must be when the State College of my adopted Connecticut must guard its students against the very mention of a policy of the college in any public discussion, if such discussion should "reflect upon military instruction." Teachers or students participating in such discussion may be summarily dismissed. When college trustees in a state with the traditions of freedom that belong to Connecticut can be thrown into a panic over so mild a matter as the discussion of the inadvisability of enforced student military training, it is apparent that the time of the departure of the old order is at hand. "Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad." Truly the times are in turmoil. The world is in travail to bring forth a new age.

Is democracy doomed? Is capitalism collapsing? Can the Church survive in the changing order? These are questions that are being asked not always by wild radicals but increasingly by sober statesmen and responsible churchmen.

We are living, we are dwelling,
In a grand and awful time,
In an age on ages telling;
To be living is sublime.

The New Deal goes limping now, but the problem of economic justice and security is still with us. Militarism fattens on appropriations wrung by falsehood and fear from a sorely taxed and tried people, but preparedness only adds fuel to the fires of international distrust and the problem of peace persists. At bottom these problems are in the field of the preacher's specialty. His task and opportunity just now are of fairly staggering proportions. He must announce that the time is fulfilled, that it is the

end of an epoch. And then he must go on to proclaim in the name of Jesus and in the spirit and power of the prophets and reformers the eternal principles of justice and brotherhood and mutual service and sacrificial love through which will come at last the new and better day.

II

From reviewing the past and pronouncing judgment upon it, Jesus went on to appraise the present and make a thrilling announcement concerning it: "The kingdom of God is at hand." The dream of the ages is beginning to come true. The exciting element in this proclamation of Jesus lay in the last two words, at hand. Others had proclaimed the kingdom. John the Baptist had stirred the people from Jerusalem to northern Galilee by declaring its near approach. Jesus went farther than John had dared to go, in his bold thinking. It is here, said Jesus. It has begun to be. The kingdom of God is among you. The kingdom of God is come upon you.

Schweitzer's view of the influence of Jewish eschatology on the mind of Jesus is attractive because it does explain so many difficult sayings. I have not been able to accept it because so fallible a Christ who was so mistaken as to the deep counsels of God and so naïve in his social thinking is quite too feeble a figure for the vast revolutionary rôle that he has played in Christian history. I cannot believe that such a Christ would have produced such stalwart Christians as Schweitzer. The view of Dr. Harold Dodd of Manchester, England, who delivered the Nathaniel W. Taylor lectures at Yale this spring, is truer and bolder. Jesus was not believing and saying that the kingdom of God in its fulness of power was about to be set up on earth, and therefore manifestly mistaken in the light of two millenniums' delay. He believed and declared that the kingdom had arrived, for such an interpretation the word of Mark permits, if it does not even demand.

How much more gravely mistaken was Jesus then, it may be said. Not so. His thought cannot be forced into the narrow limits of Pharisaic literalism nor of ours. The kingdom of God had really begun to be when once its basic principles had been clearly apprehended and fully accepted by even one man. On the day that Columbus turned his three little ships westward the United States of America was at hand, even though more than a century should elapse before the first permanent settlement would be established, nearly three centuries before the Constitution would be adopted and God knows how many more centuries before its fulness of moral and political power shall come. For Columbus with all his limitations had hit upon the truth as to the shape of the earth and the possibility

of its circumnavigation. In addition he had the courage of his conviction. "Sail on! Sail on! Sail on!" he cried to his near-mutinous crew. That guaranteed America. In very truth it had even then begun to be.

Many prophets before Jesus' day had glimpsed the kingdom. They had in fact laid a foundation upon which he should build. Clarifying and vitalizing the prophetic ideals and visions of Hosea and Isaiah and Micah and Jeremiah by his superior spiritual insight, and correcting the fantastic and immensely popular "revelations" of the apocalyptists, Jesus breathed a new spirit into the old thought forms. He discovered and declared the fundamental principles upon which the kingdom of God as he knew God and man could now or ever be established.

There were not many of these. God is the universal Father. Personality is infinitely precious. Character has illimitable spiritual possibility. Redemption is costly. Corollaries of these basic propositions are readily deduced. Mutual service must overleap all barriers of class and caste and culture. Not legal righteousness nor ritual correctness but love is the ultimate measure and test of goodness. The kingdom of God is a kingdom of character rather than a governmental machine operated by a super-mechanic. The cross is not just an event in time but a process in eternity. Whenever one man sees all this and begins to live by it and is ready to die for it the kingdom of God has begun to be. When enough men order their personal lives and their social institutions by these principles the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdom of God, and the glory and the power of it will be abundantly manifest. The kingdom, first fully comprehended in Christ, will be finally consummated in humanity.

Thus Jesus sought to stimulate the failing faith and courage of the people and to give spiritual content and meaning to their kingdom hope when he came preaching in Galilee and saying: "The kingdom of God is at hand." At that moment religion was making a great forward leap. A new day was dawning.

Can anyone say that the preacher of today and tomorrow may as confidently take up this old gospel of Jesus and proclaim it with assurance and conviction? It must be admitted that it is much easier to declare that the time is fulfilled, that the end of an epoch has come, than it is to say that the kingdom of God is now at hand, that the dream of the ages is again in striking fashion beginning to come true, that a new day is now dawning upon the troubled world. May it not be true, to take the unhappy possibility in Doctor Rauschenbusch's "crisis," that our civilization is even now on the way to the graveyard of dead civilizations and that it is too late to save it? I do not know as to that. But even if it be granted

that we are missing our chance because we know not that this is the time of our visitation, still in that very fact there may lie the clearest evidence that the kingdom of God is at hand. A generation ago we were pointing to what we called "Christian civilization" as an evidence of the power of Christ, and were urging it as one of the reasons why the Orient should hear our missionaries and accept our religion. Now the missionaries tell us that this selfsame civilization in which we were wont to glory stands athwart the path of Christian progress, since it becomes apparent that it denies utterly the spirit of Christ's Gospel. The approach of the kingdom in Jesus' day was heralded by the revealing fire of God's judgment which was burning up the false systems of ecclesiastical and legalistic and nationalistic and materialistic religion that obstructed the way of the kingdom far more than did even the gross sins of publicans and prostitutes. That may be true of our day. Even so, I say, it is a great time for the preacher:

But if we may dare to take the happier view that we may enter now "upon a new era in the transformation of the world into the kingdom of God," then what a time this is for courageous preaching! And to take this view does not convict one of naïveté nor deny him the right to claim to be realistic. That which is seen is temporal; that which is not seen is eternal. Beneath the too, too solid flesh of a vast materialistic organism the quickening energies of the creative Spirit are at work. The ideals of Jesus which found expression in the Sermon on the Mount are being more boldly proclaimed by more courageous preachers today than ever before in a thousand years and are being more thoughtfully and sympathetically received by those who hear. Not in vain did the great soul of Rauschenbusch travail in pain and his heart break in spiritual martyrdom as he, in the power of Christ's old Gospel of the kingdom, flung himself into the economic and political conflicts of the opening years of the twentieth century.

The New Deal may be assailed on the right and on the left, and may be very defective, as it no doubt is, but it is the forerunner of a new day. Huey Long and Father Coughlin and Doctor Townsend and Upton Sinclair may be the demagogues that some assert, and their plans and programs may be thoroughly unsound, as they probably are, but they are focusing attention on the sorrows of the poor and the exploited. All questions of economic sanity and moral sincerity aside, they are spokesmen for the same classes whose cause Jesus and the prophets espoused and defended. Deliverance will not come through demagogues, to be sure, but like Paul in prison at Rome we may rejoice that Christ is preached even though some do it of envy and strife and contention. And they

do serve Christ who preach deliverance to the captives and set at liberty them that are bruised and preach good news to the poor.

And the protest against war is growing louder and clearer every day. Though it be made by many who walk not with us, let us rejoice that it is being made and that the prospect of prisons filled with conscientious objectors should war break out grows more and more.

In all this clamor of voices and confusion of tongues let the preacher of Christ's Gospel be heard. He may not be wise in economic or political technique and should not assume a wisdom that he does not possess. While refusing to speak as a specialist in spheres where he has not learned, let him not forget that he has a specialty of his own. Others may know more than he about business and industry and statesmanship and finance but he knows or should know more about the Gospel of Jesus. The Greeks had a word for it. They called it foolishness. But at long last it will be found that in that gospel whose preaching may now be accounted foolishness by hard-headed practical men—captains of industry and finance and militarists and worldly wise politicians—there reside the wisdom and power adequate for the world's ultimate need. This is a great time for the preacher of the gospel of the kingdom.

III

But Jesus' Galilean preaching issued in an inevitable challenge. If it is the end of an epoch and the dream of the ages is about to come true, something must be done about it. Repent ye and believe the good news. Get a new mind for the new day. Here are two great old words of the Christian vocabulary that have become feeble. Like coins that have been rubbed smooth till the image and superscription that they once bore have been almost or quite effaced, so "repent" and "believe" have been worn smooth by much usage till they have become trite, literally rubbed, worn out. They greatly need to be reminted. For they are really dynamic words, living and powerful and sharper than a two-edged sword.

Repent means literally and exactly "Get a new mind." This Jesus saw to be the first need for such a time as that. A man's philosophy is the most important thing about him. That is not first which is action but that which is thought and afterward that which is action. The limitation which Peter revealed when he protested Jesus' announcement of the cross was not a limitation of love or loyalty. It was a limitation of his thinking. You think like men not like God, Jesus protested. And Paul beginning that section of the Epistle to the Romans which is most practical, which calls to individual and social action, must needs say first: "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your minds." Jesus was going on to

present religion in more radical terms than had ever been heard before or since and, therefore, pleads first for a deep and thoroughgoing change of mental attitude. It is like being born again, he said to Nicodemus, beginning all over again like a little child and thinking religion out again *de novo*. No wonder the old councillor was staggered by so radical a proposal. How can a man be born again when he is old? How indeed? How can a man or an institution, a church or a civilization get a new mind when it is old? Impossible it seems and impossible it is were it not for the regenerating, transforming power and insight of the Spirit of God.

Repent meant much more when Jesus said it than it ever meant on the lips of John the Baptist. When the people asked him what they should do, he replied in terms of moral action. No more grafting by the publicans, nor rioting nor extortion by the soldiers. Giving to the poor he prescribed for the people generally. Jesus was out for moral action too but he would change the minds of men so that right moral and social action would flow spontaneously from right thinking rather than from a coerced obedience to rules and regulations.

You must think differently about God, said Jesus. When you pray, say, "Father." You must think differently about man, about every man, the lowest and basest, the Gentile, the Samaritan, the publican, about women and children and slaves. You must think differently and far more realistically about sin and about society, about riches and about religion, about life and about death. A revolution in men's thinking is a necessary condition of changed lives and a transformed world. And he told the stories of The Prodigal Son, and The Good Samaritan, and The Rich Man and Lazarus, and The Rich Fool and many others to show what he meant. A new mind for the new day is imperative.

But that was not all. In your repentance supply faith. Believe the good news. Here is another word that has been worn thin. A whole hemisphere away from mere assent to a creed or adherence to an institution is faith as Jesus conceived it. Faith is a thrust of mind and imagination and purpose into the unknown. It is vital, dynamic.

> Think not the faith by which the just shall live
> Is a dead creed, a map correct of Heaven;
> Far less a feeling fond and fugitive
> . . . . . .
> It is an affirmation and an act
> That bids eternal truth be present fact.

There is something exciting about faith as Jesus thought of it and practiced it.

In that new and highly stimulating biography of Francis I by Francis Hackett there is a sentence that reveals and by implication condemns a whole philosophy of education. The distinguished abbé who was tutor to the lad who was later to become the French king, he tells us, had no intention of *arousing* the young intellect but sought only to *furnish* it. How much of our economic, political, religious education has been of this sort? We have a ready-made system of ideas, traditions, doctrines and institutions with which we have grown up and which appear to be the last word of wisdom. With these we would furnish the minds of the young.

How adequate our system may have been for other days we shall not now discuss. Certainly it is not sufficient for the new day. What is needed now is to arouse intellect and heart and will. There must be a new mind to perceive and a new faith to accept the new possibilities in individual and social life that the Gospel of the kingdom holds out to us. "Believe the Good News," cried Jesus, as he sought to arouse the people from their hopelessness and sense of helplessness. Some things must be burned down before the kingdom can be built up. I have come to cast fire in the earth. Evil is not invincible. I saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven. I have overcome the world. He that believeth on me hath eternal life. But more than that is true. God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world but that the world—the whole social order—through him might be saved. Oh, believe the Good News. Faith as Jesus conceived it was something tremendously alive and thrilling, and hope-inspiring.

And the faith of Jesus arouses the spirit because it was courageous. Professor Kirsopp Lake defines it in a well-turned sentence: "Faith is not belief in spite of evidence but life in scorn of consequence." It is not for feeble minds or timorous souls. It is gloriously rugged and stubborn and determined. The three Hebrew young men whom Nebuchadnezzar had set over important affairs in Babylon are good exemplars. Commanded to bow down before the image of the king and worship they refused. Threatened with death in the fiery furnace and challenged with this question, "Where is the god who can save you from my power?" they replied: "O Nebuchadnezzar, we need not say a word in answer to that question. There is a God who is able to save us. . . But even if he does not, understand this, O King, we will not serve your gods and we will not bow down before the golden image." Life in scorn of consequence!

Could Jesus' faith be more precisely described. It does not find expression in insistence upon ancient dogmas and wonders, but in a bold grasp of the present and a courageous demand upon the future, in the

name of the Father God. In this faith he stedfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem, and followed unshrinkingly the path of pain to the very end where was Gethsemane with its sweat of blood and Calvary with its cross and Joseph's garden with its sepulcher. Life in scorn of consequence! This is the demand which the preacher in this grand and awful time must make in the name of Christ. Get a new mind; believe the Good News.

The world is getting ready for this message. Let it be granted as President Angell of Yale has recently said, and as many of us have found, that Protestantism is "confronted by a vast paralyzing indifference." Yet it is true, as he went on to say, that men will not indefinitely "tolerate the continuation, much less the repetition, of the hopelessness in which our earlier economic and political systems have landed us." And furthermore he declared, and what is more to the point here, that fulness of life cannot come "through economic channels solely but from an awakening ethical and religious spirit." Many have said as much, but now we are being driven to the point where multitudes in desperation perhaps are becoming willing to try religion. There is perplexity and distress of nations in which men's hearts are failing them for fear of those things that are coming on the earth. The remedy for our ills is religion and men begin to see it. But religion for such a time as this must be freed from bondage to ancient dogma and ritual and institutionalism. This new day calls for the old gospel of Galilee, the gospel of the kingdom. It will find its own forms for the expression of the new truth that will burst out of the old Book and the new life that will spring from the new operations of the old Pentecostal Spirit.

Young men who this day were welcomed into membership in The Crozer Alumni Society and you who preceded them by but a few years, your older brothers greet you and bid you be strong and of good courage. "A great and effectual door is opened unto you and there are many adversaries." Young preacher, believe, and believing rejoice that you have come to the kingdom for such a time as this. *Morituri te salutamus.*

Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee,
Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,
Our faith triumphant o'er our fears
Are all with thee, are all with thee.

THE HUMANIST CONCEPTION OF SALVATION

CHARLES S. BRADEN, Ph. D.
Northwestern University

HUMANISM is a flexible term. It is employed in a variety of ways. Very loosely, it is used almost synonymously with humanitarianism to denote a deep interest in the well-being of man. As a technical term it is used by two widely differing groups: the so-called *literary humanists,* represented by such men as the late Irving Babbit and Paul Elmer More, who claim to carry on the humanistic tradition of the Renaissance, and the so-called naturalistic humanists, sometimes called *religious humanists,* represented by such men as Professors Otto, Sellars, Auer and Haydon, on its academic side and by such preachers as Curtis Reese, John H. Dietrich and Charles F. Potter in the pulpit. It is an organized movement, thoroughly self-conscious, Unitarian for the most part in background. It publishes a magazine, *The New Humanist.* Defined in the words of one of its more influential exponents it is, according to Charles F. Potter:

"faith in the supreme value and self-perfectibility of human personality" or in expanded form "Humanism is the conviction that personality is the explanation of the universe, that man himself is the highest manifestation of this personality, and that the powers resident in the individual and society are sufficient to ensure progress toward an ideal society of ideal persons."[1]

Humanists of this sort are not agreed at every point, but they are one in their rejection of the supernatural, at least as in the older sense of a conscious, personal Being who controls the destinies of men and can be appealed to for help by man. Humanists rather generally dislike to be called atheists, because of the sinister connotation of that term in the popular mind. They prefer to be thought of as agnostic with reference to belief in God—by no means all of them are sheer mechanists in their belief; some even continue to use the term God, but defined in such a way as to be unrecognizable to the orthodox believer.

They do however have a rather concrete idea of *Salvation* and it is that phase of their belief which engages us here. They preach a very definite gospel, hold out a very real hope to humanity, and have well-recognized techniques for the realization of their ideal. What is the doctrine of salvation?

It should be said at the outset, of course, that they do not frequently use the term salvation, although a recent number of *The New Humanist*

[1] Chas. F. Potter, *Humanism a New Religion,* p. 14.

carried an article on "The Meaning of Salvation for Scientific Naturalism," from which we shall have occasion to quote. For them in general *Salvation* can be used only in its more comprehensive sense as the goal of religion. Salvation of the *soul* in any such sense as conceived of by orthodoxy is of course out of the question, since in that older sense there is no soul. A humanist writer discussing specifically the meaning of salvation for scientific naturalism expresses what is probably a commonly accepted humanist view:

> Moreover, the net result of empirical evidence—what data we have as well as what we lack—inclines the naturalist against a belief in the existence of separable souls. The mind-body relationship is still a moot question, but in general, scientific naturalists consider it highly improbable that thinking and willing could take place apart from a physical organism. Indeed, do such terms as thinking, willing, and the like have any significance except in describing the behavior of a living organism?[2]

With no conception of a God who is interested in or cares for humanity, salvation can obviously not be thought of as a part of a divine plan. Indeed, while humanity itself is the chief concern of the humanists, from the standpoint of the universe there is only indifference. John H. Dietrich expresses it thus:

> The Humanist believes—mind you, he cannot prove it though all the evidence points in that direction—that the cosmic process is not aware of him at all, that it is not in any sense partial to him, and that should the human race disappear it would occasion that process no more concern than the disappearance of any other of its products, the mosquitoes for instance.[3]

Another humanist preacher, A. W. Slaten, contrasts sharply the orthodox view and that of the humanist:

> It calls upon you to give up the comforting thought of the Fatherhood of God and offers you instead the inflexible impartiality of immutable natural law. It reminds you that you are no favorite of a kindly Providence, but that your existence has been thus far prolonged by virtue of your fortunate heredity and your resourcefulness in adaptation. You have stood perhaps upon the point of some great rock that jutted out over the roaring sea. You have crouched upon some dizzy mountain height and clung fast, and gazed in fascination into the abyss below. But now you are asked to look out upon the Universe, to place yourself, as it were, upon some projecting spar and look into the frightful depths of infinite space. You see vast worlds rolling in resistless precision. You realize that you are in the grip of cosmic forces. You sense your isolation, that you are physically alone in a terrifying and uncaring universe, and that when your little span of life is done you sink down into extinction, the blackness of darkness forever!

[2] Horace J. Nickels, "The Meaning of Salvation for Scientific Naturalism," *The New Humanist*, VI, 6, No. 4, p. 5.

[3] John H. Dietrich, "What Is Humanism?" *The New Humanist*, VI, 6, No. 2, March-April, 1933, p. 8.

It requires some courage to take that frightening look and then to creep back into the homey, happy, human relationships, find them sufficient, dream of a better world of human life, not in Elysian Fields or Walhalla, or the New Jerusalem, but here upon the good brown earth.[4]

Conceiving thus of man in relation to the Universe it is only logical to deny to him any such thing as personal immortality, as held by orthodox Christianity. Potter declares that humanists "will not assume any dogmatic position against immortality, if immortality is conceived as a state of improved and perfected personality."[5] Nickels rather more logically expresses the belief of many humanists. He says:

Many naturalists discover that a belief in the immortality of the individual is, after penetrating reflection, undesirable. They feel no delight in the prospect of a really endless personal survival, even with life at the best. And what a colorless existence would be one deprived of the faculties and joys necessarily pertaining to life in the physical world! Consequently, it is the opinion of most naturalists that this idea would not be advanced so persistently except for the age-old inheritance of rationalized, primitive notions.[6]

It appears therefore that humanists regard salvation as something present and this-worldly. Reese makes the whole object of humanistic religion the enhancement of the human estate. "The chief end of man," he says, "is to build towering personality, and to direct it into ways of complete living. This requires not merely the recognition of wrong, but active endeavor to right the wrong and to build the right, for,"[7] he continues:

A worth-while religion must have human life as its aim, and the fulfilment of human life as its supreme test of values. All other considerations whether of an other-worldly or of a materialistic character are of secondary importance. At the fiery altar of human life must be tested every idea, every symbol and every institution.[8]

The *Humanist Manifesto,* a document issued in 1933 and subscribed to by a number of the leading humanists, though by no means all, defines religion in distinctly human terms. It declares:

Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation—all that is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained.[9]

[4] A. W. Slaten, in Curtis W. Reese, *Humanist Sermons,* pp. 90, 91.
[5] Charles F. Potter, *Op. cit.,* p. 108.
[6] Horace J. Nickels, *Op. cit.,* p. 5.
[7] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanism,* p. 17.
[8] Curtis W. Reese, *Op. cit.,* p. 10.
[9] "A Humanist Manifesto," *The New Humanist,* VI, 6, No. 3, May-June, 1933, p. 2.

Over and over again humanist preachers stress the relation of humanism to the whole of life. Curtis Reese writes:

> Humanism regards all the normal human impulses as valid and worthful and it seeks the complete and harmonious realization of them all. There is no question of higher and lower impulses. None is mean or unclean. All are good and sacred. Humanism proclaims the democracy of the human impulses. Conflicts in the impulsive life are abnormalities due to the misunderstanding and misuse of the impulses. The well-balanced, fully developed, and intelligently controlled impulsive life is the full life. Of all the needs of the race, the greatest are for freedom from repression and oppression, and for committal to the fullest possible realization of life on the highest possible human plane.[10]

And again:

> The Humanist gospel aims to satisfy the whole of human life, no phase of life being taboo. . . It is interested in everything that concerns human life. The sweat of the shop and the grind of the market-place, as well as the thoughts of philosophers and the dreams of seers. It sorrows over every wail of woe and rejoices over every far-flung hope. Sometimes grimly, sometimes buoyantly, but always definitely and with the rear bridges burned, Humanism tackles life situations. Issues shift, needs change, men grow old and pass away; but always there remains the human struggle to wring a satisfactory life from environing situations that are sometimes none too friendly. But with greater knowledge comes greater control, and with greater control more visions of far-reaching goals. With increasing knowledge and insight, with growing determination and power, man moves steadily forward, striking from his soul the chains that nature and his older self have forged, courageously facing the present, and venturing in the face of greatest difficulties to chart the unknown tomorrow.[11]

That " man is himself an end, not just a means to something else, not a mere instrument to some other end unrelated to himself " [12] is a cardinal doctrine of humanism according to Dietrich. But individual men's happiness and well being are inextricably bound up with society and must be sought by social means. The *Manifesto* affirms this. It declares: " The goal of humanism is a free and universal society in which people voluntarily and intelligently cooperate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared life in a shared world." [13]

Concretely of course this means a rich, abundant physical life, with the fullest possible development of the individual's powers, a normal unfolding of his mental capacities to their highest attainable limits and full opportunity for the expression of his higher so-called spiritual qualities. The *Manifesto* sums up the position thus:

[10] Curtis W. Reese, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
[11] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanist Religion*, pp. 38-40.
[12] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanist Sermons*, p. 102.
[13] *The New Humanist*, VI, 6, No. 3, p. 4, June, 1933.

We assert that humanism will: (a) affirm life rather than deny it; (b) seek to elicit the possibilities of life, not flee from it; and (c) endeavor to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not merely for the few. By this positive morale and intention humanism will be guided, and from this perspective and alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.[14]

How is this goal to be attained? How shall men be "saved"?

First of all humanists are unanimous in insisting that there is no help of any supernatural sort to be relied upon. Man is the measure of the universe. He is himself sufficient. Humanists looking out upon a universe indifferent to man nevertheless believe that man's present condition may be improved. They cherish a warm faith in what Potter calls the "perfectibility of human nature." They assert that man has within himself the power to realize his own dreams and ideals and build a better world. If the humanist has no faith in God he has a tremendous faith in man and is assured that without supernatural help "men possess within themselves and have at hand the tools to achieve a highly satisfactory life for all the members of a world society." [15] "Human nature," says Reese, "is neither depraved nor divine: it is simply unorganized and undirected. Its remaking, its regeneration if your prefer, consists in its organization and direction toward worthy ends. And this is the work of intelligence and will." [16] "Human nature is the most plastic part of the living world. Within very large margins, human beings may not only do what they will, but also become what they will. . . A man may consciously remake himself and society may deliberately assist in the remaking." [17]

But how is this to be done? The answer is simple: "by the application of intelligent human effort," [18] says Dietrich; "by the conscious observation of experience and regulated experimental living," [19] says Reese. The key to salvation is in the understanding of the ways of the universe leading to the ability to control it in the interests of man's highest well being. And science is the royal road to an efficient control of the world both of matter and of mind. The universe may be indifferent to man. Its impersonal laws may even work havoc upon mankind, but it is within man's power to discover those laws and bend them to his own purposes. Franklin bringing lightning down to earth and making it serve him instead of cringing in fear before it is said to represent the typical humanist attitude to the world of nature. So in the laboratories of the chemist, the physicist, the biologist, the botanist, the mathematician, and the

[14] "A Humanist Manifesto," *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[15] Horace J. Nickels, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.
[16] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanism*, p. 52.
[17] Curtis W. Reese, *Op. cit.*, p. 50.
[18] John H. Dietrich, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
[19] Curtis W. Reese, *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

astronomer, the psychologist and the sociologist man's salvation is being wrought out progressively.

"The responsibility for a disordered world rests on man," cries Reese.

> Men are not mere things to be used by the fates. If the world is to be rightly ordered, if humanity is to make rational progress, man must assume the responsibility. In his control of natural processes man is proving his skill and mastery. In his development of moral ideals, man is demonstrating his wisdom and foresight. In his discovery and creation of spiritual values man is expressing his undying hope and his prophetic insight. Already man is at work remaking both the world of things and the world of ideals.[20]

Most of the evils that afflict humanity are remediable. Find the causes and remove them. Health conditions are largely, though not yet wholly, subject to control. Poverty, vice and crime are mostly to be charged to some kind of faulty social organization. First of all, the humanist would find out by scientific means just where the fault does lie, then by the use of every technique of individual and social control he would attempt to correct the evil. As A. E. Haydon puts it:

> The quest of the good life today is seen to involve the harnessing of all resources to the service of spiritual values. There does not seem to be any reason why the remediable evils should mar the lives of men, least of all war or the possibility of war. There seems to be no reason why we should condemn millions of the sons of men to hopelessness and despair, to poverty and vice and crime when we know that these things are the product of social conditions which may be remedied. Some social philosophers have said that 95 per cent. of all the evils men suffer are the result of faulty social organization. The religious ideal seems to challenge to the creation of a free cooperating democracy of splendid individuals, who sharing the common heritage will at the same time accept responsibility and find joy in serving and beautifying the common life.[21]

As to just what this would involve practically let Reese further state:

> The building of the commonwealth of man requires the conscious dependence of the race on the human control of human destiny on the planet, subject always to the possibilities inherent in the natural order. The technique of such control involves many factors which must be experimentally worked out through the years, but the indispensable minimum requirements are: (1) universal education, (2) social guarantees, and (3) world organization.[22]

The practical program of humanism looking toward the kind of a world in which the ideal of the abundant life of individuals and society may be realized reads, it must be confessed, like the *Social Creed*

[20] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanism*, pp. 32, 33.
[21] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanist Sermons*, p. 261.
[22] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanism*, pp. 10, 11.

of the Churches; the churches, incidentally, which humanists quite generally hold up as intent upon an other-worldly ideal. It includes as outlined by Reese:

Universal cultural education in addition to any specialization.

Promotion of health by requiring minimum standards of living and assuring adequate instruction and treatment for all.

Abolition of child labor and the imposition of strict limitations on the labor of young people, women and aged men.

Social insurance against misfortune, accident, unemployment, illness, improvident motherhood, old age and death.

Provisions of long-time and low-rate funds for home builders and consequent encouragement of family life.

Optional parenthood, involving access to information that makes this possible.

Right of labor to negotiate collectively through chosen representatives.

Industrial democracy, involving equitable participation of labor in control, rewards and ownership of industry.

Technical improvement in methods of production and distribution, resulting simultaneously in increase of commodities and decrease of labor.

Freedom of speech, press and assemblage, priority of personal over property rights.

Equitable participation in rights and duties, regardless of race or sex as such.

Creation of machinery by which governments can be democratically controlled.

World federation of peoples based on mutual abrogation of special concessions and mutual obligation to general service.[23]

Missing in all this are certain characteristic notes of orthodox and even liberal Christianity, for example the element of vicarious suffering. Does this play any part in the humanist program? Potter answers thus:

Our recognition of the claims of wider personality may sometimes call for the sacrifice of self, but not frequently. Humanism would find higher value in social service than in vicarious suffering, for the suffering is incidental and accomplishes little in itself.[24]

And still further:

If, in the course of duty, suffering comes, it is to be accepted and endured, but only temporarily. Always the Humanist who suffers is planning that the suffering may not occur again, either for himself or for others. Pain of any sort is a sign of maladjustment and not a sign either of the wrath or the love of a supernatural deity. Pain is a social warning and not a religious accolade.[25]

Gone also is the centrality of or even a strong emphasis upon Jesus in the salvation process. What place do humanists give to Jesus? Here of course enters the personal equation. Humanists whose background

[23] Curtis W. Reese, *Humanism,* pp. 74, 75.
[24] Charles F. Potter, *Humanism a New Religion,* p. 28.
[25] Charles F. Potter, *Op. cit.,* pp. 29, 30.

was evangelical Christianity are likely to give him a place of very much greater importance than others. Some humanists we are reminded come from Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and other world faiths.

Potter, discussing "Was Jesus a humanist?" writes of him:

> Did Jesus then believe that human personality is of supreme value and is self-perfectible? In other words, was he a Humanist?
>
> He held human personality of great value. In even the outcasts of society he perceived great possibilities. The result of his teachings has been to increase immeasurably the world's estimate of human worth. And he urged men, "Be ye therefore perfect," but he added, "as your Father in heaven is perfect."
>
> The theistic coloring of his thought prevents Humanists from claiming him as altogether their own, but the strongly humanistic trend of many of his utterances leads them to hail him as a kindred spirit and to bring him their reverence and respect.[26]

Probably the attitude of most humanists toward Jesus is reflected in the statement of E. B. Backus in a sermon on "Christianity and Humanism":

> Could we get at the facts I think they would probably reveal something like this: that Jesus was a young man of the best type produced among the Jews, of courageous idealism and undaunted loyalty to his convictions. But also we should find him possessed of the limitations of his time, sharing the intellectual outlook of his contemporaries, giving evidence ever and again of that frail and fallible human nature which is the heritage of every man born into the world. I can see no reason to think that there have not been many men in the history of the world who have led just as exemplary, just as inspiring lives as did the young man of Nazareth. His unique position in the Christian world is attributable to the accident of circumstances which singled him out as the point upon which the idealism innate in man should concentrate itself, rather than to any unique and superior virtue in the man himself.[27]

Will science suffice for all humanity's needs? When science and organization and social control have all done their perfect work, will man's needs be met? Can he look for a completely satisfying life? Some of the younger humanists raise a question here. Will it suffice for "the aged whom society inevitably leaves out of its notice," will it "carry hope and cheer into the room where the final summons has clearly been served, to overcome the awfulness of death in the hearts of those who stare confusedly into a grave that will muffle eternally the sound of a familiar voice?" asks one of the younger humanist preachers. "All the science of the New Humanism together with its dynamic socialized ideal of a new earth, they have seen, is only the beginning of wisdom when it comes to ministering not to the psychological classroom constructions of the self,

[26] Charles F. Potter, *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

[27] E. B. Backus, in Curtis W. Reese, *Humanist Sermons*, p. 69.

but to the panting, longing, swearing, crying human enigma. . . It is the Humanism of the market-place, of the old people's home, of the questioning child and the cancer-ridden father that concerns the second generation Humanist, if he may still accept that title." [28]

"What," the writer asks again, "what can we offer as against a Christian salvation hereafter and the pathological Christian mysticism of trance union of the present which will save the literally lost souls?" "May it not be possible," he himself replies, "that persons can find an at-homeness in the universe, not through . . . renunciation of body and mind, but through a flowering out of the self into its fulness in cultural and humanitarian purposes? By accepting this experience may we not put the much needed power behind what is now a theoretical and virtually inactive Humanism and in so doing entitle it to be called a religion in the fullest sense?" [29]

How numerous the group of second-generation humanists may be an outsider has no way of discovering, but it is worth noting that at least there is such a note beginning to appear in the official humanist organ.

In summary then, if we have interpreted rightly the thought of the humanist leaders who have published their ideas, humanism conceives of *salvation* as a wholly this-worldly satisfaction of the deepest needs of humanity, both individual and social, wholly *present* for the individual save as he finds enlargement of his own personality through shared effort with others in the building of a world which will provide a more perfect fulfilment of mankind's dreams as humanity further evolves. Salvation is to be achieved without any supernatural aid, by man himself through the cooperative attempt by means of the scientific method to understand and so control natural and social forces as to compel them to yield him the satisfaction for which he yearns and strives.

[28] R. Lester Mondale, "The Second Generation Humanist," *The New Humanist*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 1, 2, 1932.

[29] R. Lester Mondale, *Op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8.

THE EDICT OF NANTES, THE 250TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS REVOCATION

HENRY J. COWELL
Fellow of the Huguenot Society of London

THROUGHOUT the Reformed Churches of France the 27th of the present month is to be observed as a day of solemn remembrance of the 250th anniversary of the Revocation, by Louis XIV, of the Edict of Nantes—a royal act which had far-reaching and abiding results not only in relation to France itself but in regard to many other lands.

"The Edict of Nantes" (granted by Henry IV in April, 1598), says Lord Acton, "forms an epoch in the progress of toleration—that is, in the history of liberty. It pacified France and afforded to the minority sufficient strength and safety, not on the basis of religious equality but in the shape of circumscribed and definite privilege. The Edict involved no declaration of new principles and no surrender of ancient claims. The power of the Protestants was acknowledged—not the prerogative of conscience. The Protestants enjoyed the faculty of self-government, and their great writers and scholars were free to influence opinion by their writings." Specifically, the Edict accorded to the Huguenots freedom of conscience, civil equality, limited liberty of worship, guarantees for the administration of justice, and a State subsidy for the maintenance of Huguenot pastors and troops.

The Edict was avowedly to be permanent, but in the reign of Louis XIV the rights of the Huguenots were gradually taken away until in October, 1685, the king deliberately revoked the Edict, with the intention of wiping out Protestantism altogether wherever his writ ran. Louis' action was very largely due to the Church in France, which had not only never been in favor of the Edict but ever since its enactment had passionately desired and worked for its withdrawal.

At no time in France had it been an easy matter to be a Protestant; after the Revocation it became almost impossible. The consequences of the king's action were by no means limited to the religious sphere. "In almost every branch of industry," writes R. L. Poole, in his *History of the Huguenots of the Dispersion,* "the Protestants surpassed the Catholics"; and when they left their native land rather than forswear their faith, they naturally took with them their habits of application and of industry.

It is thought that more than a quarter of a million became exiles

for conscience sake. The larger numbers settled in Holland, in Germany, in England, and in Switzerland, but others went to Scotland, to Ireland, to Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and to the Cape of Good Hope.

The English seaports all the way from the Severn on the west to the Thames on the east were thronged with fugitives. Churches were formed at Bristol, Barnstaple, Bideford, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Exeter. In addition, Winchilsea, Rye, Dover, Sandwich, Faversham, and Yarmouth received refugees who mostly were on their way to Norwich and Canterbury. There are records of calico-workers at Bromley; cotton-spinners at Bideford; lace-makers at Buckingham, Newport Pagnell and Stony Stratford; furriers and hat-makers at Wandsworth; tapestry-workers at Exeter; wool-carders at Taunton; linen-makers and sailcloth-makers at Ipswich; weavers at Smithfield, Hoxton, Stepney, Bow and Canterbury; silk-workers at Spitalfields; paper-makers at Maidstone, Laverstock and Glasgow; kersey-workers at Norwich; cambric-workers at Edinburgh.

There was, indeed, scarcely a branch of trade in Great Britain but at once felt the beneficent effects of the large influx of experienced workmen from France. Besides improving those manufactures which had already been established, they introduced many entirely new branches of industry; and by their skill, their intelligence, their laboriousness, they richly repaid the land which had welcomed them for the asylum and the hospitality which had been so generously accorded to them in their time of need.

The Huguenots did not a little to bring to a head the agitation which led to the offer of the throne of England to William of Orange. There is little reason to doubt that the flower of the little army with which William landed at Torbay in November, 1688, consisted of Huguenot soldiers trained under Schomberg, Turenne and Conde. There were three regiments of French infantry and a complete squadron of French cavalry. Nearly all of these were veteran troops. Moreover, many of William's ablest and most trusted officers were Huguenots.

Louis XIV lived for nearly thirty years after his rash and cruel act. He declared that he would extinguish heresy in his dominions even at the cost of his right hand. The persecution of the Protestants went on not only to the end of his own reign but throughout the reign of his successor, Louis XV. Under the severest penalties, every man, woman and child was required to conform to the religion professed by the monarch.

Nevertheless, in the very year of Louis XIV's death there was held

the first of the historic "Synods of the Desert." This period of the "Synods of the Desert" marks a truly heroic chapter in the story of the Huguenots. It reminds one of the Covenanters in Scotland. It is the history of a church which refused to die. By 1756 there were 48 pastors; in 1763 there were 62. In 1789 the States-General voted for complete religious liberty, and in 1802 the Protestant religion was not simply tolerated but subsidized by the State. The 809 pastors in 751 churches in 1626 had been reduced in 1802 to 121 pastors and 171 churches. State support continued until December, 1905, and for the last 30 years, save in Alsace and Lorraine, Protestantism has had to maintain itself by its own efforts.

The loss to France by the act of Louis XIV was, of course, altogether beyond computation; but that loss was very largely the gain of the countries to which the exiles fled for refuge. As one authority puts it: "Correctly viewed, the history of the Huguenots is in no sense the history of a lost cause. The emigration of the Huguenots must be viewed in the larger relations of world history, wherein the advantages accruing to the Netherlands, to Switzerland, to Germany, to England, to the United States, and to other countries far more than offset the damage received by the land which the fugitives forsook. The principles for which the Huguenots battled are imperishable."

EDITORIAL NOTES

THE TIMELY AND THE TIMELESS

There is no necessity to assume a sharp antithesis between the timely and the timeless. Christian thought has always maintained that there are elements of both in the Gospel. It is not easy however to maintain the balance between the two. For one reason or another now the timeless is stressed to the neglect of the timely, and again the timely is emphasized while the timeless is slurred. Religious thinking is its own worst enemy when it loses perspective. As Professor Lyman points out so ably in his article in the present issue of The Crozer Quarterly, it is such one-sidedness that vitiates the religious philosophy of John Dewey and the theology of Karl Barth. Professor Lyman himself is in a much stronger position in arguing for a synthesis of the two claims.

I

Religion is a personal attitude and relation. It does not exist apart from people who are religious. Its significance and worth are always appraised and appreciated in human situations. Whenever we see it functioning it is in human life, individual or social. It adds new incentives to action and inspires new motives for striving. Sometimes it brings solutions to baffling problems; at other times it creates new problems to be solved. It has its own abstractions, but it is itself never abstract. At its best it throbs and pulses with life; at its worst it reflects the life of other times. It is never devoid of its concrete connections with human life, either present or past.

The Christian ministry and the Christian church are specific recognitions of the timeliness of religion. Their purpose is to minister to people who are in the throes of tasks and problems that derive from living in a world of other people and of natural forces. Their right to be depends on the effectiveness with which they bring help to people who are in need. The word "ministry" itself reflects the meaning and spirit of all true religion.

The Gospel is good news for all moods and all times. It is concerned with the enrichment of life. And life is a composite of all sorts of moods and tempers. Its moments are not only different from each other, but they sometimes even seem contradictory and confusing. The glory of religious faith consists in its power to match these changing moods and

needs. In our own day a whole battery of new problems and perplexities have arisen to irritate us. The forces, physical and social, that play around us are more than a match for us, despite what some of our optimistic friends may think about the power of intelligence to deliver us. What we need is not any less intelligence, but more cooperation with the forces that uplift us and a greater use of the spiritual resources available to us. The task of the minister of religion is to study the immediate needs of his people and help them toward such cooperation and reliance. In other words his good news must always be timely.

II

But the timely is not all. The universe and life disclose also aspects of permanence. If all were "flux and flow," as Heraclitus thought, the sense of insecurity would be intolerable. Life could have no dependable significance, and the world around us no stability. Instead of cosmos we would have to confront chaos. An interpretation of change has real significance only on the background of permanence. On any other hypothesis the processes of thinking would succumb to unspeakable irrationality.

Life has meaning and significance because we live in a universe of interrelated parts. There is a perpetual interplay of physical, social and cosmic forces. And the whole drama moves with amazing regularity. At times man seems to himself to be a part of nothing but a puppet-show. On the other hand such a philosophy of life would leave unsolved more than it solves. The world is much more than a round of circumstances, and history than a series of accidents. He who closes his eyes to the evidences of "one increasing purpose" offers us a shallow philosophy indeed.

The history of human thought shows evidence of the operation of certain principles that are of more than temporal significance. The science of logic is based on assumptions of that sort. Induction assumes the uniformity of nature. Human thinking cannot brook contradictory assertions. Sheer relativity would come perilously near to destroying the distinction between truth and error. None of us would be able to live mentally in a world with such intellectual confusion. There is timelessness in the laws of thought.

Our value judgments in regard to good and evil lead us to an assumption in regard to the moral life similar to that relating to the mental life. Any interpretation of the facts that casts a shadow of obscurity over the difference between right and wrong lacks coherency. It is necessary to recognize that there is an element of the relative in human judgments of right and wrong. One group approves that which another condemns. And one age affirms the rightness of that which another

denies. But with all due allowances for differences in circumstantial judgments, there remains forever the human disposition to hold to an ethical dualism as inescapable and independent of particular occasions. Unless there be a hopeless dualism between the human and the cosmic, these judgments are grounded in the very nature of things. There is timelessness in the laws of the moral life.

Is it not the timelessness that is assumed in our human judgments of value that gives enduring support to our faith in God? These judgments, as we have seen, would themselves be lacking in cogency unless they have a timeless support, a cosmic basis. Our appraisals of worth reflect permanent differences that are grounded in the nature of reality. Otherwise the ground of their validity is shaken and insecure. The surest link between man and God is in these same judgments of value. We are never more sure of God than when our sensitiveness to the differences between truth and error, good and evil, right and wrong is most acute. In that way judgments of right and truth merge in our thought about God.

This is part of the Christian gospel. We preach not only a God who gives help in time of need, but one who is the timeless support of these distinctions that give life meaning and enrichment. To be sure this is faith, and does not admit of proof in the ordinary sense. Nevertheless it is faith with a rational basis, much more rational indeed than a philosophy of chance. In times of insecurity such as those through which the world is passing, people need the touch of men and women fired by such faith. They need to feel the contagion of such faith, the hope and the courage that it engenders.

There is no more difficult task and yet none that needs to be performed with more diligence than that of maintaining the balance between the timely and the timeless. Christian leadership must not fail through lack of perspective.

BOOK REVIEWS

FINALLY—WITH PAUL TO THE END. John A. Hutton, D. D. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 302. $2.50.

THIS is a remarkable book. I have read it with mingled feelings. At first I was inclined to be a bit supercilious, despite the fact that the author is "the distinguished editor of *The British Weekly*." The calm assurance in the opening words that "for what follows I shall have readers, and these not a few" and the reference a few pages farther on to "one of my twenty-six published books"—if the author were an American he could scarce escape an investigation by the snooping committee of our Senate for glutting the market; lucky for him that the NRA is now only a not-too-fragrant regret—were irritating. Then his refusal to come to grips with his subject irked me. He had announced the purpose of his quest on p. 20: "If you, Saul of Tarsus, the man of the Damascus road, and now Paul the aged, if you had only one thing permitted to you to say to your fellow men, to those who look to you for such a word, and whom you love, if you had but one thing permitted you to say about life, and about our part in it, what would you say?" Yet it was not until p. 204 that he crossed the "final threshold" and came to the answer.

But long before p. 204 all of those annoyances had passed. In their stead I found myself enthralled. I had come to see the truth of the old adage that "the longest way 'round is the shortest way home." He had stated his custom as a preacher not to *begin* from a text, but rather with "some aspect of life—of life in general, or of a large mass of life, as it comes to a point in some distress or poignancy of the soul." And this was his method here. Indeed, the book can be described as a series of sermons—perhaps better paragraphs of sermons—but this is no damning praise. If we had preaching like this, fewer people would park their intelligences with their automobiles when they went to church. The matured and seasoned judgments of a man who has been viewing life for many years—and not from the outside, but living it from within—all stand illumined by the flashes of insight toward his greatest hero and beloved friend, Paul of the Damascus road. The book is simply the author's "devoted tribute." And what a tribute it is. With nothing fulsome in it, he can yet say: "We can say of Paul that we know nothing of him which we should be glad not to have known." It is not a biography in the strict sense, and yet it is. In the course of his many detours, his willingness to turn down any interesting avenue, he has painted Paul—no, better said, let Paul talk to us—as has rarely been done before. It is the sort of thing that the psychologists and psychoanalysts have tried so pathetically but have failed so lamentably to do. Not only does Paul still live and breathe—here is no autopsy over a not particularly lamented corpse—but the findings are recorded in the language of men before it had become confused and confounded in punishment for our recent attempts at towers of Babel. I cannot see how any reader can fail to say when he has finished the book: "I too am 'on a raft, not without risk.' Like Socrates I will consult those who have made the voyage."

It would be a shame to try to list the contents of the book; let every reader

have that pleasure for himself. I will not even say what the answer to the query is. (Probably the rare individual who still reads Paul's letters may get a clue from the striking title of the book; the rest will find an additional thrill from traveling new country.) Although the author never says, "Here is a good text or thought for a sermon," it will be a curious sort of preacher who will not find it. I got three. The book is so intensely personal—it would be even better to hear Doctor Hutton read it aloud than to read it oneself—I make no apologies for the equally personal nature of this review.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

SOCIAL SALVATION. John C. Bennett. Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1935. Pp. xv, 222. $2.00.

PROFESSOR BENNETT has earned our lasting gratitude for this penetrating study, which he describes as "a religious approach to the problems of social change." It would be well if it were prescribed reading for every minister and student of theology. The study goes to the roots of the most vital aspects of Christian experience, and demonstrates the absolute necessity for the application of the Christian ethic to the various aspects of social life. It is not just another diagnosis, but it brings the therapeutic of a gospel.

Beginning with a discussion of the relation between sin and social evil, the book moves on to an examination of the interdependence of individual and social salvation. Three half-truths are criticized with discernment: (1) that individuals can rise above any combination of social circumstances; (2) that it is enough to save individuals, since society is composed of individuals; and (3) that society can be changed without changing individuals. The second of these is the half-truth that comes dangerously near being an error in the emphasis of the Oxford Groups.

The heart of the study is in chapter three, "The Relevance of Jesus for Society." Professor Bennett accepts the best results of New Testament criticism, but refuses to allow the teaching of Jesus to be reduced to a vanishing-point. He makes affirmations about the ethic of Jesus, that it is God-centered, primarily inner, epitomized in love while aggressive against evil, that it placed spiritual values uppermost, and stressed humility. Such an ethic has social consequences for all time, and the author's purpose is to show its significance for our day.

The church comes in for criticism aplenty in these days because of its lack of effectiveness as the channel for divine grace. Any man with doubts in his mind as to the continued mission of the church to bring a gospel to a world of social change ought to read the fourth chapter. He will see there not only that the church has repeatedly served as a deterrent to social evils, but that it continues to occupy a strategic position as an agent for social salvation.

The reviewer would also direct attention to an able discussion of "How God Works in Society." Christian thought has always stressed the righteousness of God's purposes and activities. Nevertheless it is confronted with the fact of moral evil due to human freedom. This creates a paradox that various thinkers have tried in different ways to resolve. Bennett holds that God, though good, is limited by his own moral character, by the structure of reality, by the determinateness of his own creation, and by human freedom. God does not will social evil. Nevertheless, that God is at work in society he finds evidences in the processes of creation, persuasion, judgment and healing. Social salvation points to a God of action, making use of the poor contributions of men who seek to work in harmony with him.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

CHAOS IN MEXICO: THE CONFLICT OF CHURCH AND STATE. Charles S. Macfarland. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 284. $2.00.

PERHAPS no one in America is better fitted to make this study of conditions in Mexico than is Doctor Macfarland. His long service as executive officer of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; his active interest in forming the National Conference of Jews and Christians and his availing efforts to create cooperation between Protestants and Catholics has given him special training in the affairs of the church and in understanding all its problems.

Doctor Macfarland went about his work in a thoroughgoing scientific spirit—impartial and unbiased. He interviewed men of partisan interest in this country and in Mexico—churchmen and politicians. But this did not satisfy him. He sought out prominent people, men and women, impartial in their judgments and also members of the laboring class, the so-called men of the street. Diligently he sought facts from all sources that might shed light upon his subject of research.

Conflicting answers were given, naturally, to his questions. But innocent of past mistakes or present faults as either Church or State might seek to declare itself, condemning the other party wholly, Doctor Macfarland found that the great majority of the third party—the common people—blamed the leaders of both the former. In the past the Church had been guilty of tyranny, of economic oppression and of keeping the people in ignorance. The State today is acting from political and not humanitarian motives.

These seem to be Doctor Marfarland's own conclusions. The Roman Catholic Church in Mexico heretofore has not granted or permitted religious freedom. Against this the people and the State have rebelled. The Church cannot expect reinstatement until it definitely repudiates this former practice and places itself on record affirmatively in favor of complete religious liberty for all.

On the other hand, the State is tending toward totalitarianism and an anti-Christian position. In theory all churches are free and all citizens are at liberty to observe their own form of worship. But in reality the State has denied this freedom by its own insistence upon defining what religious practice and worship may be observed. When the State has denied to the Church some of its age-old rights and has taken unto itself some of these activities, then the Church is being persecuted so far as its orthodox believers are concerned.

It is difficulties such as these which are causing the disturbances of the present. But with a clear and honest facing of the facts and a sincerity to meet the needs of the people on the part of the leaders of the two conflicting groups, a wholesome and helpful agreement should be reached. Mexico is but another nation in the present world determining either for full democracy or dictatorship.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

MAKING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION EFFECTIVE. John Dillingham. New York: Association Press. 1935. Pp. 203. $1.50.

THE director of religious activities at Tennessee State College has written an unusually informative little manual on the new program for the church school today. It is very difficult to make a book readable for beginners in religious education and at the same time provide the reader with a critical, dependable introduction to the subject. The author has accomplished this purpose to a considerable extent. Based on much of the best literature available, the outlines of principle and program are

traced. Chief emphasis rests on the latter, for ministers and church workers are kept constantly in mind.

The author takes a moderately progressive position on most questions. He sees values in evangelism that should be conserved in religious education. The "Decision Day" practice has some merits but needs re-definition. While curriculum should be life-centered, somehow it should also be Bible-focused. There is not the wide gap between the aims of secular and religious educations that is usually supposed. Possibly the term "Christian Religious Education" is overworked.

STEWART G. COLE.

POLITY AND PRACTICE IN BAPTIST CHURCHES. William Roy McNutt. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1935. Pp. xii, 274. $1.50.

ONE pastor has just read Doctor McNutt's volume on Baptist polity and practice, with a number of varied reactions, which he would set down, somewhat in orderly fashion, as a comment upon the work.

1. Perhaps it is not novel, but it is wholesome to recognize that the author pays tribute *via* the book to two churches, in which he was honored as pastor. Where wise and happy pastoral ministry has been carried on, are the finest intimacies and relationships that life has to offer.

2. A Baptist, Professor D. C. Macintosh, who has been in the public limelight, with much public sympathy, writes the "Foreword" in excellent scholarly fashion, and with a nobly high appreciation of the true Baptist position. It is totally without sectarianism, undue denominational pride, and breathes a broad spirit of Christian charity.

3. In the folds of the volume is a wide variety of related subjects essential to the well-being and fine conduct of a Baptist body, which to great numbers of pastors and laity could be made to yield great value to their local groups.

4. The query confronts, because of the spirit of the church age—"What, another book on denominationalism?" In this age of rapprochement, is this not a flavor of days when denominational competition and rivalry, all too scandalously raked the Church? Mayhap, we have not removed so far from the camp of Protestantism's Sinai as we had supposed?

5. The thirteen chapters of the book seem to the writer to major in worth upon the following—"Baptist Doctrine of Church." "The Witness of History." "The Matter of Authority." "The Ordinances of the Churches," and "Cooperative Unity."

6. Professor McNutt lays due emphasis on the very heart of Baptist genius, in his treatment of "The Competency of the Soul." This might have been greatly enhanced by more than a sentence or two relative to the integrity and competence of a non-Baptist, which is ours to recognize and honor, whether it be in the ordinances of or relationships to the church.

7. If this writing could be made the text-book of large numbers of classes in our Baptist churches there would be one worthy outcome, viz.: the great increase of an intelligent acquaintance with a body of Christian believers who have, at least in Christian theory, and much in practice, centered their life and belief on Jesus Christ, the one who at every turn, has been found entirely adequate to their life and testimony during the centuries.

8. Both appendix and bibliography are exceedingly valuable to students, pastors and the laity alike, yet even this recalls the frayed epigram that "Baptists have been so busy making history, they did not take time to record it."

9. The pastor-reviewer happens to be a classmate of the author, and rejoices in this contribution to the literature and life of the denomination, whose truths, doctrines and service, both have espoused.

ROBERT T. TUMBELSTON.

THE MYSTICAL LIFE. Roger Bastide. Translated from the French by H. F. Kynaston-Snell and David Waring. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1935. Pp. 256. $2.50.

OUR modern scene is so convulsed with social issues that people who claim to be religious do not excel in mysticism. Indeed, a deeper observation may be made. The religious mind has become so markedly impregnated with the scientific spirit of our age that the interests and endeavors of the mystic are foreign to normal people. Or are they, for these reasons, abnormal? It depends who answers. In any case, it is a good discipline for a modern to study a book like Bastide's.

The author, a professor of philosophy at the University of Valence, France, has made a definite contribution to the study of the mystical state. His contribution not only lies in a comprehensive survey of the practices of primitive peoples, the Sūfis of Persia, the Fakirs of India, Moslem devotees, and particularly of Christian mystics, but more particularly in his critical analysis of the interpretations of mystic experience by French and American scholars (limited to James and Leuba). In his own view-point, he is partial to William James and Pierre Janet. Bastide's scholarship is marked with an unusual sense of balance. He is not easily convinced by the logic of conflicting and tangent theories of mysticism. For instance, concerning the pathological theories he remarks, "the essential error is to have seen only a part of the whole question . . . mysticism does not mean dissolution; it is generally the creation of a new ego."

The author has no concern to defend any particular metaphysics of mysticism. He considers his task is "scientific." He is a psychologist. A reader notes page after page the contrast between the European psychoanalytic approach, which the author follows, and the American behavioristic approach, to religious phenomena. There is little question that whereas Bastide's view-point throws much light upon his subject, the advantage of an entirely different view would have greatly enriched his findings. This criticism is borne out clearly in the contents of the last two chapters of the volume.

The translators have done this work in a superior manner, and the publishers are to be thanked for making the text available to the English-reading world.

STEWART G. COLE.

MODERN MYSTICS. Sir Francis Younghusband. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc. 1935. Pp. 312. $3.00.

AN earlier volume by the same author entitled *The Living Universe* serves to indicate the philosophy out of which this present book takes rise. The whole universe is alive, this life is manifest by ceaseless, ordered activity. Living energy, as if radiated by personality, is the most striking characteristic of all that is.

Now the religious mystic is a soul rare in his capacity to sense and understand

this engulfing and sustaining energy and action. "And some of these highly susceptible persons are finely discriminative of these impressions—which they shall receive and reject. And a few exceedingly rare persons are not only impressionable and discriminative, but expressive also. They are thus able to communicate to others the most valuable of the impressions they have received from the operating of the creative process." These we call the mystics.

In illustration of this thesis, the author studies the lives and interprets the conduct of three Hindu mystics: Keshub Chander Sen, Ramakrishna and Vivekananda; Muslim mystics: The Bab and his various followers; the Roman Catholic mystic, St. Therese de Lisieux; a Protestant mystic, the authoress of *The Golden Fountain,* and finally Evan Roberts, mystic leader of the Welsh revival.

The book is well written and will prove arresting to the thoughtful reader.

William R. McNutt.

Rev. John Doe, D. D. Edwin McNeill Poteat, Jr. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 127. $1.25.

We have come to expect something incisive when Edwin McNeill Poteat, Jr., writes or speaks, and we are not disappointed in this little volume of four chapters which constitutes a "study of the place of the minister in the modern world."

In chapter I "Dr. Doe Looks at His World" and finds it has changed rapidly in many respects in recent times, all of which affects his work and his status in society. In the chapter on "The World Looks at Dr. Doe" the results of a questionnaire which was widely circulated among the laity are intensely interesting. The opinions expressed regarding the present-day minister in general will enable them to see themselves as others see them. There is a good deal to give comfort; there is much to cause heart-searching and serious reflection.

What must Dr. Doe do? That is the question. We are made to wonder what would happen if "with a return of ancient loyalty to His [Christ's] way of meeting life, we should visit upon our practically minded generation a demonstration of it."

"How can Dr. Doe do it?" The difficulties that greet us are no greater than those in the early days of Christianity, and "Creation is waiting with eager longing for the sons of God to be disclosed."

Some of the lines in this picture of the minister of today are drawn with utter and almost cruel frankness, and we are indebted to the artist for a lifelike portrait, done with many an artistic touch to his canvas.

James H. Franklin.

Christ's Alternative to Communism. E. Stanley Jones. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: The Abingdon Press. 1935. Pp. 302. $2.00.

When Stanley Jones was in the Far East in 1931 he declared that the race was on between Christianity and Communism in China, with Asia in doubt. Since then he has been in Russia and has returned to India. In Russia he made a careful study of conditions. In India he has conferred very recently with many thoughtful men. This book, therefore, is a natural result of his observations and recent conferences, and he is now convinced that the race between Christianity and Communism is world-wide.

On almost every hand one finds convictions deepening that the Christian forces of the world are challenged to offer an alternative to Communism, with its provision

of economic brotherhood. Doctor Jones believes that the storm of conflict is gathering rapidly and that anything done by the Christian church must be done quickly. He believes that the Russian experiment will force "Christianity to rediscover the meaning of the kingdom of God upon earth," and if so, "It will mean such a mighty revival of the Christian spirit that will transform the earth." He believes Christ offers the alternative to Communism, and his book is an attempt to interpret Christ's teachings in their bearing on the present world crisis, which is so largely based on economics.

Christ's alternative to Communism calls for a heroic practice of the cross. Will the Christian forces accept it and act promptly? Even "A minority, sure, determined and united, might turn a confused and hesitant world-situation to the Christian program."

This latest book by Doctor Jones demands a new daring on the part of the disciples of Christ in facing the economic and other problems of the hour. It is written with the author's well-known boldness, clarity, and charm. This reviewer wishes it might be read by every pastor in the land and its meaning be communicated to the American Christian forces.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN.

BETWEEN TWO CENTURIES. Dana M. Albaugh. Associate Secretary American Baptist Foreign Mission Society. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1935. Pp. xviii, 245, with 11 illustrations. Cloth, $1.00; paper, 60 cents.

THIS year marks the centennial of four of the missions conducted by the Baptists of the Northern Convention. It is a particularly appropriate time to take stock both of accomplishments and problems. As the second hundred years begin, those concerned with the enterprise are conscious of facing new situations and problems. It is imperative that these new situations be faced with the same courage, devotion and intelligence as the old. Mr. Albaugh's book is written as a contribution to that end. He has related in a fascinating way the stories of the South India, Assam, Bengal-Orissa, and South China fields. In a concluding chapter he faces frankly the problems of the new day, such as nationalism, devolution, international relations, racial misunderstanding, interdenominational cooperation, economic discrimination, feminism, and rural reconstruction. The Department of Missionary Education offers the book as a basis for study in church groups. It is excellently designed to serve that purpose.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

POLITICAL ETHICS. Daniel Sommers Robinson, Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1935. Pp. xvii, 288. $2.00.

THIS is a book by an author whose earlier volumes have enriched American philosophical and ethical literature. This new book is greatly needed in the United States today. Every voter should be expected to read it before casting his next ballot for congressman, senator or President. It is an admirable condensation of the reflective thought concerning political ethics contributed by our ablest thinkers since the World War. It has also original analyses and suggestions expressed with conviction and eloquence.

The author expresses the hope that I wish could be realized: "I hope that my discussions may prove stimulating to the general reader, and useful to teachers of

political and elementary ethics, government and social civics courses, and to leaders of discussion groups conducted under the auspices of such organizations as the International Relations Club, the Y. M. C. A., Public Forums, Churches and Extension and Evening Schools." He calls it "a pioneer text-book." He blazes a trail through the wilderness of practical public and international ethics that must soon become a well-trodden highway.

Professor Robinson discusses the idea of a state, and gives a summary of the historic theories of a state. Then he constructs his conception of an ideal state, giving its "postulates" and its "three orders" with their relations. With his hypothetical ideal state as a standard or norm, he compares existing actual states, the Soviet State, Dictatorship, and Representative Democracies, using his postulates as tests. He admits that it is an audacious attempt, but it is audacity that has made human progress possible. This audacious "pioneer text-book" will offend both Machiavellian political realists who repudiate the application of claims of private duty on public duty, and vigorous moralists who insist that one moral law is binding upon states and individuals equally, but it will encourage and cheer all who dream of a time when the ideals of The Covenant of the League of Nations will not only be actualized, but superseded by a "League of Cultures," based not on *covenant,* but on good-will.

For purpose of intensive study of the subject-matter of each chapter, the author has given a sufficiently exhaustive list of post-World War books and periodicals.

MILTON G. EVANS.

COOPERATION: A SURVEY. F. Hall and W. P. Watkins. Manchester, England: The Cooperative Union Limited. 1934. Pp. 408. 7s 6d.

THE authors of this valuable work have given a pretty thorough historical survey of the cooperative movement in Great Britain and Ireland. The operating principles are seen clearly functioning in concrete situations. The work enables the reader to appreciate the situations and motives that gave birth to the cooperative movement, and are responsible for its steady vigorous growth in Britain. The movement is one of the people's responses to the social problems of our modern era. In particular the inequitable distribution of wealth which has resulted from economic individualism and the pursuit of private profit has created discontent and the feeling of insecurity. Cooperation is a challenge to the old economic order, and one that is bound to be taken with increasing seriousness, especially by those who still believe in the possibility of building a kingdom of God in this world.

It would be well if this eminently readable volume could have a wide reading in America. It is not only informative with reference to the British movement, but suggestive of possible developments along similar lines in other countries.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

THE BEGINNINGS OF OUR RELIGION. Fleming James, Charles B. Hedrick, Burton Scott Easton, and Frederick C. Grant. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. vii, 170. $1.00.

CONVINCED that "knowledge of the historical sources of Christianity has been too exclusively the property of experts and specialists [and] that if the results of research were set forth in clear language and without too much use of technical

terminology, they would be of value to the ordinary man and woman confronted with the religious problems of the present time" these four scholars have sought to present in very brief compass a bird's-eye view of these processes from the genesis of Hebrew religion through the second Christian century. The materials fall into ten chapters: The Religion of Moses; The Religion of Early Israel; The Religion of the Writing Prophets; The Wise Men and the Psalmists; Early Judaism; Our Lord; The Christianity of St. Paul; The Christianity of St. John; The Beginnings of the Church; The Evolution of Our Religion.

The brevity of the volume and the lowness of price will probably encourage its use in church study groups. The (at times) very pious phraseology and not too subtle attempts to disabuse the fear of the cautious reader that if the Bible be studied as any other book it will of necessity be regarded as any other book and will probably encourage many to take the plunge. They will not find the water very cold, nor will they have to jump off the deep end.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

GOD AND THIS TROUBLED WORLD. Essays in Spiritual Construction. W. R. Matthews, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, University of London. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc. 1934. Pp. xvii, 243. $2.50.

DOCTOR MATTHEWS is one of the most lucid of present-day writers in the philosophy of religion. He is keenly aware of the difficulties created by the development of modern scientific culture, and reinterprets Christian faith with due recognition of the intellectual adjustments that are needed. In his writing, the reader is aware that the author is writing from the point of view of the Anglican tradition which feels a stronger impulse to maintain the language of the Nicene Creed than a free churchman would experience. Nevertheless the book is, by and large, a courageous attempt at re-interpretation.

The author's point of view is that of supernaturalism. By that he means that the initiative of religious experience is with God. This does not involve him in a hopeless metaphysical dualism. Through and through he insists that the interpretation must be spiritual. Furthermore, belief in God, while not removing the sense of mystery, renders the universe intelligible in principle. Such a concept as the miraculous may be retained in the religious sense. We are not moving in the realm of proof but of faith in such matters.

Doctor Matthews has an excellent discussion of the significance of the historical for religion. Recognizing that certain religious values could be maintained even if it were discovered that they had no historical basis, he yet sees no reason for abandoning the historical basis for Christianity. We might still believe that God is love even though we were doubtful of the historicity of Jesus. Nevertheless the historical Jesus is our best revelation of that fact. This matter of historical evidence leads the author into an unduly long discussion of the Virgin birth for which he offers an apology.

The references to the problem of evil are valuable. Everywhere he carries his readers into the sphere of the practical and ethical rather than the speculative. For example he says, "One Christian whose life is transformed by the power of the living Christ is a better argument for the Resurrection than reams of discussion about the empty tomb." All in all, the essays are written in a fine temper, both intellectually and spiritually.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

God and the Common Life. Robert Lowry Calhoun, Associate Professor of Historical Theology, Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1935. Pp. xxiv, 303. $2.50.

This is a distinctive type of work on the doctrine of God. Its approach is from the experiences of every-day living, and particularly from the vocational interest. However, the implications of such a study are so far-reaching that it takes the author into somewhat extended discussions. It includes, for example, the problem of values, distinguishing between what is of worth and what is not. It involves the discussion of the human mind and its competency to deal with profound problems. Its scope is wide enough to demand also a consideration of the structure and interpretation of the cosmos, and man's place in it.

Professor Calhoun makes it quite plain that these two problems, the vocational and the theological, are inextricably interwoven. Work that is in any sense a source of satisfaction must be worthy of effort with reference to an intelligible purpose. In this machine-dominated age it is not easy to preserve the sense of a calling, and yet our author is convinced that only the sense that God has called a person to do a piece of work will produce work of the highest level. While seeking to improve the conditions of work which are today creative of drudgery, boredom and insecurity, it is best to maintain a sense of God actively cooperating with us.

Improvement in human character and an ennobling conception of God are mutual influences. Work and worship are interrelated throughout the history of human endeavor. With the development of morality and religion there is apparent much more ethical notions of God, and a finer sense of devotion and of meaning in man's daily work. The Christian religion has accomplished much historically toward such ennoblement. And it needs still to be active in opposition to all that dehumanizes life. We must have improved men and women, or else improved conditions of work will profit nothing. Theologians and religious workers need to cooperate with social engineers for the betterment of life in all respects. The God whom we need and can worship is one who is intent on bringing about better life, and one who works with a full comprehension of human needs.

God and the Common Life is provocative of thought, and should stimulate to action in the direction of that enrichment of the common life which comes through a consciousness of working together with God.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

Education for an Age of Power. The T. V. A. Poses a Problem. Joseph K. Hart. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. ix, 245. $2.50.

One of America's foremost exponents of the new education draws the blue-prints of adequate learning for our day. Education is not to be identified with schooling any more than religion is with churchism. Nor is a person "educated" when he has familiarized himself with the folklore of long yesterdays. Rather, education is the adoption of a course of action consonant with the resources available to man and with a view to controlling those resources for the highest satisfactions of life.

This view-point suggests at one and the same time the major problem and a paramount opportunity of the American people. We are shifting from an agrarian civilization to a technological one in which unmeasured energy is coming into the possession of man. This fact is revolutionizing both personal and institutional life. The situation in the Tennessee Valley with the construction of the Norris Dam and the city of Norris dramatized the American scene. Shall we continue to drift by

hanging on tenaciously to old habits of social action, or can we *learn* how to *live* collectively and individually in terms of a power age? If we do, philosophies of rugged individualism saddled on churches and schools, governments and industries, communities and the nation, must give way to social planning. Science gives endless power; intelligence in terms of the world of science provides secure control. The first is amazingly operative; can the second be emancipated from traditions to take its divine place in our mundane economy? It remains to be seen. Unless we change our ways, we perish as a civilization.

There is little comfort in this book for those citizens who seek security in the *status quo*. In youthful minds that welcome change and a philosophy of change there is much to challenge. Thoroughgoing in his pragmatism, fearless in his postulates of thinking, and sobering in his posing of a national issue of supreme consequence, the author presents his timely position.

STEWART G. COLE.

LIVING WITH BOOKS. Helen E. Haines. New York: Columbia University Press. 1935. Pp. xiv, 505. $4.00.

THE somewhat vague and possibly misleading title is explained by the subtitle of this second volume in the Columbia University Studies in Library Service, "The Art of Book Selection." It is dedicated "To Librarians *in posse* and *in esse* Friends and Fellow Workers of a Lifetime." As such, it will be seen that few ministers will find this a necessary book for their personal libraries. Yet, many might well profit by the reading of it.

Its special values for them lie in its explanation of terms used in the making of books—(Ex-President Hickey, of Villanova College, now a resident of Rome, told the reviewer recently that the pope, speaking with a well-known cardinal, said of a common friend, "He did not know the difference between a Codex and an Incunabulum." NOTE: The cardinal went home and consulted a dictionary)—its section on book reviews and evaluations; and its several chapters dealing with particular fields of literature, such as biography, history, sociology, religion, philosophy, poetry, drama and fiction.

This last group, called "Part Four: Exploration and Discovery," is for the general reader the most interesting and useful portion of the material.

Three sentences at least (p. 30) will provoke thought and consideration of the service of books: "For its relation to the public, library service is both impersonal and personal. People who seek counsel, incentive, or encouragement are apt nowadays to turn instinctively to books. In many personal situations the public library is the modern substitute for the religious help sought in an earlier age."

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON.

CREATIVE CHRISTIANITY. Shailer Mathews. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. 1935. Pp. 167. $1.50.

IN these Cole Lectures for 1934, which, the author states, provide a supplement to his Barrow Lectures delivered in India in 1933-34, we have another of Dean Mathews' insistent demands that Christianity be realistic, aggressively and scientifically, in its effort to create a worthy, wholesome order of life for men upon this earth. This is its original and true purpose.

Christianity is a religion rather than a philosophy or a theology. Religion is

man's effort to attain the victory over his circumstances and experiences, within and without. It is a way of life through and by which man seeks to gain the most worth-while and rewarding returns from life. The Christian religion is this search according to what its adherents believe is the way of Jesus. That "Way of Jesus" according to Dean Mathews, is not the way Jesus actually lived or did things. It is rather a way which is in accord with his mind, spirit and attitude. It is quite impossible for people of today, in a world so far advanced beyond his time, to act exactly as he did. But it is possible and necessary for true progress and welfare to have his spirit. Therefore "not his method but his motive" is to be the Christian's.

Thus, the author constantly affirms that "the more one studies the history of the Christian religion the stronger grows the conviction that Christians are more important than abstract Christianity." This is the dean's way of saying that life is more than profession and conduct more than creeds. But it is a striking and true way of saying it. What is needed is men and women who live the spirit of Jesus; who live the truth that "love is the heart of the universe," and that hatred is its counterpart. To love one thing is to hate its opposite. That attitude is to be carried into all the affairs and relationships of life. There is no easy guide in so doing. It can be done only through the severity of the scientific method.

For "Christian truths, like mathematics, have significance only as life is organized in accordance with them. Christianity is creative in so far as its truths affect human behavior, both individual and social." This is a challenge to put the worth of man first and highest in the consideration of all questions that may arise for settlement in the relationships of men and nations.

R. E. E. Harkness.

What Religion Is and Does. An Introduction to the Study of its Problems and Values. Horace T. Houf, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Ohio University. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. viii, 373. $3.00.

This volume is the fruit of varied experiences with youth in undergraduate life in college and university, in the pastorate of suburban and urban and college-town churches, in the presidency of a college, and in university lecture-rooms. It illustrates "shovel" thinking in seminar work. Students have asked questions; questions disclosed interests and appreciated values; questions and interests and conceived values were facts to be interpreted. The result is a book that is what the writer wishes it to be—"informative and expository, realistic, impartial, and more positive than negative." The title indicates the practical aim of the writer. He and students working together were not merely academically scientific, seeking to ascertain what religion is, but practically scientific also, trying to discover what religion does. The method compelled recognition of contemporary sciences, art, philosophy and conduct. Part One, entitled *Generic Religion,* discloses adequate acquaintance with accepted authorities on the history and psychology of religion, and thirteen chapters are devoted to discussion of definition, origin, function, and problems.

Since present-day Occidental culture is almost wholly an inheritance from Hebrew and Early Christianity religious and moral ideals, Part Two is entitled *Hebrew-Christian Religion,* and deals with the history and interpretation of the Old and New Testaments and the institutions and beliefs and practices based upon them. Chapters XIV to XX, discuss: "Old Testament Origins and Meanings"; "New Testament Origins and Meanings"; "The Jesus of History"; "Christianity"; "The Church and Its Divisions"; "Religion and Social Morality"; "The Ethics of Belief." Professor

Houf wished this book to be non-technical and readable. He has succeeded in his aims. The general reader who wishes a good introduction to religion in its meaning for life, and the pastor and religious educator who desire a usable text-book for class-room instruction, will find it in *What Religion Is and Does.*

The book is published in two editions, the bibliographies and helps for students being included in the student edition only.

MILTON G. EVANS.

SACRED SITES AND WAYS—Studies in the Topography of the Gospels. Gustaf Dalman, D. D., Professor of Theology at the University of Greifswald. Translated (from the third German edition) by Paul B. Levertoff, D. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. xii, 398. $3.50.

FEW men know Palestine so intimately as does Professor Dalman, and not only does he know it himself but he is able to lead his reader through it. Reading this book is the next best thing to traveling through the land, and probably the average reader will actually know the land better and have a more genuine love for it than he would from his hasty rush between trains to view the sites which his guides—employed and self-appointed—tell him are the things to do. The translator is correct in his remark that the volume "while indispensable to all serious students of the Gospels, . . could be used as the most scientific 'Guide' to the Land of Jesus." It is a book for every man. The scholar will profit from the lexicographical studies, detailed arguments, and vast documentation; those interested in the traditions which have grown up about the land will find an immense store otherwise not conveniently accessible, if at all. The reader of the Gospel narratives will find an almost complete commentary. The traditionalist will find all the "sites" described in detail. Animals, flowers, customs—in fact all the intimate details save the smells—are faithfully and winsomely woven in. The twenty-one chapters are arranged in the order of the localities mentioned in the Gospel narratives, starting in Bethlehem, then Nazareth, the Jordan and Desert, Cana, the Sea of Galilee, and finally ending in Jerusalem with its Sanctuary, Pools of Bethesda and Siloam, Gethsemane, the Palace of the High Priest, the Judgment Hall of Pilate, Golgotha, and the Holy Sepulchre.

The translator is to be warmly praised for his able work and the publishers thanked for thus making so valuable a work available to English readers.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

THE CHRISTIANITY OF IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH. Cyril Charles Richardson. New York: Columbia University Press. 1935. Pp. xii, 108. $2.00.

IGNATIUS, that doughty champion of what was proper and orderly, has been variously appraised during the centuries. What to Chrysostom appeared "a spirit . . . seething with divine love" led Gibbon to remark contemptuously: "The Epistles of Ignatius . . . breathe sentiments the most repugnant to the ordinary feelings of human nature." The question of the validity of the writings which bear his name—not only which of the three recensions is the earliest, but whether the letters in any form are really from his pen—has been discussed again and again. Doctor Richardson in this study, which he submitted to Union Theological Seminary as a dissertation for the doctorate in theology, has not attempted to rework that field where the laborers have not been few, but seeks to discuss Ignatius' view of religion, which problem has received far less attention. Although the treatment is very brief and at times jerky,

the little volume contains much of value. It is a pity that the notes are printed at the end. When will publishers cease that wretched emasculation of a book's usefulness?

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

INDIAN NATIONALISM AND THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGES. Paul J. Braisted, formerly Director of Religious Work, Judson College, Rangoon, Burma. New York: Association Press. 1935. Pp. xii, 171. $2.00.

THIS is an illuminating discussion of the phenomena associated with nationalistic aspirations in India, particularly subsequent to the World War. It describes the economic, social and political phases of the movement as well as the religious, indicating the development from the historical standpoint. But it is more than a description. The author has felt the pulse of India at first hand, and interprets with sympathy and discernment.

The second and third parts of the book are devoted to an analysis of the problems and tasks confronting Christian higher education in view of the nationalist developments. There is a fine statement of the purpose and objectives, and suggestions for redefinition. An important chapter is concerned with the bearing of the movement on the curriculum of the colleges, and on the necessity for adjustments in the light of evolving cultural movements. The whole discussion is in a fine temper, and deserves most serious consideration.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

PEACE AND THE PLAIN MAN. Norman Angell. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. xi, 334. $2.50.

IN recent years many books have come from the press describing the various plans and suggestions for world peace. Valuable as these volumes have been, the "plain man" has had neither the inclination nor the background to pursue a thoroughgoing study of them. Recognizing the wide-spread need for an understanding of the fundamental principles by which all peace plans must be judged, Sir Norman Angell has written with this objective in mind. When so much confused thinking prevails, even among the "educated," concerning the most elementary and most vital aspects of the problem of peace, there is need for such a book as this.

Every minister ought to digest its contents, and, if possible, use it as the basis of study for a "Peace Group." When the Christian Church begins to acquaint its people with such information as is contained in this book, the public mind will undergo marked changes in its attitude toward world peace.

JOSEPH J. HANSON.

GOD IN THESE TIMES. Henry P. Van Dusen, Associate Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1935. Pp. xv, 194. $2.00.

THE task which the author sets himself in the present volume is to interpret the influence and activity of God "in these times." That involves a recognition of what God is actually doing as well as what to most men is more palpable. The book seeks to inspire a larger recognition in the mind of the day, a greater realization of the sense of dependence. There are two main questions considered, viz.: the Christian message of the living God for today, and the message for the crisis through

which society is passing today. Two appended notes deal with the Christian attitudes toward communism and toward compromise.

Perhaps the most gripping part of the book is that in which Professor Van Dusen attempts a Christian philosophy of history which he takes to be the heart of the Church's social message. The thought is that the development of history is in accord with the plan of God. The ultimate outcome of history is within God's control, and the direction of its development is determined by moral forces. It is through this understanding of how God operates in history that the church must appreciate "the only ways by which social ills can be soundly and permanently rectified."

A. Stewart Woodburne.

Christ the Victorious. Geoffrey Allen, Fellow and Chaplain of Lincoln College, Oxford. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. ix, 330. $1.90.

This volume treats of great religious themes in a striking and convincing way and with a wideness of view and breadth of sympathy which make the author's messages exceedingly helpful. He recognizes the fact that "in the realm of religion feeling is apt to run high, and for that reason blind prejudice is also apt to run high," and emphasizes the need of a more radical realization that "God is lord of truth and fact."

While the theological positions of the writer are evidently conservative, he is most liberal in his insistence upon the application of scientific principles to the study of the Bible and of religious ideas generally. He urges that we should be like the great scientists "who continually let facts defeat their theories rather than let theory prejudice their knowledge of fact." His practical common sense is evident in what he says concerning freedom, labor, the tension between centralized government and individual liberty, a reunited church, and other important subjects.

While Mr. Allen is associated with the "Group Movement" and is one of its best-known English exponents, he is not a blind partisan to it. He calls attention to the "grave dangers of abuse in the doctrine and practice of intuitional guidance," and in the matter of "sharing" insists that love should become "the one motive which determines our silence and our speech."

The reading of this book was one of the enjoyable experiences of a brief vacation at the seashore. Its pages added much to the spiritual value of the holiday. Like the ocean, its horizons are wide, its currents deep, and its breezes invigorating. It is a noteworthy addition to the great body of literature which has as its object the bringing of the individual to "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

Rittenhouse Neisser.

The Fact of the Christian Church. P. Carnegie Simpson. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1935. Pp. 191. $1.75.

Doctor Simpson made us all his debtors when he wrote *The Fact of Christ.* Later came *The Facts of Life,* really a sequel to the earlier volume. And it is with Christ as the central fact that he begins the book before us, as is clear when we read: "The Christian Church took its rise, not through the promulgation of a theological or the propagation of an ecclesiastical system, but from something essentially personal. It took its rise—this is a matter not of religious faith, but of historical fact—from the impression which Jesus Christ made upon certain of his contemporaries. And

this, which was the initial impulse of the Church's existence, has proved permanent in its life."

This "initial impulse has passed like a holy contagion across the centuries making of the Church a continuous life"—the theme of Chapter I. Moreover, in the personal relationship to Christ, causative of such an initial and continuing impulse, the gospel is revealed—truth about God, and saving power of God, both of which come to light in "the fact of Christ." And this gives us "the religion of the evangel"—the theme of Chapter II.

In the chapters which follow, the author discusses with rare insight the outworking of a vital, personal, saving relationship to Christ. "Gospel in Word and Sacrament" is not merely what we do, but also what the Lord does through these—perhaps a corrective for the thinking of pure symbolism. "The Development of Doctrine" is a product of the fact of a continuously creative relationship to the living Christ. He is central and dynamic in the process. "Elements of Order and Unity" and "The Evangel and Civilization" are the concluding chapters, the latter being finely climactic and prophetic.

William R. McNutt.

What Did Jesus Think? Studies in the Mind of Christ. Stanley Brown-Serman and Harold Adye Prichard. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. ix, 287. $2.50.

In this book a professor and a preacher have joined forces in the difficult task of understanding the mind of Jesus. They have attempted to trace the steps that led Jesus to become conscious of "complete and matured oneness with the Father." Their method is frankly modern: they confine themselves largely to the synoptic tradition; their approach is critical and historical; they repudiate outworn three-dimensional conceptions and appeal to the new quantum theory of uncaused progress, yet they arrive at conclusions acceptable to the confirmed traditionalist. The reader can scarcely avoid the conviction that they have discovered in the mind of Jesus much of what they have been thinking as well as what he really thought.

The literary style is excellent throughout, with frequent passages of unusual beauty, such as are found, for example, in the chapter on "Jesus and the Father." The Religious Book Club made a good selection when it chose this volume as one deserving its recommendation.

Rittenhouse Neisser.

Finding the Way: Jesus Answers the Questions of a Frightened World Today. Robert Harris Gearhart, Jr. New York: Association Press. 1935. Pp. 141. Cloth, $1.75; paper, $1.00.

The author has been minister to Lutheran students in the metropolitan area of Philadelphia for the past thirteen years, during which he has had close contact with the students of fourteen schools of higher learning, including Princeton, Temple, and the University of Pennsylvania. His book has been written to answer the question of many of those who make up the student world: "Is there a way out of the confusion in thought and life which is so wide-spread today?" He points the way out by presenting Jesus as the solution of mankind's pressing personal and social problems.

The world in which Jesus lived, and with which he was acquainted, is described as being similar almost in detail to the world of today. Jesus faced its problems

with a six-point program announced in the synagogue at Nazareth. With this program as a basis the writer discusses the essentials for a new world order, the importance of proper attitudes in the desire-areas of life, sin and its consequences, the unique personality of Jesus, the service he has rendered for the salvation of men, and other vital topics.

The book is well written and holds the interest of the reader throughout. It is evangelistic in its constant and fervent pressing of the question of the personal relationship of the reader to the ideals presented.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

SOCIAL CHANGES DURING DEPRESSION AND RECOVERY. Edited by William F. Ogburn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1935. Pp. v, 118. $1.00.

EACH year the May number of *The American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to a discussion of social changes transpiring in the preceding year. The present issue contains fourteen articles touching as many phases of our common life. The reader cannot fail to notice the thoroughgoing influence of the economic factor on every social institution and trend in the United States. The depression has brought its disheartening toll in ill-health, family difficulties, curtailed public education and community disorganization. In the closing article the editor presents forty-one charts tracing "depression and recovery" evidences in a wide range of economic and social activities. These are particularly revealing to the student of contemporary conditions. As far as business indices are involved, there has been a slight change for the better since early in 1933. As for social and cultural interests, there has been as yet no corresponding change in trend.

STEWART G. COLE.

THE GODS IN PLAIN GARB. A Study in Psychology. Emil Humble. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1935. Pp. x, 314. $3.00.

THE author is a self-styled psychologist who has been exploring ideas in religion, science and philosophy for many years. In this book he attempts to show that all scholarship is divided into three schools. There are those who explain reality in terms of matter; those who choose deities to account for it; and those who find the key to metaphysics in mind. The author lays claim to Plato as his guide and suggests the third alternative. Without regard for historical method or a critical understanding of various theories of physics, medicine, chemistry, mysticism and theology, he estimates them all in terms of his standard of truth and finds them wanting. "The science of right thinking" is then presented, which, if universally adopted, would be a solvent for all our human ills.

STEWART G. COLE.

THE EARLY PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE. Matthew Thompson McClure, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, The University of Illinois. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc. 1935. Pp. viii, 218. $2.25.

THIS is not just another book on a familiar theme. The author in a brief, comprehensive and suggestive chapter makes "the Pre-History of the Greeks" a living reality. This chapter is followed by three which treat "Early Beliefs about the Soul," "Early Beliefs about the World," "Early Beliefs about Nature." These

are thoroughgoing and exhaustive discussions about the subject-matter of early Greek reflection.

The interpretation is based on translation of the source material, so the reader comes in touch with the thinkers whom the author is introducing. Familiar names acquire new significance, when the translation of fragments and selected doxographical material of the passages quoted from Plato and Aristotle, makes it possible to hear the voices of the eleven early philosophers, from Thales to Democritus. The author's historical introduction to early philosophers is as brief as that of a radio announcer, but sufficient for the purpose, and shows his intimacy with the philosopher who delivers the message.

A chronological table and an exhaustive index add to the value of the book. The book gives information and pleasure.

MILTON G. EVANS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. Issued by the Office of the Secretary of the Association. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America. 1935. Pp. 183. $1.50.

THE general theme for discussion at this meeting was *Philosophy of Religion.* This volume of proceedings contains penetrating round-table discussions on "Philosophy of Mind," "History of Mediæval Philosophy," "Ethics," and "The Teaching of Philosophy." The presidential address by Francis A. Walsh, of the Catholic University of America, is a wholesome affirmation of Christian theism. He makes suggestive remarks on contemporary philosophers, for example, William James, Royce, Bertrand Russell, Henri Bergson, Whitehead, Montague, and Dewey. His subject is "The Defect of Philosophy in Religious Experience." There are other contributions that merit reading.

MILTON G. EVANS.

THE NEW TESTAMENT: Vol. I, The Gospels according to St. Matthew and St. Mark. Edited by M. R. James, O. M., Litt. D., D. C. L. (Hon.). New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc. 1935. Pp. viii, 165. $2.00.

THE King James Version still continues to be "the Bible" to by far the majority of English readers. In the series, of which the present volume is the first, Doctor James prints the text of this version without alterations, save that all chapters and verse notations are omitted, the material is arranged in paragraphs, and the punctuation is modernized. At the top of each page is an indication of the contents of that page. Twenty-one pages of notes at the end of the volume enable the reader to make "such changes of the text, and such only, as are judged, in the light of new knowledge, to make an appreciable difference in the sense of the wording." These changes are so skilfully done that little or no loss of cadence and beauty is felt. The physical appearance of the volume, with its clear and pleasing type, two engravings by Eric Gill, and maps of Palestine on the inside of the front and back covers, fulfils the aim of the editor "to combine beauty of form with ease of use." Three companion volumes will eventually complete the series.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

LEADERSHIP IN GROUP WORK. Henry M. Busch. New York: Association Press. 1934. Pp. vi, 305. $2.25.

IT is unfortunate that there is nothing particularly inspiring about the title to this book. For the majority of people who ought to acquaint themselves with its prin-

ciples, the phrase "leadership in group work" means little or nothing. And yet ministers, church school teachers, scout-masters, and the like are (or should be) group workers. They are expected to direct age, sex and activity groups in programs that are conducive to personal enjoyment and the personal enrichment of life.

Although this type of leadership has been active for centuries, technical training in the skills of group leadership is a very recent venture. It has received its chief stimulus and marked its most rewarding achievements in non-ecclesiastical organizations. Yet one cannot read Professor Busch's book without feeling that he is dealing with a subject that is basically religious. Some day churchmen will evaluate their services by the yardstick of pedagogical principles as well as by that of theological loyalties. Through the instrumentality of this text they may secure an admirable introduction to the factors that should undergird their endeavor. The author has drawn upon a wide range of literature in the presentation of his theme and documented each stage in his procedure with great care. Although appreciative of the best values inherent in pre-democratic and unscientific types of group work, he presents a strictly liberal approach to his subject. Of particular merit is a brief summary of his thought appended to each chapter in the volume.

STEWART G. COLE.

DEEP DARK RIVER. Robert Rylee. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc. 1935. Pp. 308. $2.50.

THIS is a novel that portrays vividly and yet beautifully the life and character of a Southern Negro. It is full of pathos, and is a moving picture of the suffering of the Negro. It has been characterized most fittingly as a modern *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* The story is not only captivating as a story, but is an arresting appeal for a greater understanding of the Negro and for social justice.

A. S. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

A GREEK PAPYRUS READER. Edgar J. Goodspeed and Ernest Cadman Colwell. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 1935. Pp. 108. $1.50.

NATURE, MAN AND GOD. William Temple. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. xxxii, 530. $6.00.

ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION. E. D. Zinninger. Los Angeles, Calif.: Wetzel Publishing Company. Pp. 372.

BOY DAYS AND BOY WAYS. Frank H. Cheley. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1935. Pp. 185. $1.00.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. William Ryburn.. London and New York: The Oxford University Press. 1935. Pp. 260. $2.50.

SOCIALIST FUNDAMENTALS. David P. Berenberg. New York: Rand School Press. Pp. 117. 35 cents.

THE FINE ART OF SOUL WINNING. William Wistar Hamilton. Nashville, Tenn.: Baptist Sunday School Board. 1935. Pp. 109. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

Baptist Student Union Methods. Frank H. Leavell. Nashville, Tenn.; Baptist Sunday School Board. 1935. Pp. 159. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

From the Pyramids to Paul. Lewis Gaston Leary. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1935. Pp. xi, 306. $3.00.

The Crow Indians. Robert H. Lowie. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc. 1935. Pp. xxii, 350. $4.00.

The Chinese Term Question. George O. Lillegard. Shanghai, China: The Christian Book Room. 1935. Pp. 43. 15 cents.

Snowden's Sunday School Lessons, 1936. James H. Snowden. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. xxiii, 382. $1.35.

The Romance of Hassidism. Jacob S. Minkin. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. viii, 398. $3.50.

Science and Religion. N. Bishop Harman. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. 174. $1.50.

The Ancient World. T. R. Glover. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1935. Pp. 388. $2.50.

Throne Rooms. Gaius Glenn Atkins. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 113. $1.00.

The Victory of Faith. George Craig Stewart. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 121. $1.00.

The Future Life. F. A. M. Spencer. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. 320. $3.00.

History and Interpretation in the Gospels. R. H. Lightfoot. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1935. Pp. xvii, 236. $3.00.

Studies in Ephesians. E. Y. Mullins. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 144. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

Studies in Colossians. E. Y. Mullins. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 118. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

The Holy Spirit. W. T. Rouse. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 230. $1.00.

Creative Learning. J. M. Price and J. L. Corzine. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 268. 75 cents.

The Bible and the Bible School. J. B. Weathersoon and G. S. Dobbins. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 280. 75 cents.

Making the World Christian. P. E. Burroughs, Arthur J. Brown and John D. Freeman. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 333. 75 cents.

Old Testament Biographies. H. W. Tribble, John L. Hill and Kyle M. Yates. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 332. 75 cents.

Southern Baptist Handbook. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 442. 50 cents.

Stop-Light. William Louis Poteat. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press. 1935. Pp. 91. 75 cents.

INDEX

Baptist State
R. E. E. Harkness, 274
Barthian Ethics
A. C. Knudson, 331
Book Notices, 107, 221, 317
Book Reviews
Albaugh: Between Two Centuries, 399
Allen: Christ the Victorious, 407
American Sociological Society: Racial Contacts and Social Research, 108
Andrews, C. F.: Sadhu Sundar Singh, 196
Andrews, M. E.: Ethical Teaching of Paul, 95
Angell: Peace and the Plain Man, 406
Archer: Faiths Men Live By, 220
Austin: Ethics of the Cambridge Platonists, 310
Bainton: Bibliography of Continental Reformation, 318
Barker: Lay Leadership in Protestant Churches, 109
Barton: Christ and Evolution, 305
Bastide: Mystical Life, 397
Bell, B. I.: Preface to Religion, 302
Bell, W. C.: If a Man Die, 215
Bennett: Social Salvation, 394
Bergson: Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 314
Boodin: God, 192
Bowen: Divine White Right, 201
Braisted: Indian Nationalism and Christian Colleges, 406
Brinton: Religious Solution to Social Problem, 222
Brown-Serman and Prichard: What Did Jesus Think? 408
Brown, W. A.: Church, Catholic and Protestant, 315
Brunner: The Mediator, 216
Buck: Christianity Tested, 97
Bultmann and Kundsin: Form Criticism, 210
Busch: Leadership in Group Work, 410
Calhoun: God and the Common Life, 402
Campbell: Blessing of Believing, 315.
Canby: Age of Confidence, 206
Case: Makers of Christianity, 88
Catholic Philosophical Association: Proceedings, 410
Cell: Rediscovery of John Wesley, 303
Clark: Indian Conceptions of Immortality, 200
Clinchy: All in the Name of God, 313
Cole: Leisure in Our Time, 221
Collier: Cosmogonies, 218
Curry: Speaking of Religion, 296
Dalman: Sacred Sites and Ways, 405
Dana: A Neglected Predicate in New Testament Criticism, 105
Davis: Capitalism and Its Culture, 310
Dawson: Mediæval Religion, 91
Dewey: A Common Faith, 92
Dickerson: Growing Into Manhood, 208
Dillingham: Making Religious Education Effective, 395
Douglass: Church Unity Movement, 103
Douglass and Brunner: Protestant Church as a Social Institution, 297
Duncan: Galatians, 212
Dunn: Thomas Aquinas, 304
Eastman and Wilson: Drama in the Church, 223
Easton: Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus, 90
Book Reviews (Cont.)
Eddy: Pilgrimage of Ideas, 109
Fairchild: Toward Belief, 298
Fleg: Jesus, 212
Franzblau: Religious Belief Among Jewish Adolescents, 301
Gearhart: Finding the Way, 408
Gilkey: You Can Master Life, 101
Glover and Dewey: Children of the New Day, 101
Godbey: Ancient Oriental History, 89
Goodspeed: Story of Old Testament, 221
Gowen: History of Religion, 85
Graham: Prophets and Israel's Culture, 202
Greene and Hudson: Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason, 91
Gregg: New Relationships with Jews and Catholics, 303
Haines: Living With Books, 403
Haldane: Philosophy of a Biologist, 299
Hall and Watkins: Cooperation, 400
Hallenbeck; Urban Organization of Protestantism, 306
Hart: Education for an Age of Power, 402
Haydon: Modern Trends in World Religions, 199
Hecker: Religion and Communism, 311
Hedley: Christian Year, 221
Helser: Education of Primitive People, 87
Hodgson: Radio Talks on Religion, 100
Hook: The Meaning of Marx, 205
Horton, D.: Taking a City, 110
Horton, W. M.: Realistic Theology, 191
Houf: What Religion Is and Does, 404
Humble: Gods in Plain Garb, 409
Hutchinson: One Light Burning, 303
Hutton: Finally—With Paul to the End, 393
India League: Condition of India, 200
Jacks: Elemental Religion, 108
James, F., *et alii:* Beginnings of Our Religion, 400
James, M. R.: The New Testament, 410
Johnson: Church and Society, 296
Johnson: Economics and Good Life, 217
Jones: Christ's Alternative to Communism, 398
Jordan: Faith that Propels, 209
Kadushin: Theology of Seder Eliahu, 89
Kagawa: Christ and Japan, 203
Keller: Religion and Revolution, 98
Kisch: Changing Asia, 204
Kurtz: Public Welfare Plan, 317
Lamont: Christ and World of Thought, 308
Landis: Must the Nation Plan? 103
Larsen: Religion and Relations, 210
Levinthal: Judaism, 316
Lewis: Christian Manifesto, 306
Lichtenstein: Judaism, 85
Liveright: Poor Relief Administration, 318
Macfarland: Chaos in Mexico, 395
Macnicol: Religions of Indian People, 214
McClure: Early Philosophers of Greece, 409
McGiffert: Christianity as History and Faith, 192
McNutt: Polity and Practice in Baptist Churches, 396
Mathews, B.: Forerunners of a New Age, 216
Mathews, S.: Creative Christianity, 403
Mathews, S.: Christianity and Social Process, 312
Matthews, I. G.: Old Testament Life and Literature, 84

Book Reviews (Cont.)
Matthews, W. R.: God and this Troubled World, 401
Mead: Mind, Self and Society, 203
Mecklin: Story of American Dissent, 196
Meland: Modern Man's Worship, 102
Miller: Practice of Public Prayer, 105
Moffatt: His Gifts and Promises, 96
Montgomery: Arabia and the Bible, 83
More: Sceptical Approach to Religion, 93
Morse: Toward a Christian America, 313
Murray and Tagore: East and West, 317
Neal and Foster: Vitalism and Mechanism, 108
Oesterley and Robinson: Introduction to Books of Old Testament, 85
Ogburn: Social Changes During Depression and Recovery, 409
Page: Living Triumphantly, 199
Peace Year-Book, 317
Pegis: Saint Thomas, 304
Perkins: Others Call It God, 94
Petty: Evening Altar, 215
Petty: Today's Jesus, 110
Poteat: Jesus and the Liberal Mind, 191
Poteat: Rev. John Doe, D. D., 398
Powell: Education for Life with God, 218
Price: Ancestry of English Bible, 194
Pyarelal: Epic Fast (Gandhi), 221
Queen, Bodenhofer and Harper: Social Organization and Disorganization, 301
Rawlinson: Chinese Ethical Ideals, 86
Read: Younger Churchmen Look at Church, 300
Redwood: Kingdom Come, 108
Richardson: Christianity of Ignatius, 405
Richmond: Sex Education, 208
Roberts: That Strange Man Upon His Cross, 95
Robinson: Political Ethics, 399
Rohrbaugh: Natural Approach to Philosophy, 220
Ropes: Synoptic Gospels, 104
Rylee: Deep Dark River, 411
Saunders: Ideals of East and West, 83
Scott: Church and World, 304
Scripps College Papers: Meaning of God in Modern Life, 93
Shedd: Student Christian Movements, 206
Simpson: Fact of Christian Church, 407
Smith, H. G. W.: Pastor at Work in Christian Education, 299
Smith, T. V.: Philosophers Speak for Themselves, 194
Smithson: Anabaptists, 305
Speer: Christian Realities, 313
Spencer: Beyond Damascus, 96
Stabler: Without Compromise, 209
Symposium: Christianity and Marxism, 222
Thomas: Human Exploitation, 207
Thorndike: History of Magic and Experimental Science, 198
Tindall: John Bunyan, 195
Tweed: Destiny's Man, 213
Van Dusen: God in These Times, 406
Wallace, H. A.: New Frontiers, 103
Wallace, O. C. S.: What Baptists Believe, 204
Wallis: God and Social Process, 202
Ward: Values and Reality, 309
Weatherhead: How Can I Find God? 208
Webb: Kingdom Within, 219
Weber: Year-Book of American Churches, 318
Weston and Harlow: Social and Religious Problems, 300
Book Reviews (Cont.)
Wicks: Reasons for Living, 100
Wood: Beatitudes for the Family, 318
Wood: Foundations of Happiness, 318
Wright, T. H.: Deadly Sins and Living Virtues, 207
Wright, W. K.: Student's Philosophy of Religion, 193
Yarros: Modern Woman and Sex, 208
Younghusband: Modern Mystics, 397
Zeitlin: Maimonides, 312
Braden, Charles S.
Humanist Conception of Salvation, 378
Bradley, W. P.
Transfiguration—Credential or Answer? 57
Braisted, Paul J.
Book Review
Currey: Speaking of Religion, 296
Briggs, George W.
Yoga, 236
Brightman, Edgar S.
Hegel's Influence in the Contemporary Social Situation, 47

China, Reconstruction in
Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, 113
Christmas Sermon
George F. Finnie, 185
Clinical Training of Theological Students
R. L. Dicks, 77
Cole, Stewart G.
Book Reviews
Bastide: Mystical Life, 397
Busch: Leadership in Group Work, 410
Canby: Age of Confidence, 206
Dickerson: Growing Into Manhood, 208
Dillingham: Making Religious Education Effective, 395
Douglass and Brunner: Protestant Church as a Social Institution, 297
Franzblau: Religious Belief Among Jewish Adolescents, 301
Glover and Dewey: Children of New Day, 101
Gregg: New Relationships With Jews and Catholics, 303
Hallenbeck: Urban Organization of Protestantism, 306
Hart: Education for an Age of Power, 402
Helser: Education of Primitive People, 87
Humble: Gods in Plain Garb, 409
Johnson: Church and Society, 296
Ogburn: Social Changes, 409
Perkins: Others Call It God, 94
Powell: Education for Life With God, 218
Queen, Bodenhofer and Harper: Social Organization and Disorganization, 301
Read: Younger Churchmen Look at Church, 300
Richmond: Sex Education, 208
Smith: Pastor at Work in Christian Education, 299
Weston and Harlow: Social and Religious Problems, 300
Yarros: Modern Woman and Sex, 208
Leisure-Time Programming, 163
Commonwealth Based on Personality
F. B. Igler, 225
Cowell, Henry J.
Edict of Nantes, 387
Cranford, C. W.
Book Reviews
Brunner: The Mediator, 216
Weatherhead: How Can I Find God? 208

Death—Destroying the Last Enemy
R. Neisser, 177
Dibelius, Martin
Gethsemane, 254
Dicks, Russell L.
Clinical Training of Theological Students, 77

Editorial Notes, 390
Enslin, Morton S.
Book Reviews
Andrews: Ethical Teaching of Paul, 95
Bultmann: Form Criticism, 210
Dalman: Sacred Sites and Ways, 405
Duncan: Galatians, 212
Easton: Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus, 90
James, *et alii:* Beginnings of Our Religion, 400
James: The New Testament, 410
Hutton: Finally—With Paul, 393
Richardson: Christianity of Ignatius, 405
Ropes: Synoptic Gospels, 104
Spencer: Beyond Damascus, 96
Evans, David J.
Book Review
Barton: Christ and Evolution, 305
Evans, Milton G.
Book Reviews
Catholic Philosophical Association: Proceedings, 410
Collier: Cosmogonies, 218
Houf: What Religion Is and Does, 404
McClure: Early Philosophers of Greece, 409
Miller: Practice of Public Prayer, 105
Robinson: Political Ethics, 399
Rohrbaugh: Natural Approach to Philosophy, 220
Ward: Values and Reality, 309
Induction Address, 12
Eyster, William H.
A Scientist Looks at Life, 152

Finnie, George F.
Book Review
Lewis: Christian Manifesto, 306
In the Days of Herod the King, 185
Franklin, James H.
Book Reviews
Buck: Christianity Tested, 97
Jones: Christ's Alternative to Communism, 398
Mathews: Christianity and Social Process, 312
Poteat: Rev. John Doe, D. D., 398
Roberts: That Strange Man Upon His Cross, 95
Speer: Christian Realities, 313
Toward a Fresh Awareness of God, 17

Gethsemane
Martin Dibelius, 254

Hanson, Joseph J.
Book Reviews
Angell: Peace and the Plain Man, 406
Clinchy: All in the Name of God, 313
Hanson, Olive W.
Book Review
Kagawa: Christ and Japan, 203
Harkness, Reuben E. E.
Baptist State, 274
Book Reviews
Archer: Faiths Men Live By, 220
Case: Makers of Christianity, 88
Cell: Rediscovery of John Wesley, 303
Book Reviews (Cont.)
Dawson: Mediæval Religion, 91
Dunn: Thomas Aquinas, 304
Hodgson: Radio Talks on Religion, 100
Keller: Religion and Revolution, 98
Macfarland: Chaos in Mexico, 395
McGiffert: Christianity as History and Faith, 192
Mathews: Creative Christianity, 403
Mecklin: Story of American Dissent, 196
Pegis: Saint Thomas, 304
Scott: Church and World, 304
Smithson: Anabaptists, 305
Tindall: John Bunyan, 195
Wallace: What Baptists Believe, 204
Hegel's Influence in the Contemporary Social Situation
E. S. Brightman, 47
Horsman, Oliver C.
Should America Go to War? 357
Humanist Conception of Salvation
C. S. Braden, 378

Igler, Frederick B.
Book Review
Hook: The Meaning of Marx, 205
Commonwealth Based on Personality, 225
Immortality: Moral Argument
F. Tracy, 142
Induction Address
M. G. Evans, 12

Japanese Mind, Religion in
C. H. Sears, 29
Jones, Frederick L.
Shelley and Christianity, 266

Keighton, Robert E.
Book Reviews
Fleg: Jesus, 212
Haines: Living with Books, 403
Tweed: Destiny's Man, 213
Kiang, W. H.
Book Review
Rawlinson: Chinese Ethical Ideals, 86
Knudson, Albert C.
Barthian Ethics, 331

Leisure-Time Programming
S. G. Cole, 163
Lewis, Frank G.
Book Reviews
Landis: Must the Nation Plan? 103
Price: Ancestry of English Bible, 194
Thorndike: History of Magic, 198
Lewis, W. O.
Lesson of Münster, 348
Link, John R.
Book Review
Dana: A Neglected Predicate in New Testament, 105
Lyman, Eugene W.
Naturalism, Ethics and Theology, 321

MacDonald, George
Book Review
Horton: Taking a City, 110
McNutt, William R.
Book Reviews
Bell: If a Man Die, 215
Brown: Church, Catholic and Protestant, 315
Campbell: Blessing of Believing, 315
Douglass: Church Unity Movements, 103

Book Reviews (Cont.)
Meland: Modern Man's Worship, 102
Morse: Toward a Christian America, 313
Petty: Evening Altar, 215
Petty: Today's Jesus, 110.
Shedd: Student Christian Movements, 206
Simpson: Fact of Christian Church, 407
Wright: Deadly Sins and Living Virtues, 207
Younghusband: Modern Mystics, 397
Matthews, I. G.
Book Reviews
Godbey: Ancient Oriental History, 89
Graham: Prophets and Israel's Culture, 202
Kadushin: Theology of Seder Eliahu, 89
Levinthal: Judaism, 316
Lichtenstein: Judaism, 85
Montgomery: Arabia and the Bible, 83
Wallis: God and the Social Process, 202
Zeitlin: Maimonides, 312
Messianic Hope, An Episode in, 39
Montgomery, James A.
Book Review
Matthews: Old Testament Life and Literature, 84
Moore, John Milton
Great Time for Preacher, 364
Münster, Lesson of
W. O. Lewis, 348

Nantes, Edict of
Henry J. Cowell, 387
Naturalism, Ethics and Theology
E. W. Lyman, 321
Neisser, Rittenhouse
Book Reviews
Allen: Christ the Victorious, 407
Bell: Preface to Religion, 302
Brown-Serman and Prichard: What Did Jesus Think? 408
Fairchild: Toward Belief, 298
Gearhart: Finding the Way, 408
Gilkey: You Can Master Life, 101
Jordan: Faith that Propels, 209
Lamont: Christ and World of Thought, 308
Larsen: Religion and Relations, 210
Moffatt: His Gifts and Promises, 96
Page: Living Triumphantly, 199
Stabler: Without Compromise, 209
Wicks: Reason for Living, 100
Destroying the Last Enemy, 177

Perkins, Marion O.
Book Reviews
Andrews: Sadhu Sundar Singh, 196
Kisch: Changing Asia, 204
Petty, Orville A.
Religion and Nationalism, 290
Preacher, Great Time for
J. M. Moore, 364

Rainey, Homer P.
Training for Christian Leadership, 3
Religion and Nationalism
O. A. Petty, 290
Robins, Henry B.
Book Review
Saunders: Ideals of East and West, 83

Scientist Looks at Life
W. H. Eyster, 152
Sears, Charles H.
Religion in Japanese Mind, 29
Shelley and Christianity
F. L. Jones, 266
Social Gospel
D. V. Steere, 128
Steere, Douglas V.
Is the Social Gospel Adequate? 128
Sze, Sao-Ke Alfred
Reconstruction in China, 113

Thomas, John W.
Book Review
Webb: Kingdom Within, 219
Toward a Fresh Awareness of God
J. H. Franklin, 17
Tracy, Frederick
Immortality: Moral Argument, 142
Training for Christian Leadership
H. P. Rainey, 3
Transfiguration—Credential, or Answer?
W. P. Bradley, 57
Tumbelston, Robert T.
Book Review
McNutt: Polity and Practice in Baptist Churches, 398

War? Should America Go to
O. C. Horsman, 357
Woodburne, A. Stewart
Book Reviews
Albaugh: Between Two Centuries, 399
Austin: Ethics of the Cambridge Platonists, 310
Bennett: Social Salvation, 394
Bergson: Sources of Morality and Religion, 314
Boodin: God, 192
Braisted: Indian Nationalism, 406
Calhoun: God and the Common Life, 402
Clark: Indian Conceptions of Immortality, 200
Davis: Capitalism and Its Culture, 310
Dewey: A Common Faith, 92
Gowen: History of Religion, 85
Greene and Hudson: Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason, 91
Hall and Watkins: Cooperation, 400
Haldane: Philosophy of a Biologist, 299
Haydon: Modern Trends in World Religions, 199
Hecker: Religion and Communism, 311
Horton: Realistic Theology, 191
India League: Conditions of India, 200
Johnson: Economics and Good Life, 217
Macnicol: Religions of India, 214
Mathews: Forerunners of a New Age, 216
Matthews: God and this Troubled World, 401
Mead: Mind, Self and Society, 203
More: Sceptical Approach to Religion, 93
Poteat: Jesus and Liberal Mind, 191
Scripps College Papers: Meaning of God in Modern Life, 93
Smith: Philosophers Speak for Themselves, 194
Thomas: Human Exploitation, 207
Van Dusen: God in These Times, 406
Wallace: New Frontiers, 103
Wright: A Student's Philosophy of Religion, 193
Timely and Timeless, 390
Woodburne, Patricia
Book Review
Hutchinson: One Light Burning, 303

Yoga
G. W. Briggs, 236
Young, George W.
Book Review
Bowen: Divine White Right, 201